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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation analyses selected issues that undermine the coherence and the 
purposes of the Swiss and New Zealand accident compensation schemes. Unlike other 
European states the Swiss accident compensation provides cover for non-work related 
accidental injury, which makes it a useful subject of comparison with the New Zealand 
accident compensation scheme which provides a comprehensive, no fault compensation 
scheme for personal injury. In undertaking a largely comparative approach the paper 
argues that both schemes have drifted away considerably from the original underlying 
purpose to provide compensation for work incapacity and, on the other hand, to restore 
the claimant to a level of work capacity as soon as possible. This thesis is illustrated by 
examining the vulnerability of the schemes to political change, the arbitrary dichotomy 
between incapacity to work caused by accidental injury and incapacity caused by 
sickness, the definitions of an accident in both schemes and the assessment of evidence. 
The paper finds that both schemes should be amended and suggests alternative 
approaches for each issue.  
 
 
 
 
STATEMENT ON WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, table of cases, 
bibliography, materials, and footnotes) comprises approximately 33,450 words. 
 
 
TOPICS 
Swiss and New Zealand accident compensation – incoherence – legal framework – 
dichotomy between accident and sickness – evidence  
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
 Accident compensation is one of the major parts of the social security schemes 
in New Zealand and Switzerland. Even if the schemes have different roots and have 
emerged from different political backgrounds, they share the same underlying purposes; 
to provide cover compensation for work incapacity caused by accidental injury and to 
restore the claimant to a level of work capacity as soon as possible. Unlike other 
European states the Swiss accident compensation provides cover for non-work related 
accidental injury. This characteristic makes the Swiss system a useful subject of 
comparison with the New Zealand accident compensation scheme which provides a 
comprehensive, no fault compensation scheme for personal injury. Both schemes 
provide a good basis for providing a level of social security. However, the current 
schemes as they are shaped today have drifted away considerably from the original 
underlying purpose, leading to arbitrariness and incoherence of the legal framework. In 
the New Zealand accident compensation scheme, such arbitrariness and inconsistency 
may be more the result of the legislative and political systems, whereas in the Swiss 
accident insurance scheme, jurisprudence plays the major role in creating these factors. 
 
The focus of this paper is to identify and explain selected issues in the New 
Zealand and Swiss accident compensation schemes on a thematic basis in order to 
increase understanding of both schemes and to make suggestions for improving the 
scope and limitations of both schemes. This analysis is more carried out in regard to the 
Swiss system as this paper argues that it has more limitations than the New Zealand 
system. Eventually this paper, in analysing selected issues about both systems, argues 
that certain identified limitations result in a level of legal incoherence, perhaps even 
legal insecurity which undermines the underlying purpose of both schemes. This thesis 
will be illustrated by selected issues with observations on both schemes. 
 
First, this paper will show that the New Zealand accident compensation scheme 
is much more vulnerable to political change than the Swiss accident insurance scheme. 
This vulnerability is largely due to the different political systems. Whereas the Swiss 
government is constituted of continuous balanced coalition of the major political 
parties, in New Zealand, the Prime Minister nominates the government. This difference 
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in political systems is reflected in the accident compensation schemes. The Swiss 
scheme has only undergone minor amendments over time, whereas the New Zealand 
scheme has been rewritten five times reflecting the ruling party’s ideology. It is 
suggested that a modern democracy should provide a stable social security policy by 
maintaining the core entitlements such as weekly compensation, medical expenses and 
a comprehensive rehabilitation plan for the injured person. It is certainly difficult to 
define those notions because law and politics are undeniably interrelated. However, this 
paper argues that these core components should not mirror the political ideology of the 
ruling party. Rather should the content of the core entitlements be defined, based on a 
consensus between the political parties in order to outlive a change of government.  
 
Second, this paper will demonstrate that both schemes are perpetuate an 
arbitrary dichotomy between incapacity caused by accidental injury and incapacity 
caused by sickness. Both schemes provide cover for specific occupational diseases 
within the accident compensation scheme, but not for non work-related diseases. 
However, the need of the claimant to cover the financial loss due to work incapacity is 
the same as for incapacity caused by accidental injury or incapacity caused by sickness. 
There is no logical reason for this distinction.1 
 
Third, the definitions of “accident” as a threshold for cover in both schemes will 
be analysed. The definitions of an accident and personal injury in the New Zealand 
scheme results in more legal security because significant weight is given to the medical 
report determining causation. In contrast, the question of causation tends to be a more 
legal than a medical question in Swiss law because jurisprudence has developed a two-
step test: There must be a natural and adequate causal connection. Whereas the natural 
causal connection will be decided on the basis of the medical report, the adequate 
causal connection is a purely legal question which gives the judge the discretion to even 
decide against the result of the medical report.2 In addition, the Swiss scheme has 
developed a primary (article 4 ATSG) and a secondary definition of an accident (article 
9 UVV) along with an often incoherent or inconsistent jurisprudence.  
                                                 
1  New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury Compensation 
for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Government 
Printer, Wellington, 1967) para 17 and 290 [Woodhouse Report]. 
2   Part VA 2(a). 
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Through selected examples of cases it will be shown that the requirement of 
what is known in the Swiss accident insurance scheme as the “unusual factor” in the 
definition of an accident (article 4 ATSG) is an arbitrary criterion that has been 
inconsistently interpreted and applied by Swiss courts. This criterion sets the bar for 
granting cover too high, and, therefore, should be repealed. 
 
Fourthly, what is termed “the maxim of the declarations of the first hour” in 
Swiss law also imposes an unjustified burden upon the claimant in the Swiss accident 
insurance scheme. This requirement, which holds that the statements made by the 
claimant in the first hour after the accident must be given more weight than subsequent 
statements, is completely unknown in the New Zealand accident compensation scheme. 
On the one hand, the spontaneous declarations of the first hour might be more unbiased 
and reliable than later descriptions, which might be, consciously or unconsciously, 
influenced by insurance law or other considerations. On the other hand, those 
declarations might not necessarily be the most truthful because very often it is very 
difficult to assess the precise sequence of events of an accident and its cause. Therefore, 
evidence should be considered based on the whole circumstances of the case instead of 
giving the declarations of the first hour a predominant weight to assess credibility of the 
insured person’s declarations.  
 
Both schemes were very innovative at the time of implementation, but should 
now be amended because both purposes of the schemes have been undermined. In the 
Swiss accident insurance scheme, the driving forces for this development are seen more 
in the incoherent jurisprudence as a consequence of the difficulty to amend current 
legislation within a short time. The New Zealand accident compensation scheme’s 
jurisprudence is on the whole seen as more coherent. However, the inconsistency of the 
legal framework of the New Zealand scheme can be seen in the political system 
allowing the legislature the possibility of substantially redesigning the scheme at each 
change of government. 
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II PURPOSE AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
A Purpose of both Accident Compensation Schemes 
 
The Swiss and New Zealand accident compensation schemes are both 
principally social insurance schemes providing compensation for loss of income as a 
consequence of an accident. They are both an answer to the inadequacies of the 
previous workers’ compensation legislation and mark a milestone in the development 
of modern social security. Without such schemes in place, the injured person would 
have to bear the economic consequences of the accident on his or her own and would 
be threatened by poverty as a consequence of work incapacity and, therefore, loss of 
income. Both schemes are built on similar underlying purposes of the prevention of 
accidents, rehabilitation of the injured person and compensation for loss of income in 
order to restore the person to health and gainful employment. Ideally, the schemes 
provide only short-term help in the form of medical expenses, social and vocational 
rehabilitation and compensation to bridge the gap until the injured person has regained 
work capacity and no longer needs the scheme in the long run.3  
 
 The aim of this section is to set out an overview of the purpose, principles and 
relevant sections of each scheme that will be discussed in this thesis. In order to 
demonstrate that these schemes fall short of their stated purposes, the enquiry will be 
limited to a few facets of both schemes. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine 
all the relevant areas where there may be inconsistency. The comparative approach 
taken in this paper aims at identifying advantages and limitations of both schemes in 
order to find options for improvements with the inspirations of the other scheme and 
finally the confirmation or disapproval of the efficiency and good functioning of one’s 
own scheme.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 2; Report of the Federal Council of 18 August 1976, 141. 
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1  Swiss accident insurance 
 
In Switzerland, private insurance played an important role in the development 
of the social security scheme.4 While the origins of fire and sea transport insurances can 
be traced to the Middle Ages, the broader development of private insurance started in 
the second half of the 19th century. The most important life insurance companies, 
whose task was very close to social security, such as providing cover for certain social 
risks, were founded between 1857 and 1895. The State soon showed interest in using 
private insurance companies to fulfil the increasing need of social security. The State 
recommended citizens take out insurance and partially subsidised the premium. 
Switzerland’s legislation regarding employment in factories was influenced by 
Chancellor Bismarck in Germany, who suggested a number of employment-based 
schemes in 1881 to cover income loss caused by work-related accidents, sickness, old 
age and disability.  
The purpose of the modern accident insurance scheme is stated under the 
heading “purpose” in article 6 of the Federal Act on Accident Insurance of 20 March 
1981 (UVG):  
 
Article 6  
(1) Entitlements for work-related accidents, non work-related accidents and occupational 
disease will be granted, if this act does not state otherwise.  
(2) The Federal Council can include personal injuries similar to an accident into the scope of the 
insurance.  
 
This general provision does not provide a lot of detail. Therefore, the structure 
of the Act and the reports of the Federal Council (Executive of the Swiss Government) 
must be taken into account. The purpose is visible from the structure and the headings 
of the Act: Titel 3 “Insurance entitlements” with sub-headings entitlements for medical 
care (article 10-14 UVG), monetary entitlements (Article 15 – 35 UVG) and prevention 
of accident (Article 81 – 88 UVG). The key provision for income compensation is set 
out in Article 16 UVG. 
                                                 
4  Gabriela Riemer-Kafka „Hintergründe des Solidaritätsgedankens bei den Sozialversicherungen“ 
(2007) 2 CHSS 61. 
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Furthermore, the purpose arises from the Report of the Federal Council on the 
Accident Insurance Act.  The underlying idea is to provide accident compensation in 
the form of a direct claim to accident insurance instead of a civil action against the 
liable person. The different types of entitlements such as income replacement (Article 
16 and 17 UVG), medical care including rehabilitation plans (Article 10-14 UVG) aim 
all at restoring the claimant’s work capacity.5  
 
At the time of the introduction of the compulsory accident insurance in 1918 the 
most urgent concern was for the liability of factory-based employers for the personal 
injuries suffered by their employees. The idea behind this concept was “insurance 
instead of liability”. The state would provide compulsory cover for employers and 
employees, even if this task was delegated to private insurance companies. Another 
characteristic was contributions by the insured persons, and also subsidies by the State.6  
Prior to the passage of this legislation factories were deemed to have a special liability. 
Not only was it difficult and time-consuming for an injured person in urgent need of 
entitlements to win a case against the employer, but this system also led to the 
bankruptcy of especially small- and medium-sized employers who faced large claims:7 
 
Bei der Einführung der obligatorischen Unfallversicherung war der Ersatz der Haftpflicht 
durch die Versicherung das dringendste Anliegen. Anstelle der oft unsicheren und 
prozessträchtigen Haftpflichtansprüche erhielt der verunfallte Arbeitnehmer einen 
Direktanspruch auf Leistungen der Unfallversicherung, als Gegenstück dazu wurde die 
spezielle Fabrikhaftpflicht aufgehoben und die allgemeine Verschuldenshaftung des 
Arbeitgebers eingeschränkt. 
 
English translation:[my translation] 
 
At the time of the introduction of the compulsory accident insurance the most urgent 
concern was for the liability of factory-based employers for the personal injuries suffered 
by their employees. It was often very difficult and time-consuming for the employee to 
win the case against the employer. Thus, the employee was given a direct claim to 
accident insurance. In return, the special liability of factories was repealed and the 
liability of employers limited. 
 
                                                 
5  Report of the Federal Council of 18 August 1976, 160; see also Report of the Federal Council of 10 
December 1906 on the Sickness and Insurance Act (KUVG), 16-17. In 1981, the part of the KUVG 
regarding accident insurance became an independent Act, the Accident Insurance Act (UVG). 
However, the purpose of accident insurance has not been changed. 
6  Erwin Murer Einfuehrung in das Bundes-Sozialversicherungsrecht (unter Ausschluss des Medizinal-
rechts) (Fribourg, 2008) 106-114; MP Olivier “The Concept of Social Security“ in M Olivier, N 
Smit and E R Kalula (Eds) Social Security: A Legal Analysis (Butterworths, 2003) 29. 
7  Report of the Federal Council of 18 August 1976, 160-161. 
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With the introduction of compulsory accident insurance in 1918 the special 
liability of factories was repealed and the liability of employers was limited in return 
for the availability of a direct claim to accident insurance.8  
 
 
2 New Zealand accident compensation 
 
The New Zealand scheme is much more clear and precise about the purpose and 
underlying principles of the accident compensation scheme. The scheme is based on the 
five principles elaborated by the “Woodhouse Commission” under the direction of High 
Court Judge Sir Own Woodhouse:9 
 
- Community responsibility 
- Comprehensive entitlement 
- Complete rehabilitation 
- Real compensation and  
- Administrative efficiency. 
 
The first principle of the New Zealand accident compensation scheme is 
community responsibility. It is fundamental and based on “the problem” triggering the 
scheme:10 
 
One hundred thousand workers are injured in industrial accidents every year. By good 
fortune most escape with minor incapacities, but many are left with grievous personal 
problems. Directly or indirectly the cost to the nation for work injuries alone now 
approaches $50 million annually. 
 
This is not all. The same work force must face the grave risks of the road and elsewhere 
during the rest of every 24 hours. Newspapers up and down the country every day contain a 
bleak record of casualties. 
 
The toll of personal injury is one of the disastrous incidents of social progress, and the 
statistically inevitable victims are entitled to receive a co-ordinated response from the 
nation as a whole. They receive this only from the health service. Fro financial relief they 
must turn to three entirely different remedies, and frequently they are aided by none. 
 
The negligence action is a form of lottery. In the case of industrial accidents it provides 
inconsistent solutions for less than one victim in every hundred. The Workers’ 
                                                 
8   For more details on the particular nature of the Swiss insurance system see Part II B. 
9   Woodhouse Report, above n 1. 
10  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 1. 
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Compensation Act provides meagre compensation for workers, but only if their injury 
occurred at their work. The Social Security Act will assist with the pressing needs of those 
who remain, provided they can meet the means test. All others are left to fend for 
themselves. 
 
Such a fragmented and capricious response to a social problem which cries out for co-
ordinated and comprehensive treatment cannot be good enough. No economic reason 
justifies it. It is a situation which needs to be changed. 
 
This crucial and most fundamental passage of the Woodhouse report explains 
that the vital principle of community responsibility for physical injuries is required due 
to the fact that modern society benefits from the productive work of its citizens. Injuries 
are a by-product of social progress. Against this background, society should accept 
responsibility for those willing to work but prevented from doing so by physical 
incapacity. As everybody participates in community activities which inevitably will 
result in a certain number of injured persons, the community should bear the inherent 
costs on the basis of equity. Because physical incapacity of workers has a negative 
effect on the economy, the community has an interest and duty to provide physical and 
economic rehabilitation.11 
 
 Furthermore, the scheme should provide comprehensive entitlement: All 
insured persons should be entitled to compensation from any community financed 
scheme, assessed by the same method, regardless the cause of the injury and whether it 
is work-related or not. 12 The underlying argument for this principle is that “a worker 
does not cease to be a worker as he leaves this factory at 5 o’clock”13, whereas the 
previous framework provided inconsistent results, namely the Workers’ Compensation 
legislation and the Social Security Fund, for non-work related accidents.14 
 
The third principle is complete rehabilitation of the injured person. Not only 
should the loss of income be compensated, but the scheme must also aim at recovering 
the best degree of bodily health and vocational utility in a minimum of time. Such are 
                                                 
11  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 56; Owen Woodhouse “The function of ACC: Social Welfare, 
not Insurance” (1 September 2008) www.accfutures.org.nz (accessed 26 March 2009); Garry Wilson 
“ACC and Community Responsibility (2004) 35 VUWLR 973. 
12  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 46. 
13  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 57. 
14  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 46. 
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the “real interests of the man himself and the interest which the community has in his 
restored productive capacity.” 15  
 
Real compensation should be granted without means or needs testing for work 
incapacity and permanent disability. As a matter of fact, the additional social hazards 
emerging from industrial and social progress should be met by a modern accident 
compensation system, as this society can better afford their real cost. 16  
 
Finally, the scheme should be based on administrative efficiency, avoiding 
delays, inconsistent assessments and economically wasteful methods.17  
 
Recently, Sir Owen Woodhouse has emphasised the importance of those 
principles: 
 
“As I say, for about 40 years those principles have had acceptance in this country, both in 
Parliament, and by the professionals and the public generally. I have put a little flesh on the 
headings, however, because I have wondered at times whether their acceptance has been 
remembered sufficiently in practice”.18 
 
The title of the current New Zealand accident compensation scheme describes 
its goal: Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation. The purpose is set out in 
detail in section 3 of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001 
(IPRC): 
 
3 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this Act is to enhance the public good and reinforce the social contract 
represented by the first accident compensation scheme by providing for a fair and sustainable 
scheme for managing personal injury that has, as its overriding goals, minimising both the 
overall incidence of injury in the community, and the impact of injury on the community 
(including economic, social, and personal costs), through 
(a) establishing as a primary function of the Corporation the promotion of measures to reduce 
the incidence and severity of personal injury: 
(b) providing for a framework for the collection, co-ordination, and analysis of injury-related 
information: 
                                                 
15  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 58. 
16  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 59-61. 
17  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 62. 
18  Woodhouse, above n 11. 
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(c) ensuring that, where injuries occur, the Corporation's primary focus should be on 
rehabilitation with the goal of achieving an appropriate quality of life through the provision of 
entitlements that restores to the maximum practicable extent a claimant's health, independence, 
and participation: 
(d) ensuring that, during their rehabilitation, claimants receive fair compensation for loss from 
injury, including fair determination of weekly compensation and, where appropriate, lump sums 
for permanent impairment: 
(e) ensuring positive claimant interactions with the Corporation through the development and 
operation of a Code of ACC Claimants' Rights: 
(f) ensuring that persons who suffered personal injuries before the commencement of this Act 
continue to receive entitlements where appropriate. 
 
 This purpose underlines in section 3(c) that where injuries occur the primary 
focus should be on rehabilitation and restoration of health, independence and 
participation. Section 3(d) contains the principle of fair compensation for loss from 
injury in the form of weekly compensation and lump sums for permanent impairment. 
19 
 
 After giving an overview over the legal framework in both schemes, this paper 
is going to explore if both accident insurance schemes still reflect the underlying 
purposes of the schemes. It is argued that both schemes have considerably drifted away 
from the underlying purposes. This argument will be demonstrated through the selected 
issues in Part III to VI and it will be shown how the purposes have been undermined. 
 
 
B Overview over the Legal Framework in both Schemes 
 
1  Swiss accident insurance 
 
In order to explore in Part III to VI how the purposes of both schemes have been 
undermined, this chapter gives an overview over the legal framework in both schemes 
and explains the place of each accident compensation scheme within the social security 
system.  
 
                                                 
19  For case law see for example Jones v ACC (5 November 2004) DC CHCH 342/04. 
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Swiss Accident Insurance is one of the ten branches of social insurances within 
the social security scheme.20 The social security scheme is divided between these social 
insurances and social assistance. Broadly speaking, the difference between social 
insurance and social assistance is that social insurance will automatically grant 
entitlements when the social contingency occurs. Social assistance will only provide 
benefits if there is a need in the specific case. The word “assistance” implies in the 
context income adjustment, whereas the “insurance” will grant entitlements in return 
for premium or contributions. A second difference is that social insurance is funded by 
contributions and social assistance is financed out of public funds.21 Social insurances 
are causally based. This means that entitlements will be granted based on the cause of 
the social risk, such as accident, sickness, unemployment, might vary depending on 
those risks and will not be granted based on the need of person. Social insurances 
provide cover for the social risks such as sickness, accident, unemployment, age, 
maternity, invalidity and death.22 They are intended to replace income where primary 
earnings are interrupted, as for example, in the case of an accident.23 Social insurances 
are regulated in Federal Acts and mostly funded by a percentage of one’s salary. On the 
contrary, social assistance is needs based, regulated by the Cantons24 and funded by 
taxes. Social assistance plays a role where there is no or insufficient cover by social 
insurance. For example, unemployment insurance grants a maximum of currently 400 
daily allowances within a period of two years.25 If the person seeking employment has 
still not found a job after receiving 400 daily allowances, cover under the 
unemployment act will expire. Thus, he or she will have to apply for social assistance if 
he or she cannot cover living costs.  
 
In the Swiss social insurance scheme, broadly spoken, each different risk is 
regulated in a specific Act. There are currently eleven Federal Acts comprising the ten 
social insurance branches and one Act on the General Part Part of Social Insurance Law 
                                                 
20  See Part IX  table 1 and 2. 
21  Thomas Locher Grundriss des Sozialversicherungsrechts (3 ed, Staempfli, Bern, 2003) 47; Jos 
Berghman “Basic Concepts of Social Security” in Danny Pieters (ed) Social Security in Europe: 
Miscellanea of the Erasmus-Programme Social Security in the EC (Bruylant, Brussels, 1991) 15. 
22  See also social risks of the ILO Convention 102 on minimum standards for social security 
protection. www.ilo.org (last accessed on 30 March 2009). 
23  Locher, above n 21, 47. 
24  Switzerland has 26 cantons which are the states of the country which a limited sovereignty (article 3 
of the Federal Constitution).  
25  Article 18 Federal Act on Unemployment Insurance, AVIG. 
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(ATSG) comprising the provisions about the key definitions and coordination between 
the different types of insurances. However, one risk might be covered under more than 
one Act. Appendix B provides a detailed overview over the different insurances and 
contingencies.  
 
The principles of social insurance are considered to be basically the social 
objectives in article 41 of the Federal Constitution. The social objectives state that the 
Confederation and the canton shall,  
 
“as a complement to personal responsibility and private initiative, endeavour to ensure that (a) 
everyone has access to social security.” 
 
In addition, every branch of social insurance has its own principles, mentioned 
in the purpose article of the Act. However, especially the acts of the older social 
insurance branches, such as accident insurance, more describe the scope of the 
insurance rather than the purpose.26 
 
One of the main features of the Swiss accident insurance scheme is that it is a 
worker insurance scheme (Article 1 UVG). Thus, non workers are not covered under 
the accident compensation scheme. However, non workers are covered for the 
contingency accident under the sickness insurance scheme, which is compulsory in 
Switzerland (Article 1 KVG). The main disadvantage for non workers is that 
entitlements of the sickness insurance are not as comprehensive as in the accident 
insurance scheme.27 The Accident Insurance Act does however provide cover for work-
related and non-work related accidents and occupational disease (Article 6 UVG). Non 
occupational diseases are covered for workers and non-workers by sickness insurance.  
 
The accident insurance scheme is funded by a percentage of a worker’s salary, 
depending on the type of work, by the employer (approximately 0.1%) for work-related 
accidents and occupational disease (Article 91 UVG). The percentage is 1-2% of the 
salary, and this is paid by the employee for non-work related accidents (Article UVG). 
 
                                                 
26  Part II A 1, for article 6 UVG. 
27  Part IV and Part IX. 
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Another characteristic of the Swiss accident insurance scheme is that the right to 
sue is replaced (to a point) by accident insurance to the extent that the entitlements 
provided for by insurance match the costs incurred by the injuries sustained.  (Article 
72 ATSG). However, the right to sue persists to the extent that there is a difference 
between the total loss sustained by the claimant and the total costs of the accident 
insurance entitlements. For example, if the insured person has a total loss of 100,000 
and the social accident insurance grants entitlements in the form of income replacement 
and medical costs in the amount of 80,000, the insured person may sue the liable person 
for the outstanding 20,000. Accident insurance pays only 80% of the salary (article 17 
UVG). Moreover, material items such as damaged glasses are not covered under 
accident insurance. Thus, the difference of 20,000 might comprise, for example, loss 
for damaged goods and the 20% loss of income not covered by the accident insurance. 
 
A further feature of the Swiss accident insurance scheme is that the monopoly of 
the “Schweizerische Unfallversicherungsanstalt” (Suva) has been repealed. However, 
the Suva is still the most important insurance provider and still holds the monopoly to 
provide cover for certain high risk professions. 
 
In order to be granted cover for accident (or occupational disease), the insured 
person first needs to show that he or she is working in Switzerland (Art. 1 UVG). The 
second step is to show that he or she has suffered from an accident. The Swiss accident 
insurance scheme has two different definitions of an accident: A primary definition in 
article 4 ATSG and a secondary definition in article 9 UVV (“article 9 UVV injuries”): 
 
 
 Article 4 ATSG 
 
An accident is defined as sudden and involuntary impact by an external unusual factor which 
results in a physical, mental, or psychic injury caused to the human body or causing death. 
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 Article 9 UVV 
2 The following, exclusively mentioned physical injuries are, if they are not clearly 
caused by sickness or degeneration, also without an unusual external factor equate with 
accidents: 
  a. broken bones; 
  b. dislocations of joints;  
  c. torn knee cartilages;  
  d. torn muscles;  
  e. strained muscles;  
  f. torn tendons; 
  g. ligament lesions; 
  h. eardrum injuries. 
 
 
An injured person who suffered from an accident has to show that either the 
requirements of article 4 ATSG or article 9 UVV are fulfilled. Article 9 UVV is an 
alleviated version of the definition of an accident of article 4 ATSG. For article 9 UVV 
injuries, an “unusual factor” is not required. As it will be demonstrated in Part V, the 
unusual factor in the article 4 ATSG definition sets the bar for cover too high. 
Furthermore, it will be shown that the requirement of an unusual factor has been 
introduced “through the backdoor” into article 9 UVV by case law. Thus, jurisprudence 
requires an “increased potential of danger” to the usual and day-to-day action.28  
 
This paper argues in Part V that the unusual factor and the “backdoor 
jurisprudence” of Article 9 UVV are undermining the underlying purpose of the Swiss 
accident insurance scheme. 
 
 
2 New Zealand accident compensation  
 
New Zealand’s social security scheme is a dual system, with on the hand, a 
accident compensation scheme that is mainly regulated in the Injury Prevention, 
Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001, broadly speaking, in the form of social 
insurance providing compensation for loss of income, and, on the other hand, the Social 
Security Act 1964 providing social assistance. 
 
                                                 
28  BGE 129 V 466. 
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The Social Security Act 1964 regulates a three tiers system with flat rate 
benefits paid according to the categories of need and supplementary assistance.29 The 
scheme provides entitlements for income replacement and income adjustment. Section 
1A states the purpose of the Act: 
 
1A  Purpose 
 
The purpose of this Act is 
(a) to enable the provision of financial and other support as appropriate 
(i) to help people to support themselves and their dependants while not in paid employment; 
and 
(ii) to help people to find or retain paid employment; and 
(iii) to help people for whom work may not currently be appropriate because of sickness, 
injury, disability, or caring responsibilities, to support themselves and their dependants: 
(b) to enable in certain circumstances the provision of financial support to people to help 
alleviate hardship: 
(c) to ensure that the financial support referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) is provided to people 
taking into account 
(i) that where appropriate they should use the resources available to them before seeking 
financial support under this Act; and 
(ii) any financial support that they are eligible for or already receive, otherwise than under 
this Act, from publicly funded sources: 
(d) to impose administrative and, where appropriate, work-related requirements on people 
seeking or receiving financial support under this Act. 
 
 According to this provision the purpose is, in a nutshell, to protect people from 
damage caused by certain social risks when they interrupt the income stream. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29  Thaddeus McCarthy (Chair) Social Security in New Zealand Report of the Royal Commission of 
Inquiry – Chapter 2: “The History and Evolution of Social Security I New Zealand” 50; Robert 
Stephens “Poverty, Family Finances and Social Security” in Jonathan Boston, Paul Dalziel and 
Susan St John (eds) Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand – Problems, Policies, Prospects 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 240. 
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The main features of the Accident compensation scheme are that it is a non-fault 
social insurance scheme, but benefits do not directly link to contributions. Further, it is 
comprehensive scheme for everyone living in New Zealand. Thus, it is not only a 
worker compensation scheme.30  
 
 In the New Zealand accident compensation scheme, the principal situations 
where there is cover are those in section 20 IPRC Act 2001: 
 
 20 Cover for personal injury suffered in New Zealand (except mental injury caused by 
certain criminal acts [or work-related mental injury])  
(1) A person has cover for a personal injury if  
 (a) he or she suffers the personal injury in New Zealand on or after 1 April 2002; and  
 (b) the personal injury is any of the kinds of injuries described in section 26(1)(a) or (b) or 
(c) or (e); and  
 (c) the personal injury is described in any of the paragraphs in subsection (2).  
(2) Subsection (1)(c) applies to  
 (a) personal injury caused by an accident to the person:  
 (b) personal injury that is treatment injury suffered by the person: 
 (c) treatment injury in circumstances described in section 32(7): 
 (d) personal injury that is a consequence of treatment given to the person for another 
personal injury for which the person has cover: 
 (e) personal injury caused by a work-related gradual process, disease, or infection suffered 
by the person:  
 (f) personal injury caused by a gradual process, disease, or infection that is treatment 
injury suffered by the person: 
 (g) personal injury caused by a gradual process, disease, or infection consequential on 
personal injury suffered by the person for which the person has cover:  
 (h) personal injury caused by a gradual process, disease, or infection consequential on 
treatment given to the person for personal injury for which the person has cover:  
 (i) personal injury that is a cardio-vascular or cerebrovascular episode that is treatment 
injury suffered by the person: 
 (j) personal injury that is a cardio-vascular or cerebro-vascular episode that is personal 
injury suffered by the person to which section 28(3) applies.  
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) are subject to the following qualifications:  
 (a) section 23 denies cover to some persons otherwise potentially within the scope of 
subsection (1):  
                                                 
30  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 55-63. 
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 (b) section 24 denies cover to some persons otherwise potentially within the scope of 
subsections (1) and [(2)(e)].  
(4) A person who suffers personal injury that is mental injury in circumstances described in 
section 21 has cover under section 21, but not under this section.  
 
 Under section 20(2)(a) IPRC Act, an accident is just one of the categories for 
cover. The requirements for an accident are defined in section 25 IPRC Act: 
 
25  Accident 
(1) Accident means any of the following kinds of occurrences: 
(a) a specific event or a series of events, other than a gradual process, that 
(i)  involves the application of a force (including gravity), or 
resistance, external to the human body; or 
(ii)  involves the sudden movement of the body to avoid a force 
(including gravity), or resistance, external to the body; or 
(iii) involves a twisting movement of the body: 
(b) the inhalation of any solid, liquid, gas, or foreign object on a specific 
occasion, which kind of occurrence does not include the inhalation of a 
virus, bacterium, protozoan, or fungus, unless that inhalation is the result 
of the criminal act of a person other than the injured person: 
(ba) the oral ingestion of any solid, liquid, gas, fungus, or foreign object on a 
specific occasion, which kind of occurrence does not include the 
ingestion of a virus, bacterium, or protozoan, unless that ingestion is 
the result of the criminal act of a person other than the injured person: 
(c) a burn, or exposure to radiation or rays of any kind, on a specific occasion, 
which kind of occurrence does not include a burn or exposure caused by 
exposure to the elements: 
(d) the absorption of any chemical through the skin within a defined period of 
time not exceeding 1 month: 
(e) any exposure to the elements, or to extremes of temperature or 
environment, within a defined period of time not exceeding 1 month, that, 
(i) for a continuous period exceeding 1 month, results in any 
restriction or lack of ability that prevents the person from 
performing an activity in the manner or within the range 
considered normal for the person; or 
(ii) causes death. 
(2) However, accident does not include 
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(a) any of those kinds of occurrences if the occurrence is treatment given, 
(i)  in New Zealand, by or at the direction of a registered health 
professional; or 
(ii) outside New Zealand, by or at the direction of a person who has 
qualifications that are the same as or equivalent to those of a 
registered health professional; or 
(b) any ecto-parasitic infestation (such as scabies), unless it is work-related; or 
(c)  the contraction of any disease carried by an arthropod as an active vector 
(such as malaria that results from a mosquito bite), unless it is work-
related. 
(3) The fact that a person has suffered a personal injury is not of itself to be construed 
as an indication or presumption that it was caused by an accident. 
 
In order to accept a claim for an accident, a personal injury described in section 
26 IPRC Act must be affirmed:  
 
 
26 Personal injury 
(1) Personal injury means 
(a) the death of a person; or 
(b) physical injuries suffered by a person, including, for example, a strain or a sprain; or 
(c) mental injury suffered by a person because of physical injuries suffered by the person; 
or 
(d) mental injury suffered by a person in the circumstances described in section 21; or 
(da) work-related mental injury that is suffered by a person in the circumstances described 
in section 21B; or 
(e) damage (other than wear and tear) to dentures or prostheses that replace a part of the 
human body. 
(2) Personal injury does not include personal injury caused wholly or substantially by a gradual 
process, disease, or infection unless it is personal injury of a kind described in section 
20(2)(e) to (h). 
(3) Personal injury does not include a cardio-vascular or cerebro-vascular episode unless it is 
personal injury of a kind described in section 20(2)(i) or (j). 
(4) Personal injury does not include 
(a) personal injury caused wholly or substantially by the ageing process; or 
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(b) personal injury to teeth or dentures caused by the natural use of those teeth or dentures. 
(5) For the purposes of subsection (1)(e) and to avoid doubt, prostheses does not include 
hearing aids, spectacles, or contact lenses. 
 
 
This brief overview over the legal framework in both schemes has set out the 
core provisions that will be discussed mainly in Part V. 
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III THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SCHEMES TO POLITICAL CHANGES 
 
In order to demonstrate that both accident compensation schemes tend to create 
a level of legal incoherence which is contradictory to the purpose of both systems, it is 
necessary to explain the political contexts of each scheme. In the New Zealand context, 
it is political changeability that most threatens the scope and purpose of the accident 
compensation scheme. In the Swiss context, there is less political changeability, but the 
political system granting citizens extraordinary participation in the process of 
legislation has caused an inconsistent legal framework for the implementation of the 
accident insurance scheme.  
 
In New Zealand, accident compensation, and social security in general, is a 
major political issue and reflects each current government’s ruling party’s policy. With 
every change of government either comes benefit cuts or reintroduction. In contrast, the 
Swiss accident insurance scheme is not so vulnerable nor an object of major policy or 
legislative change. This disparity is due to the different political systems of both 
countries.  
 
A Swiss Accident Insurance 
 
Switzerland’s unique direct democracy political system is said to be today’s 
most stable democratic system, granting citizens extraordinary participation in the 
process of legislation through referendum and popular votes.31 It is even suggested that 
it could “turn out to be a model for everybody’s 21st century democracy”.32 The 
country’s territory (41,285 km2) is not even the size of Canterbury (45,845 km2), but 
has 27 main political systems (one federal and 26 cantonal systems) and a diversity of 
different cultures, mentalities, languages and dialects.  
 
The Swiss Parliament and legislative authority is composed of two chambers 
having the same power, the National Council and the Council of States. The National 
Council has 200 members who represent the population of the country as a whole. Each 
                                                 
31  www.democracy-building.info (last accessed 17 March 2009). 
32  Brian Beedham, United Press International, in a book review on Gregory Fossedal’s “The road to 
full democracy”, www.democracy-building.info (last accessed 17 March 2009). 
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canton is represented in proportion to the number of their inhabitants. The Council of 
States has 46 members and represents the 26 cantons.33 The Swiss Parliament is not a 
regular parliament in the sense that sessions of several weeks are held several times a 
year.  Members of Parliament are rarely full-time politicians, usually having another 
job, and therefore, are closer to the everyday life of their electorate. They devote around 
60% of their working hours in sessions and preparation for the sessions in-between in 
numerous parliamentary commissions.34  
 
As mentioned before, Swiss citizens have far-reaching rights of co-
determination in the Swiss political system, especially in the legislation process. First, a 
Bill is prepared by the federal administration. Second, the cantons, political parties, 
entrepreneurs, unions and other interested groups in that field are consulted. Third, 
Parliament debates the Bill in both chambers and the final version is passed by vote. 
Citizens have various possibilities to give their opinion during this process as 
individuals, members of interested groups or as members of Parliament. In addition, 
Federal Bills are voted under the condition of an optional referendum. If 50,000 
signatures of citizens are collected within 100 days of a Bill’s publication, a popular 
vote must be held where voters decide by a simple majority whether to accept or reject 
the Bill. This veto-like right of referendum is an important element of citizens’ co-
determination of the Swiss political system. It favours willingness to compromise, and 
blocks extreme Bills, but, on the other hand, it causes delay in implementation of the 
Bill.35 
 
The Swiss government (executive) constitutes seven members of the Federal 
Council, elected by the United Federal Assembly36 for a four-year term. There is no 
prime minister as in New Zealand, only a president elected for a one year period acting 
as Primus inter pares, or first among equals. He has only a leading role in meetings and 
above all, representational duties.  
 
                                                 
33  www.eda.admin.ch (last accessed 17 March 2009). 
34  www.direct-democracy.geschichte-schweiz.ch; www.parlament.ch (last accessed 17 March 2009). 
35  www.eda.admin.ch and www.democracy-building.info (last accessed 17 March 2009). 
36  The United Federal Assembly is the assembly of the National Council and the Council of States 
(bicameral Parliament), see www.parlament.ch (last accessed 17 March 2009). 
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Since 1959, the government has been composed according to the ‘magic 
formula’, when the seats allocated to parties represent approximately their share of the 
vote. The Swiss Social Democratic Party (SP) (26.3%), the Radical Free Democratic 
Party (FDP) (23.7%) and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP) (23.3%) each 
are represented by two seats in the Federal Council, while the Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP) (11.6%) used to have one. With this formula in place, a change of government is 
not possible as in New Zealand and it should be a guarantee for a balanced and 
sustained policy taking into account the different political interests while making 
amendments to legislation. However, this formula was changed after the National 
Council elections in 2003 where the SVP became the strongest party in Parliament 
(26.9%) and the CVP the weakest party (14%). Thus the Parliament chose to elect two 
representatives from the SVP and only one from the CVP for the Federal Council. Even 
after this slight change of the “magic formula”, the Swiss political system has ensured 
and maintains a stable policy.37 In general, Swiss policy is characterized by taking into 
account the interests of the 26 cantons and different mentalities of different linguistic 
regions38. In addition, a lot of amendments to legislation are decided by popular vote. 
This constitutional background results in a steady tendency to compromise, and radical 
reversals of any status quo, such as the social security system, would be almost 
impossible.  
 
The first Report of the Federal Council of 12 February 1896 describes the Swiss 
mentality and the political climate very well in which the accident insurance scheme 
has emerged. The report underlines both the slow process due to the Swiss mentality 
and direct democracy to get approval for a new idea. In return, once the idea is well 
accepted, it will be well rooted and will persist:39 
 
Wir haben keine Zeit mehr zu verlieren. Man hat schon lange von der Sache gesprochen. 
Demokratie arbeitet etwas schwerfällig; es bedarf langer Zeit, bis sich neue Ideen in der 
Einsicht eines jeden von siebenhundertlausend stimmberechtigten Bürgern fest 
eingewurzelt haben; dafür besitzt dann ein solches Gebilde allerdings starke Wurzeln und 
widersteht jeder Reaktion. Das Schweizervolk hat sich mit der Idee der Kranken- und 
Unfallversicherung vertraut gemacht. Schreiten wir zum Handeln und setzen wir diese 
Idee in die Wirklichkeit über! Damit ist dann der Grund für die Entwicklung der 
                                                 
37  Federal Chancellery The Swiss Confederation a brief guide (Bern, 2008) www.bk.admin.ch (last 
accessed 17 March 2009). 
38  Switzerland has four official languages: German, French, Italian and Rhaeto-Romanic (article 4 
Federal Constitution). 
39  Report of the Federal Council of 12 February 1896, 219. 
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Volksversicherung durch den Staat gelegt und wird es noch der heute lebenden 
Generation möglich sein, weiter zu bauen. Wir geben uns der Hoffnung hin, daß sich die 
neuen Institutionen bewähren werden. Überzeugt sich das Schweizervolk davon, daß, was 
es von den öffentlichen Mitteln an die Kranken- und Unfallversicherung verwendet, gut 
verwendet ist, so wird es nicht anstehen, für neue verwandte Versicherungszweige neue 
indirekte oder direkte Steuer. 
 
English translation: [my translation] 
 
We do not have time to lose. This matter has been discussed for a long time. Democracy 
works a bit slowly. It takes a long time until new ideas have rooted in the head of each of 
the 700,000 citizens who have the right to vote. In return, such a scheme will have strong 
roots and will resist every reaction. The Swiss people are acquainted with the idea of 
sickness and accident insurance. Let’s act and realise this idea! Hereby, the foundation 
for the development of insurance for everyone by the state will be laid and the current 
generation will be able to build on it. If the Swiss people are convinced that public means 
for sickness and accident insurance are wisely spent, there will be no resistance to 
funding by indirect or direct taxes for related insurance branches. 
 
 
The other side of the coin of this political climate of co-determination is that 
reforms take a long time to elaborate and accomplish because they have to go through a 
long process of consultation and compromise. Another disadvantage of this process is 
that the consistency of the legal framework sometimes suffers considerably and causes 
gaps within the structure of the Act.  
 
An example is the definition of an accident (article 4 ATSG), which will be 
examined more fully in Part V. At the time of implementation in 1984, the current 
Accident Insurance Act (UVG) did not contain a definition of an accident. Parliament 
found it unnecessary to depart from the definition developed by jurisprudence.40 
Moreover, a couple of years later, the definition was not integrated into the Act itself, 
due to the complicated procedure of amending acts, but into the Federal Regulation on 
Accident Insurance (UVV), second paragraph of article 9.  However, with the 2003 
introduction of a complementary Act, the Federal Act on the General Part of Social 
Insurance Law (ATSG), article 9 UVV was repealed and reintroduced in article 4 
ATSG. Therefore, the basic principles and definitions of the current accident insurance 
legislation are spread over several acts and regulations, thereby lacking a consistent 
legal framework. This is the consequence of the difficulty of completely rewriting an 
Act within the Swiss political system. For the same reasons, the Accident Insurance Act 
(UVG) has only been slightly amended since its implementation, and certainly not 
overhauled as thoroughly as New Zealand’s accident compensation legislation. 
                                                 
40  Report of the Federal Council of 18 August 1976, 165. 
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B New Zealand Accident Compensation 
 
New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme has been rewritten several times, 
usually with each rewrite reflecting the political ideology of the dominant part in 
government.41 This characteristic has brought about major differences, with each 
rewrite of the scheme, in the scope of cover for insured persons and the rate and extent 
of entitlement.  In addition, very complicated and unsatisfactory transitional provisions 
have emerged which are often subject to interpretation and debate in court.42 These 
several changes in accident compensation legislation must be understood in the context 
of the constitution of the New Zealand Executive. It is composed of the Prime Minister, 
Cabinet and public sector. The Cabinet consists of Ministers who are members of the 
governing party or parties in Parliament and is conducted by the Prime Minister.43 New 
Zealand’s last government was a Labour coalition government, led by Prime Minister 
Helen Clark from 1999 until November 2008.44 Under that government, the current 
Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001 repealed the former 
1998 Act, reintroducing lump sum compensation which had previously been abolished, 
and other ameliorating amendments to the range of injuries covered by the former 
Act.45 
 
It is too early to predict the development of the accident compensation scheme 
under the new National-led government elected in November 2008. Will the Act be 
rewritten and trimmed similar to former accident compensation legislation under 
national-led governments?46  
 
 
                                                 
41  Accident Compensation Act 1972, Accident Compensation Act 1982, Accident Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Insurance Act 1992, Accident Insurance Act 1998 and Injury Prevention, 
Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001. 
42  Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001, Part 11. See for example Te Wake v 
ACC [2008] 1 NZLR 251 (HC). 
43  Ministry of Justice The New Zealand Legal System www.justice.govt.nz (last accessed 17 March 
2009); W R Atkin “New Zealand” in International Encyclopaedia of Law series (ed) Social Security 
Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2004) para 4.  
44  www.teara.govt.nz (last accessed 17 March 2009). 
45  John Miller “Trends In Personal Injury Litigation: The 1990s” (2003) 34 VUWLR 407-42; John 
Miller “ACC Basic Overview”, www.jmlaw.co.nz (last accessed 17 March 2009). 
46  Miller, above n 45. 
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For instance, the Government has announced an increase of levy rates for 
2009/2010 claiming that previous Labour Government left the country with a massive 
fiscal hole. In addition, an increase of claims is expected.47 Voices critical of the 
Government suggest that the latest moves by the Government in replacing the chairman 
of the ACC Board and highlighting such fiscal issues are precursors to opening up the 
earner’s account to competition from private insurers, thereby ending ACC’s 
monopoly. Such commentators observe that ACC has always been a “political 
football”.48 They further claim that ACC’s financial problems are largely a result of 
lower returns on investments in the recession, bookkeeping changes and policy changes 
which have broadened coverage, associated with the ageing population, worsening 
injury rates and medical advances allowing people with serious injuries to live longer 
and rising medical costs, which are partly caused by wage rises for doctors and 
nurses.49 This recent development of the New Zealand’s Accident compensation 
scheme reveals again how vulnerable the scheme is to political change. 
 
 
C Observations 
 
The scope of legislative changes in the accident compensation scheme is 
influenced by the political system. The Swiss political system is built on a more 
continuous balanced coalition of the major political parties than the New Zealand 
system. In Swiss law, the accident insurance scheme has never undergone such far-
reaching changes as the New Zealand scheme. This continuity provides on the one 
hand, a level of legal security. On the other hand, necessary legislative amendments 
take a long time to come into force. In order to overcome this main disadvantage, 
provisions are often formulated very broadly and such broadness leaves greater 
discretion to the decision-maker for interpretation. As a consequence, often a very 
complicated and inconsistent jurisprudence has been developed, for example, regarding 
                                                 
47  www.beehive.govt.nz (16 December 2008 and 4 March 2009); PricewaterhouseCoopers Results for 
the valuation of outstanding claims liabilities as at 31 December 2008 (Melbourne, 2009). 
48  Geoff Cumming “Truth the casualty of crisis management” (14 March 2009) www.nzherald.co.nz 
(accessed 27 March 2009). 
49  Cumming, above n 48; Brian Fallow “ACC hostage to a changing world” (12 March 2009) 
www.nzherhald.co.nz (accessed 27 March 2009). 
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the primary (article 4 ATSG) and secondary definitions (article 9 UVV) of an 
accident.50  
 
In contrast, the New Zealand political system is more vulnerable to political 
change and creation and application of legislation are very much influenced by the 
ruling party’s policy. The advantage of this system is more flexibility to amend existing 
legislation in order to clarify a provision or legalise jurisprudence. The other side of the 
coin is that the whole accident compensation scheme can be completely changed within 
a short time leading to legal insecurity and complicated transitional provisions. 
 
Law and politics are closely interrelated. The purposes of the accident 
compensation schemes in both jurisdictions are constantly challenged by political 
ideologies and jurisprudence and also reflect the present state of the economy. These 
factors result in the fact that both schemes have drifted away from the initial purposes. 
However, no accident compensation scheme should be a vehicle to enforce the ruling 
party’s ideology. This paper argues that it is very important for a modern democracy to 
provide a stable social security policy by maintaining the core entitlements, such as 
cover for medical expenses, best possible rehabilitation and compensation, of the 
injured person. This can be achieved and funded by focusing on rehabilitation, 
retraining and compensation in order to prevent disability and long-term 
unemployment. The latter may cause short-time financial consequences for the welfare 
state, but will clearly pay off in the long run as the injured person will not have to rely 
on social welfare. An injured person being able to return to (part-time or full-time) 
work, adapted to his or her disability and, if necessary, in a different profession, is 
rewarding and increases self-esteem.51 What Woodhouse recognized in 1972 by stating 
that “real interests of the man himself and the interest which the community has in his 
restored productive capacity”52 is still valid today in both jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
50  Part V. 
51  Erwin Murer Die UV- und IV-rechtliche Auseinandersetzung mit reaktiven psychischen Störungen: 
eine Zwischenbilanz (Fribourg, 2002) 44. 
52  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 58. 
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IV THE ARBITRARY DICHOTOMY BETWEEN INCAPACITY CAUSED BY 
 ACCIDENTAL INJURY AND INCAPACITY CAUSED BY SICKNESS  
 
Another issue that demonstrates the undermining of the underlying purposes of 
both schemes is the arbitrary dichotomy between incapacity caused by accidental injury 
and incapacity caused by sickness. Both social security schemes make a clear 
distinction between incapacity caused by accidental injury and incapacity caused by 
sickness, with the accident compensation schemes of both countries providing better 
benefits than the respective sickness compensation/benefit schemes. This distinction is 
arbitrarily ‘causally” based, rather than “needs” based. However, the condition of the 
person suffering from work incapacity persists, irrespective of the cause. As it will be 
shown there is no logical reason for this dichotomy other than a political decisions 
based on costs.  Moreover, this distinction has resulted in inconsistencies in the legal 
framework of both countries. This paper suggests that, in the long run, a new approach 
of merging accident and sickness compensation should be considered, even if, in the 
short run, change is unlikely in the light of the economic and political situation New 
Zealand and Switzerland.  
 
 
A  The Underlying Purpose of the Dichotomy  
 
The development of the current accident and sickness insurance scheme must be 
understood in the light of the political system described in chapter III A. In this section, 
it will be shown that, in the Swiss social security scheme, accident and sickness 
insurance was intended as a complement to personal responsibility and private 
initiative. Moreover, the dichotomy between compensation for incapacity caused by 
accidental injury or incapacity caused by sickness has historically evolved, having been 
questioned at the end of the 19th century, but subsequently upheld until today. 
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1  Swiss accident insurance 
 
As mentioned in Part II, in 1883, compulsory sickness insurance for workers 
was introduced, followed in 1884 by compulsory accident insurance. In 1896, the 
Federal Council considered whether the two social insurances should be merged, but 
finally rejected the proposal: One of the main reasons was that it was believed that 
claimants were far more likely to seek to fraudulently claim sickness insurance than 
accident insurance.  It was considered that the consequences of an accident were 
visible, whereas as far as sickness is concerned, the insurance was much more 
dependent on the declarations of the insured person. Therefore, sickness insurance 
could not provide as comprehensive entitlements as accident insurance, because the 
financial outlay could lead to its bankruptcy. However, it was recognized that both 
contingencies were closely interrelated. Thus, it was suggested that two different kinds 
of insurances should be upheld, but - for both sickness and accident - short-term 
entitlements should be covered by the sickness insurance and long-term entitlements by 
the accident insurance.53 Nevertheless, this suggestion was also rejected by Parliament, 
and the two different Acts were developed further within the political process, leading 
to the adoption in 1912 of the “Kranken- und Unfallversicherungsgesetz” (KUVG)54 by 
popular vote. This Act was widely inspired by the German model, but its novelty was 
that it suggested separate cover for non work-related accidents which is, still today, 
unique in comparison with other European countries. The part of this Act regarding 
sickness insurance came into force in 1914. The part concerning accident insurance 
only came into force in 1918, after the foundation of the insurance company, the 
“Schweizerische Unfallversicherungsanstalt” (Suva)55 to provide cover for accident 
insurance. In 1981, the part of the “KUVG” regarding accident insurance became an 
independent Act, the “Unfallversicherungsgesetz” (UVG).56 However, the dichotomy 
between accident and sickness and their very different entitlements has remained, even 
though the two insurances were regulated in one act. 
 
                                                 
53  Report of the Federal Council of 12 February 1896, 220. 
54  Sickness and Accident Insurance Act. 
55  The “Suva” can be compared to the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) in New Zealand. 
However, the Suva does not hold the monopoly of accident compensation anymore in comparison to 
the New Zealand ‘ACC’. New Zealand’s next government might abolish the ACC’s monopoly. 
56  Murer, above n 6, 171-173. 
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In addition to this intended scheme that provided two different classes of 
compensation for two different risks the Swiss social insurance scheme must be 
understood as a complement to personal responsibility and private initiative.  
 
As a consequence, historically, there was no underlying purpose of creating a 
comprehensive scheme including entitlements for both accident and sickness, nor a 
completely comprehensive scheme for the contingency, accident, alone. 
 
The legal basis for the Accident Insurance Act is article 41 of the Federal 
Constitution (completely rewritten and came into force on 1st January 2000): 
Article 41 (Social Objectives) 
1 The Confederation and the Cantons shall, as a complement to personal responsibility 
and private initiative, endeavour to ensure that: 
a.  everyone has access to social security;  
b.  everyone has access to the health care that they require;  
c.  families are protected and encouraged as communities of adults and 
 children;  
d.  everyone who is fit to work can earn their living by working under fair 
 conditions;  
e.  anyone seeking accommodation for themselves and their family can  find 
suitable  accommodation on reasonable terms;  
f.  children and young people as well as persons of employable age can obtain an 
education and undergo basic and advanced training in accordance with their 
abilities;  
g.  children and young people are encouraged to develop into independent and 
 socially responsible people and are supported in their social, cultural and political 
 integration. 
2 The Confederation and Cantons shall endeavour to ensure that everyone is protected 
against the economic consequences of old-age, invalidity, illness, accident, 
unemployment, maternity, being orphaned and being widowed. 
3 They shall endeavour to achieve these social objectives within the scope of their 
constitutional powers and the resources available to them. 
4 No direct right to state benefits may be established on the basis of these social 
objectives. 
 
Subsection 1 of article 41 Federal Constitution states the principle that the social 
political engagement of the state shall complement personal responsibility and private 
initiative. Historically, many of today’s public institutions have evolved from a private 
initiative, for example, aid for disabled or old people. The importance of this principle 
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of subsidiarity57 and complementarity58 of the state depends on the type of social 
objectives. Personal responsibility plays a minor role in regard to access to social 
security (litera a) providing cover for social risks and aiming at preventing poverty. In 
this context, this principle has a predominantly declarative character.59 On the other 
hand, personal responsibility is more visible in health insurance insofar as, for example, 
insurance can be taken out with levels of excess (CHF 300 to CHF 2,500 per year). The 
insured person must at least pay the first CHF 300 of medical expenses per year. 
However, it is also possible to take out insurance with higher excess (up to CHF 2,500 
per year). In regard to accident insurance, personal responsibility can be seen in the 
possibility of the Suva to reduce or refuse entitlements for gross negligence when the 
insured person is taking risks (article 39 UVG). This subsidiarity and complementarity 
clause is also a legal basis for federal and cantonal contributions to private institutions, 
which fill in the gaps of state social security. Such organizations are, for example, Pro 
Infirmis (support for disabled people), Pro Senectute (support for older people), and 
also associations active in the fields of equality between men and women and AIDS 
help.60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57  The principle of subsidiarity means that the state will be the secondary provider of social security 
after the individual person. 
58  The principle of complementarity means the state will only complement personal responsibility and 
private initiative regarding social security. 
59  Provisions with declarative character in Swiss law do not give a direct right to individual person 
which can be claimed in court. They are not enforceable by law. 
60  Bernhard Ehrenzeller, Philippe Mastronardi, Rainer J Schweizer and Klaus A Vallender (eds) Die 
schweizerische Bundesverfassung (2 ed, Schulthess, Zurich, 2008) 792. 
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Subsection 4 of article 41 Federal Constitution stating that no direct right to 
state benefits may be established on the basis of these social objectives has to be 
understood in the context of the fundamental rights (article 7 – 36) set out in articles 7 
(human dignity)61, 8 (equality before the law)62, 9 (protection against arbitrary conduct 
and principle of good faith)63 and 10 (right to life and personal freedom)64. 
In contrast to the Social Objectives in article 41, these fundamental rights are 
directly enforceable. Case law has defined the scope and the inalienable core content of 
these rights, for example, the fundamental right to cover basic needs65 and the right to 
medical care66. Therefore, even if the social objectives stated in article 41 of the 
Federal Constitution give no direct right to state benefits, certain social rights are still 
enforceable under the title of fundamental rights.67 
 
According to article 117 of the Federal Constitution the Confederation (and not 
the cantons) legislates on sickness and accident insurance. It may declare sickness and 
the accident insurance to be compulsory, either in general terms or for individual 
sections of the population. 
 
These two constitutional legal bases reflect the two main ideas of the Swiss 
social security scheme: First, it is complementary to personal responsibility, and 
second, there is no direct right to state benefits. However, the principle of personal 
responsibility is softened insofar as sickness insurance is compulsory for everyone 
living in Switzerland, and premiums are subsidised for people on lower income. In 
regard to accident insurance, it has been declared compulsory for all workers, and non-
                                                 
61  Art. 7 Federal Constitution: Human rights must be respected and protected. 
62  Art. 8 Federal Constitution: Everyone shall be equal before the law (sec 1). No one may be 
discriminated against, in particular on grounds of origin, race, gender, age, language, social position, 
way of life, religious, ideological, or political convictions, or because of a physical, mental or 
psychological disability (sec 2). Men and women shall have equal rights. The law shall ensure their 
equality, both in law and in practice, most particularly in the family, in education, and in the 
workplace. Men and women shall have the right to equal pay for work of equal value (sec 3). The 
law shall provide for the elimination of inequalities that affect persons with disabilities (sec 4). 
63   Article 9 Federal Constitution: Everyone has the right to be treated by state authorities in good faith 
and in a non-arbitrary manner. 
64  Article 10 Federal Constitution:  Everyone has the right to life. The death penalty is prohibited (sec 
1). Everyone has the right to personal liberty and in particular to physical and mental integrity and to 
freedom of movement (sec 2). Torture and any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment are prohibited (sec 3). 
65  BGE 121 I 367. 
66  BGE 102 Ia 306. 
67  Ehrenzeller, above n 60, 804. 
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workers must take out cover within their compulsory sickness insurance. However, 
benefits from this accident insurance are significantly less comprehensive for non-
workers as for workers.68 
 
To sum up, the dichotomy between accident and sickness insurances has 
historically evolved from the coexistence of sickness and accident insurance schemes. 
The question of merging the two schemes was examined at the end of the 19th century, 
but rejected, based on the higher risk of feigning sickness and the associated financial 
consequences for the insurance provider.  
 
 
2 New Zealand accident compensation 
 
 The dichotomy between incapacity caused by accidental injury and incapacity 
caused by sickness is also found in the New Zealand social security scheme. At the 
time of the Woodhouse Report, it was envisaged that the accident compensation 
scheme would be expanded to cover sickness as well as accident.69 Although, this has 
not yet happened nevertheless, the accident compensation scheme was intended to be 
comprehensive.70 
 
New Zealand’s system derives from similar roots as the British system, but each 
system reflects unique geography and demography. Today, New Zealand has a dual 
system for compensating incapacity. On the one hand, New Zealand has a social 
security system based on social assistance principles and, on the other hand, the 
accident compensation system, based on social insurance and contributory principles, 
but benefits of the latter are not linked directly to contributions. The accident 
compensation system provides cover for incapacity caused by accidental injury and 
some occupational diseases. Generally, benefits are better than from social assistance.71  
 
                                                 
68  Ehrenzeller, above n 60, 1205. 
69  Judith Ferguson “The line between sickness and accidental injury in New Zealand’s Accident 
Compensation Scheme” (2004) 12 TLJ 61; Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 17 and para 290.  
70  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 278.  
71  Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2005) 21; 
Margaret McClure “A Decade of Confusion: The Differing Directions of Social Security and 
Accident Compensation 1969-1979” (2003) 34 VUWLR 272; Atkin, above n 43, para 18. 
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In the early 1900s, a “non fault” scheme was introduced under the Worker’s 
Compensation Act providing cover for work-related injuries for workers.72 In 1967, the 
Government constituted a Royal Commission of Inquiry, the “Woodhouse 
Commission” under the direction of High Court Judge Sir Owen Woodhouse, to 
analyse the scope of compensation for personal injury in New Zealand, not only for 
workers.73 The “Woodhouse report” was a response to the inappropriate mechanism for 
dealing with personal injuries such as the failure of compensation for significant 
numbers of accident victims, high costs for the parties, long delays and lack of 
rehabilitation.74 
 
 As has been shown, the accident compensation scheme has evolved on the basis 
of the need for cover for industrial accidents.75 The underlying purpose was to provide 
cover and comprehensive compensation for work incapacity, for both work- and non-
work related accidents. There is no logical reason, why this extension to non-work 
related accidents should not have been applied to non-occupational diseases as well, 
other than on a pragmatic cost basis.76 This dichotomy has led to anomalies and 
inconsistencies and has been criticized in the literature.77 A report by the New Zealand 
Law Commission recommended that sickness and accidental injury be dealt with under 
the same legislative scheme in 1988. As summarised by Sir Kenneth Keith, a member 
of the Commission in 1988, the Report recognised the pragmatic basis for the 
dichotomy between sickness and accidental injury:78 
 
For historical and pragmatic reasons sickness incapacities were not included in the new 
comprehensive scheme. The concept of earnings related benefits across the whole field of 
personal injury was itself a new one. Funds which already were supporting the compulsory 
work and road accident systems could be applied to the wider injury scheme. And there 
were questions about the additional and uncertain cost of extending cover to sickness. So it 
seemed wise to take only one step, at least for the time being. But clearly the demarcation is 
anomalous. It is the kind of situation which gives hard emphasis to what has been called the 
                                                 
72  Param Jegatheeson Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation, Act and Analysis 
(Brookers, Wellington, 2002) 1. 
73  Atkin, above n 43, para 16; Jegatheeson, above n 72, 1. 
74  Brian Easton “The Historical Context of the Woodhouse Commission” (2003) 34 VUWLR 210-211; 
Atkin, above n 43, para 16. 
75  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 1 “The Problem”. 
76  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 17 and para 290. 
77  Ferguson, above n 69, 61; Easton, above n 74, 207; Robert Stephens “Horizontal equity for disabled 
people: Incapacity from Accident or Illness” (2004) 35 VUWLR 783; Grant Duncan “Boundary 
Disputes in the ACC Scheme and the No-Fault Principle” (2008) 27 NZ Law Rev 32-33. 
78  Sir Kenneth Keith “The Law Commission’s 1988 Report on Accident Compensation” 34 VUWLR 
293. 
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inequality of luck. It ought to disappear. And sooner rather than later. But how? 
Even if it were proper in the face of the compact so recently arrived at, can the way be 
opened only by taking an axe to the value of injury benefits? For reasons of free market 
theories in 1988 some will at once say that the 1974 consensus should be ignored. Some 
will assume that otherwise there would be insurmountable expense. As happened when 
claims were made against the injury proposals (sometimes with actuarial as well as lay 
confidence) that it would be impossible to afford such a comprehensive scheme. 
 
In 1990 the then Labour Government drafted the Rehabilitation and Incapacity 
Bill 1990, incorporating much of the Law Commission’s report, proposing the merging 
of both systems. This Bill was never enacted and the new National government took 
power shortly thereafter.79   
 
 
3 Observations 
 
Both social security schemes make a clear distinction between incapacity 
caused by accidental injury and incapacity caused by sickness, with the accident 
compensation scheme providing cover for work and non work-related accidents and 
occupational diseases and better benefits than the sickness compensation scheme. This 
distinction is arbitrarily “causally” based, rather than “needs” based. Neither in the 
Swiss accident insurance scheme nor the New Zealand accident compensation scheme, 
is there a logical reason for this dichotomy other than a political decision based on 
costs. The main argument advanced in the Swiss legislation process was the inherently 
higher danger of feigning sickness rather than accident, where the consequences are 
visible. Thus, it was argued that, if the same better entitlements were provided for 
sickness as for accident, the financial loss would be too great. The New Zealand 
scheme originally intended to extend cover for sickness later in time, but successive 
governments have failed to do extend the scheme. Nevertheless, the need of the 
incapacitated person’s for cover persists, no matter the cause of the incapacity. 
 
It is advocated that it is high time to reconsider the unequal treatment of 
incapacity by accident and by sickness, especially given the consequences of this 
arbitrary distinction which will be set out in the next chapter. 
                                                 
79  Rehabilitation and Incapacity Bill 1990. 
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B  The Consequences of the Arbitrary Dichotomy for the Person Suffering from 
 Work Incapacity 
 
Both social security schemes are crafted on the arbitrary dichotomy between 
incapacity caused by accidental injury and incapacity caused by sickness. This 
distinction is “causally” based, rather than “needs” based. For the injured person, the 
need for cover in the case of incapacity, caused by chance by accident or sickness, 
persists. Entitlements from the accident compensation scheme in both social security 
schemes are considerably better than from the sickness compensation scheme. In both 
jurisdictions, occupational diseases are included in the accident compensation scheme. 
However, the underlying purpose of both schemes is to provide medical care and 
restore work capacity as soon as possible. This process is considerably inhibited in the 
case of work incapacity caused by non occupational disease because the sickness 
compensation scheme in Switzerland only provides medical care, not the necessary 
measures to promote rehabilitation, nor weekly compensation. In New Zealand, the 
scheme only provides flat rate social security sickness benefits and not earnings-related 
accident compensation.80 
 
 
1  Swiss accident insurance 
 
The Swiss social security system makes a clear distinction between incapacity 
caused by accidental injury and incapacity caused by sickness. Apart from this 
distinction there is also a second distinction between compensation for workers and non 
workers. 
 
The Accident Insurance Act (UVG) provides cover for work-related accidents 
(article 7), non work-related accident (article 8) and occupational diseases (article 9). 
Insured under this act are those who are employed, self-employed or on unemployment 
benefits (article 1a).  
 
                                                 
80  Atkin, above n 43, para 18; Easton, above n 74, 211. 
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Regarding accidents, the scheme provides compensation for medical costs and 
income replacement (maximum CHF 126,000 per year, 80% of the last salary), lump 
sum compensation for damage of integrity, complete cover for medical expenses (GP, 
specialist and hospital), disability pensions depending on the degree of disability, 
widow/widower’s and orphan’s pension and ancillary services related to rehabilitation. 
The scheme is funded by a percentage of one’s salary, depending on the type of work. 
The contribution for work-related accidents is paid by the employer (approximately 
0.1%) and for non work-related accidents, by the employee (approximately 1-2%). 
 
The accident insurance scheme provides the same benefits for occupational 
diseases. The damaging substances and occupational diseases covered under the 
scheme are listed in appendix I of the Federal Regulation on Accident Insurance 
(UVV). Other diseases not specifically listed are also covered if there is evidence that 
they were exclusively or with predominant probability caused by work (article 9(2) 
UVG). This requirement is, however, rather difficult to fulfill.  
 
For example, the claim of a brick layer suffering from a medical condition 
affecting on the elbow was denied in the case 126 V 183.81 The Federal Supreme Court 
held that “with predominant probability” meant that the occupational disease must be 
caused with 75% probability by the occupation. In this case, there was insufficient 
medical evidence that the condition was the result of his repetitive physically 
demanding job as a brick layer. 
 
The Sickness Insurance Act (KVG) provides sickness, maternity and accident 
cover for non workers. All persons living in Switzerland must be insured, but may 
freely choose their insurer. Benefits include medical and pharmaceutical care and 
hospital treatment. However, there is a minimum excess of CHF 300 per year and a 
maximum excess of CHF 2,500 per year. In addition to this, there is a share of 10% of 
costs exceeding the excess up to CHF 700 for adults and CHF 350 for children.  
 
 
                                                 
81  BGE 126 V 183. 
 43
The contribution to board and accommodation in the case of hospital stays is 
CHF 10 per day. The insured person pays a monthly premium which – for excess of 
CHF 2,500 per year – currently costs between CHF 150-180 per month. The cantons 
provide a system of subsidies for low income earners. 
 
In contrast to the accident insurance scheme, the (social) sickness insurance 
scheme does not provide income replacement. Cover for income replacement caused by 
sickness can be taken out through private insurance. Another difference of this 
distinction between the accident and sickness schemes is that the Sickness Insurance 
Act only provides minor benefits like medical expenses, after deduction of the annual 
excess (between CHF 300 and 2,500). Therefore, if a non worker suffers from an 
accident, he or she will not be insured by the accident compensation scheme, but only 
entitled to the minor benefits like medical expenses after deduction of the annual 
excess. 
 
In regard to workers suffering from sicknesses other than occupational disease, 
80% of the salary is covered for a fixed period, depending on the sickness preceding 
duration of the employment (article 324a and 324b Obligations Law Act, OR). 
To sum up, the arbitrary dichotomy is seen in the different types of benefits for 
incapacity caused by accidental injury and incapacity caused by sickness. A second 
dichotomy is the different benefits for workers and non workers. Benefits for sickness 
other than occupational disease are considerably less comprehensive than for accident 
and occupational disease. This distinction is in contradiction to the underlying purpose 
of providing cover for medical expenses and promoting the restoration of work 
capacity.  
 
 
2 New Zealand accident compensation 
 
The dichotomy between incapacity caused by accidental injury and incapacity 
caused by sickness is also found in the New Zealand social security scheme. The 
second dichotomy between benefits for worker and non workers is not as distinct in the 
New Zealand scheme also because non workers are covered under the accident 
compensation scheme. 
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The current accident compensation scheme (IPRC Act) 2001 provides cover for 
accident (section 25), personal injury (section 26), mental injury (section 27), work-
related personal injury (section 28), personal injury that is both work-related and motor 
vehicle injury (section 29), personal injury caused by work-related gradual process, 
disease, or infection (section 30), treatment injury (section 32), motor vehicle injury 
(section 35). Therefore, sickness, other than work-related disease, is not covered under 
this scheme. 
 
Regarding work-related gradual process, disease, or infection (section 30), the 
scheme differentiates between work-related gradual process, disease or infection 
mentioned in Schedule 2 and those not mentioned in Schedule 2. “Schedule 2” diseases 
do not require an assessment of causation under subsection (1)(b) or (c) which is an 
alleviation of the burden of proof for the insured person. Section 31 provides that 
ministerial advisory panel will advise the Minister whether Schedule 2 should be 
amended. 
 
In the case of a work-related gradual process, disease, or infection not 
mentioned in Schedule 2, the insured person must first fulfill the requirements of 
section 30 (1): The personal injury must be (a) suffered by a person, (b) caused by a 
gradual process, disease, or infection, and (c) caused in the circumstances described in 
subsection (2). 
 
Section 30(2) sets out the three-tier test for considering whether a personal 
injury is a work-related gradual process, disease, or infection82: 
(a) What property or characteristic in the workplace, caused or contributed to the 
personal injury? 
(b) Is that property or characteristic found to any material extent in the person’s non-
employment activities or environment? 
(c) Is the risk of injury significantly greater for persons performing that task in that 
environment? 
The insured person can claim cover if tests (a) and (c) are answered in the affirmative, 
and test (b) in the negative. 
                                                 
82  Brookers, commentary ad section 30, IP30.02 www.brookersonline.co.nz (accessed 18 February 
2008). 
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Where incapacity arises through sickness, the New Zealand social security 
scheme provides two different types of benefits. Broadly, the sickness benefit may be 
claimed for temporary incapacity, and the invalid’s benefit for long-term incapacity.83  
  
Sickness, other than occupational disease, is covered under the Social Security 
Act 1964, section 54 – 57. The standard eligibility requirements relate to employment. 
According to the requirements for the sickness benefit set out in section 54, the person 
is (a) not in full-time employment, willing to undertake it, but because of sickness (…) 
is limited in his or her capacity to seek it, undertake, or be available for full-time 
employment or is (b) in employment, but is losing earnings because, through sickness is 
(…) not actually working (…). Under section 54A a sickness benefit may be granted to 
a person on grounds of hardship. 
 
According to section 39F of the Social Security Act 1964 the purpose of the 
invalid’s benefit is to provide income support to people who (a) have, and are likely to 
have in the future, a severely restricted capacity to support themselves through open 
employment because of sickness, injury, or disability; or (b) are totally blind. Sections 
40 – 46 set out the requirements for the invalid’s benefit.  
 
 
3 Observations 
 
In both accident and sickness compensation schemes, entitlements from the 
accident compensation scheme are considerably better than from the sickness 
compensation scheme. In both jurisdictions, occupational diseases are included in the 
accident compensation scheme. There is also a second dichotomy between workers and 
non workers providing better entitlements for workers. This distinction is not as 
obvious in the New Zealand scheme because non workers are covered for accident 
under the accident compensation scheme. However, a non worker under the New 
Zealand scheme would have to fulfill the requirements of hardship (section 54A Social 
Security Act 1964) to qualify for a sickness benefit. This requirement is much for 
                                                 
83  Atkin, above n 43, para 129. 
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difficult to fulfill and grants more discretion to the chief executive than the standard 
eligibility requirements of section 54. 
 
To sum up, the arbitrary dichotomy has severe consequences for a person 
suffering from work incapacity. As entitlements in both jurisdictions are better in the 
accident compensation scheme, the consequences are not only financial in nature, but 
also inhibit the person’s rehabilitation and restoration of work incapacity caused by 
sickness. The purpose of both accident compensation schemes was to extend the 
schemes to work incapacity by sickness at a later stage. Instead, this dichotomy persists 
in both schemes. Thus, the dichotomy is undermining the purpose of the schemes.   
 
 
C  A New Approach and its Political Feasibility 
 
1  Swiss accident insurance 
 
The question arises whether a change in the current Swiss social security 
scheme is desirable and politically feasible. It has been shown that the dichotomy 
between work incapacity caused by accidental injury and incapacity caused by sickness 
has been last examined at the end of the 19th century. It will also been shown in Part V 
that the two definitions of an accident have been almost unaltered for over 90 years84, 
and the scheme as a whole has never undergone radical changes.85 Further, Switzerland 
has a steady political system due to the permanent equilibrium of the major parties in 
the Federal Council.86  
  
In a recent comparison with the Dutch social security law scheme, the Swiss 
social accident insurance has been subject to a profound study in regard to an unequal 
treatment of accident and sickness.87  
 
                                                 
84  Part V C. 
85  Part III A. 
86  Part III A. 
87  Olivier Steiner Die Abschaffung der Unfallversicherung, Eine Untersuchung zur 
Ungleichbehandlung von Unfall und Krankheit im schweizerischen und niederlaendischen 
Sozialrecht (Schulthess, Zuerich, 2007). 
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The Dutch scheme has not had separate accident insurance since 1967. Since 
then, entitlements are no longer caused based, but still remain different for workers and 
non-workers because they are earnings-related. In this scheme, it does not matter 
whether work incapacity is caused by accidental injury or by sickness. Thus, workers 
will be entitled to income replacement not only for work incapacity as a result of an 
accident, but also as a result of sickness.88 
  
This comparative study found that the dichotomy of independent accident and 
sickness insurance in Switzerland was questionable for several reasons89:  
 
First, the current Swiss scheme privileges people suffering from an accident 
over those suffering from a sickness. Supposing that the needs of the claimant, such as 
income replacement, medical expenses and rehabilitation, is the same irrespective of 
the cause of the incapacity, there must be a justification for this unequal treatment.90 
The majority of Swiss literature holds that there is no convincing argument for this 
inequality.91 The legislature examined the question of inequality between accident and 
sickness in the 1970s, but, decided that the abolition of the social accident insurance 
would be premature, because the second pillar (Compulsory Company Pension Fund 
providing cover for accident, old age, disability and death for employees)92 was not into 
force at the time. Moreover, the structure of the social sickness insurance did not allow 
merging the two systems at the time.93 When the second pillar was introduced in the 
1980s, the question was neither examined again94 nor in later partial revisions of other 
social insurances, such as the introduction of the sickness insurance act in the 1990s95, 
the various revisions of the disability insurance96 and the 1st revision of the BVG 
(Compulsory Company Pension Fund)97.  
 
                                                 
88  Steiner, above n 87, 67-68. 
89  Steiner, above n 87, 197-200. 
90  Steiner, above n 87, 198. 
91  Steiner, above n 87, 124.  
92  See Part IX B. 
93  Report of the Federal Council of 18 August 1976, 141, 161-162. 
94  Report of the Federal Council of 18 August 1976, 149, 246 and 274-277. 
95  BBl 1992 I 93, 206. 
96  BBl 1985 I 17 (2. IVG-Revision), BBl 1988 I 1333 (3. IVG-Revision), BBl 2001 I 3205 (4. IVG-
Revision), BBl 2005 II 4459 and BBl 2006 II 8313 (5. IVG-Revision). 
97  BBl 2000 II 2637.  
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Secondly, the main argument in favour of a merger of the sickness and accident 
insurance schemes is the difficulty of differentiating an accident from a sickness. This 
task involves tremendous costly undertakings on the part of lawyers, medical doctors 
and case workers. It has to be determined if the contingency is an accident, an article 9 
UVV injury, an occupational disease or an “ordinary” disease. This process also results 
in expenses and legal uncertainty for the insured person. 
 
Thirdly, the present coordination of the accident insurance with the social 
insurance scheme is very complicated. Apart from the accident insurance, two other 
social insurances (Compulsory Company Pension Fund and Disability Insurance) 
basically provide cover for an accident.98 These schemes have, furthermore, to be 
coordinated with the sickness insurance scheme and any private accident insurance 
taken out by the insured person. 
 
In the light of these difficulties, the Netherlands in 1967 repealed the accident 
insurance and introduced entitlements for health damages notwithstanding whether they 
are the result of a sickness or an accident. By doing so, the inequality and problems of 
delimitation have been removed, and questions of coordination with the rest of the 
social insurance scheme have been simplified.99 This scheme is funded by a 
combination of contributions of the insured person with subsidies for those with a low 
income and the state.100 
 
It is advocated here that the suggested repeal of the Swiss accident insurance 
and integration into the social security scheme would be the answer to the 
inconsistencies and problems raised in this dissertation. However, it is also important to 
examine the question of the political feasibility of such a model which is, as it is 
suggested here, the crucial point. 
 
On the 1st July 2008, the Federal Council published the Federal Report in regard 
to the reform of the accident insurance act (UVG) for the attention of the Parliament. 
The project comprises modifications concerning the organisation of the Suva and its 
                                                 
98   For details see Part IX B table 3 overview of insurances for the contingency accident. 
99   Steiner, above n 87, 199. 
100  Steiner, above n 87, 69–76. 
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rehabilitation hospitals, improvement of surveillance of the accident insurance 
companies, coordination of the invalid benefit with the first pillar (state old age and life 
insurance), and harmonisation of the medical tariffs in accident and sickness insurance. 
The question whether it would be suitable to merge the accident and sickness scheme or 
introduce a new definition of an accident, is regretfully not the object of the reform.101 
 
As a conclusion, it can be said that a radical change of the current social 
accident insurance scheme is not realistic in the near future, especially in the light of 
the recent pending reform in Parliament. However, it is suggested that, at least, the 
definition of an accident should be reconsidered. As it will be argued in this paper, the 
repeal of the requirement of the unusual factor would solve the problems of 
inconsistencies in between an accident and a sickness. 
 
 
2 New Zealand accident compensation 
 
New Zealand’s political system allows for reforming the accident compensation 
scheme in order to include cover for non occupational disease within a reasonable time. 
However, this has not been seriously reconsidered since the implementation of the 
scheme. Despite the critiques in literature,102 Parliament has contented itself with 
regularly amending the current legislation, for example, introducing the category of 
treatment injury (section 32 IPRC). Other suggestions have been made to include man-
made disease.103 Also the Law Commission in the 1988’s Report on Accident 
Compensation recommended a gradual expansion of the scheme to include cover for 
sickness by stages, including occupational diseases.104 Recently, Sir Owen Woodhouse 
has claimed that the Law Commission had demonstrated that the expansion would have 
been an economically acceptable path.105 
 
                                                 
101  BBl 2008 II 5395. 
102  Ferguson, above n 69, 61; Easton, above n 74, 207; Stephens, above n 77, 783; Duncan, above n 77, 
32-33. 
103  Maria Hook “New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme and man-made disease” (2008) 39 
VUWLR 289. 
104  Keith, above n 78, 301; Ken Oliphant “Beyond Woodhouse: Devising New Principles for 
Determining ACC Boundary Issues” (2004) 35 VUWLR 915. 
105  Woodhouse, above n 11. 
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3 Observations 
 
A merger of the current accident and sickness compensation schemes is fairly 
unlikely in both jurisdictions. In the Swiss scheme, the political system is crafted on the 
basis of balance of interests among the Government, Parliament and citizens rights, 
which has proved to be a guarantee for social peace and stability. The other side of the 
coin, radical changes of any well established scheme are almost impossible. In New 
Zealand, a merger of the accident and sickness compensation schemes would not have 
to overcome as many hurdles. However, in the light of the current economic situation 
and the announced increase of levy rates for ACC, which might forecast the direction of 
the development of the scheme, an extension of the accident compensation scheme to 
sickness seems unrealistic today. 
 
Nevertheless, on the grounds of the success of the Dutch model and the current 
issues concerning the dichotomy in both jurisdictions, such a merger merits being 
examined further and analysed regarding costs. It is expected that potential additional 
costs for funding such a scheme would be balanced by people incapacitated by sickness 
regaining work capacity earlier with the same entitlements as the accident 
compensation scheme. Therefore, claims for other benefits such as unemployment or 
sickness benefits would decrease and provide funding for the new benefits.  
 
 51
V DEFINITIONS OF AN ACCIDENT IN BOTH ACCIDENT 
 COMPENSATION SCHEMES  
 
 Despite arising in different legislative, political and jurisprudential contexts 
there is much that is similar between Switzerland and New Zealand in their respective 
definitions of what constitutes injury by accident for the purpose of the legislative 
schemes.  Both schemes require a strong causal nexus between the event of the accident 
and the resultant injury, although Swiss jurisprudence places significant emphasis on 
requiring sufficient the gravity of an accident before cover will be granted. Both 
schemes require that accidental injury occur within a limited time-frame so as to 
prevent cover for illness or gradual processes.  In addition both schemes usually require 
that accidental injury be the result of some external force or action external to the body.  
A key difference between the schemes however is visible when examining the Swiss 
requirement for a qualifying accident to involve an external “unusual factor”. The 
Swiss courts’ interpretation of what is required to show this “unusual factor” is another 
example of how the development of the scheme has drifted away from the underlying 
purpose of providing cover and compensation in order to restore work capacity as soon 
as possible.106  
 
In this Part the application of the definition of an accident in Swiss accident 
insurance law will be demonstrated by case studies. The case law that has arisen from 
the interpretation of the Swiss definition is very technical and intricate and far away 
from the ordinary person’s understanding and general language use of the term 
“accident”. The definition is formulated very broadly and leaves much discretion for 
interpretation by the decision-maker. As a result, incoherent jurisprudence has been 
developed. Furthermore, the jurisprudence has developed two definitions of an accident 
which have now been enacted in legislation: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106  Part II A 1. 
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 The primary definition is set out in Article 4 ATSG;107 and  
 the secondary definition, set out in Article 9 UVV,108 only applicable 
for certain specific injuries where the requirements of Article 4 ATSG 
cannot be met.  
 
As a result of this complicated jurisdiction, some injured persons miss out on 
cover, even if, from a medical point of view, an accident causing injury has undeniably 
occurred. As the scope for cover has been narrowed and as claims are accordingly 
denied, the insured person has no access to entitlements including rehabilitation and the 
restoration of work capacity is considerably more difficult and time-consuming. 
Through selected examples of jurisprudence, mainly concerning sport injuries, it will be 
demonstrated that, what is termed the “unusual factor” in the definition of an accident 
(Article 4 ATSG), is an arbitrary criterion. This requirement sets the bar for granting 
cover too high, and, therefore, should be repealed. 
 
In New Zealand accident compensation, the definitions of an accident and 
personal injury do not require an unusual factor, and more effectively define the 
boundary between an accident and sickness.  
 
 
A  The Primary Definition of an Accident (Article 4 ATSG) 
 
The word accident is often associated by the ordinary person with physical 
injury caused by mechanical forces like a kick or fall.  
 
The German word “Unfall” is defined as an event involving a sudden impact 
(external injury or organic disease), which causes physical or mental damage to the 
health of a human being. The etymology of the German word “Unfall” has its origins in 
the word “Unval” which means “Unglueck, Missgeschick”109. It is a combination of the 
                                                 
107  Federal Act on the General Part of Social Insurance Law (SR 830.1). 
108  Regulation on Accident Insurance (UVV) of 20 December 1982 (SR 832.202). 
109  English: misfortune, mishap; Günther Drosdowski (ed) DUDEN Etymologie (2 ed, Dudenverlag, 
Zürich 1989) 770. 
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two words “un” interpreted as “uebel”, “schlecht”, “miss”110 and “fall”,111 and 
expresses the meaning of a “bad fall”.112  
 
The English word “accident” has its origins in middle English and at the root 
Latin, “accident”, from “accidere”, from ad- “towards, to” and cadere “to fall”.113 An 
accident can be defined as “anything that happens without foresight or expectation, an 
unusual event, which proceeds from unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known 
cause; a casualty, a contingency, a mishap, an unfortunate event”.114  
 
Even if the words in both languages have different root words, the meaning is 
the same. An accident generally means a (unfortunate) fall. 
 
However, not every event that the insured person counts as an accident is an 
accident under the accident compensation legislation in either Swiss or New Zealand 
law. As it has been shown in Part III, the definition of an accident in Swiss law is the 
criterion to distinguish between accident compensation and sickness compensation. It is 
crucial to determine the boundaries between an accident and a gradual continuous 
process, and a sickness. Its function is to delineate cover of the accident insurance and 
sickness insurance.  
 
Swiss accident insurance utilises the definition developed by the Swiss Supreme 
Court in 1939.115 The court defined an accident as a sudden and involuntary injury 
caused to the human body by a “more or less external unusual factor”.116  This phrase 
was interpreted by the courts over the succeeding decades, but only in 1984 was this 
definition integrated into article 9(1) UVV.117  The new definition included a small 
                                                 
110  English: bad, miss. 
111  English: fall or case. 
112 Dudenredaktion (ed) DUDEN Synonymwörterbuch (4 ed, Dudenverlag, Zürich 2007) 913; 
Drosdowski, above n 109, 770. 
113  Judy Pearsall (ed) The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (3ed Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2002) 7. 
114  J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner The Oxford English Dictionary (2ed Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1998) 74; Tony Deverson and Graeme Kennedy The New Zealand Oxford Dictionary (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland 2005). 
115  EVGE 1939 E. 3 S. 112. 
116  EVGE 1939 E. 3 S. 112. 
117  The Regulation on Accident Insurance (UVV) of 20 December 1982 (SR 832.202) came into force 
on 1st January 1984. However, art. 9 UVV was abolished, when the ATSG (art. 4 definition of the 
accident) came into force on 1st January 2003. 
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amendment; the expression “more or less” was deleted. This description was meant to 
give the judge the necessary discretion to interpret the notion of “unusualness” in every 
specific case.118 Case law has defined that the external unusual factor must involve “a 
disruption of the framework of the ordinary or usual in the respective area of life”.119 
 
Meyer-Blaser’s comparative study of the definition of an accident in Germany, 
Austria, France, Italy and the UK has shown that only the Swiss scheme requires this 
unusual factor.  In Switzerland, it was argued that a special threshold for cover was 
needed because there was no reason to include non occupational accidents in the 
scheme. In other countries, non occupational accidents are not included in the accident 
insurance scheme. At the same time, it was admitted that there is no logic for the 
criterion of the unusual factor for occupational accidents. In addition, this criterion 
would be difficult to apply. 120 
 
In New Zealand accident compensation, the Woodhouse Report found that 
cover should be provided for “bodily injury by accident which is undesigned and 
unexpected so far as the person injured is concerned, but to the exclusion of 
incapacities arising from sickness or disease”.121 The former Accident Compensation 
Acts 1972 and 1982 defined the term of “personal injury by accident”, but, did not 
contain a definition of an accident prior to the Accident Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Insurance Act 1992. Previously, the Court of Appeal held that it meant 
an unlooked for mishap or untoward event which was not expected or designed.122  In 
the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001, the notion of 
accident is defined in section 25 and the term of personal injury is separately described 
in section 26.123 Accident is just one ground for cover (section 20(2)a) IPRC 2001. The 
other categories are set out in section 20 and 27 – 35 IPRC 2001. 
 
 
 
                                                 
118  Paul Piccard Haftpflichtpraxis und soziale Unfallversicherung (Orell Füssli, Zuerich, 1917) 15. 
119  BGE 116 V 147. 
120  Meyer-Blaser Ulrich, Unfallbegriff im Sozialversicherungsrecht, St. Gallen 1995, 289 – 292. 
121  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 289. 
122  Green v Matheson [1989] 3 NZLR 564 (CA) and Willis v Attorney-General [1989] 3 NZLR 574 
(CA), applying Fenton v Thorley & Co Ltd [1903] AC 403, 408 (HL). 
123  Brookers, IP25.02 commentary ad s 25 www.brookersonline.co.nz (accessed 20 March 2009). 
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1  Physical or mental injury 
 
(a) Swiss accident insurance  
  
The primary definition of an accident is that it must be a sudden and involuntary 
injury caused to the human body by an external unusual factor (article 4 ATSG). 
The “injury” requirement of the definition of an accident is fulfilled, if the event 
causes damage to the claimant’s health. This damage can be of physical or mental 
nature.124 The damage must either entail medical care, work incapacity, or death.125 
Therefore, the requirement of an injury is not fulfilled by the event itself, such as a fall, 
but only when the event causes an injury, for example a fracture, sprain or strain. On 
the other hand, the harmful impact on the human body is already sufficient, not only its 
further consequences, such as pain, sickness or death. Further, minor, non-harmful, but 
surely unpleasant impacts, such as headache, insignificant bruises or skin abrasions are 
not considered an injury.126 
In Swiss law, in contrast to New Zealand accident compensation, mental 
injuries are covered independently from a preceding physical injury. However, the 
threshold for cover often is the causal connection between the event and the mental 
injury, which can be difficult to demonstrate. 127 
 
 
(b)  New Zealand accident compensation 
 
In New Zealand accident compensation, the Woodhouse Report found that 
cover should be provided for “bodily injury by accident which is undesigned and 
unexpected so far as the person injured is concerned, but to the exclusion of 
incapacities arising from sickness or disease”.128  
 
                                                 
124  BGE 122 V 232 E. 1; Locher, above n 21, 73. 
125  Alfred Maurer Schweizerisches Unfallversicherungsrecht (2 ed, Staempfli, Bern, 1989) 172. 
126  André Largier Schaedigende medizinische Behandlung als Unfall (Schulthess, Zürich, 2002) 22-23. 
127  Part V A 2. 
128  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 289. 
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The former Accident Compensation Acts 1972 and 1982 defined the term of 
“personal injury by accident”, but, did not contain a definition of an accident prior to 
the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. Previously, the 
Court of Appeal held that it meant an unlooked for mishap or untoward event which 
was not expected or designed.129  In the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and 
Compensation Act 2001, the notion of accident is defined in section 25 and the term of 
personal injury is separately described in section 26.130 Accident is just one ground for 
cover (section 20(2)a) IPRC 2001. The other categories are set out in section 20 and 27 
– 35 IPRC 2001. 
 
In New Zealand accident compensation, the requirement of a physical injury is 
set out in section 26 IPRC 2001, and is not a constitutive element of the definition of an 
accident in section 25 IPRC 2001. 
 
As set out in Part II section 26 IPRC 2001 defines the personal injury: 
 
26 Personal injury 
(1) Personal injury means  
(a) the death of a person; or 
(b) physical injuries suffered by a person, including, for example, a strain or a sprain; or 
(c) mental injury suffered by a person because of physical injuries suffered by the person; or 
(d) mental injury suffered by a person in the circumstances described in section 21; or 
(da) work-related mental injury that is suffered by a person in the circumstances described in 
section 21B; or 
(e) damage (other than wear and tear) to dentures or prostheses that replace a part of the human 
body. 
(2) Personal injury does not include personal injury caused wholly or substantially by a gradual 
process, disease, or infection unless it is personal injury of a kind described in section 
20(2)(e) to (h). 
(3) Personal injury does not include a cardio-vascular or cerebro-vascular episode unless it is 
personal injury of a kind described in section 20(2)(i) or (j). 
                                                 
129  Green v Matheson [1989] 3 NZLR 564 (CA) and Willis v Attorney-General [1989] 3 NZLR 574 
(CA), applying Fenton v Thorley & Co Ltd [1903] AC 403, 408 (HL). 
130  Brookers, IP25.02 commentary ad s 25 IPRC Act www.brookersonline.co.nz (accessed 18 February 
2008). 
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(4) Personal injury does not include  
(a) personal injury caused wholly or substantially by the ageing process; or 
(b) personal injury to teeth or dentures caused by the natural use of those teeth or dentures. 
(5) For the purposes of subsection (1)(e) and to avoid doubt, prostheses does not include hearing 
aids, spectacles, or contact lenses. 
This section does not provide an exhaustive set of criteria to determine exactly 
what counts as a physical injury.  As in Swiss law, jurisprudence therefore has specified 
the term ‘physical injury’.  In a very influential judgment Teen v ACC131 the Court 
accepted a broad definition of the term ‘physical injury’ as ‘damage or hurt’ that ‘is of 
or relating to the body, as distinguished form the mind or spirit’. A precise label for the 
injury is not required as long as the effects are seen and manifest.132 However, pain 
alone is not sufficient evidence for an injury.133 Further, the claimant has to establish 
that the injury results from an accident, but does not have an onus to determine or label 
the precise nature of the injury.134 
 
When pain is accompanied by swelling the claimant is not usually entitled to 
cover: In Govind v ACC135 the Court held that swelling is the result of an inflammation, 
and therefore, the required physical injury had been established. Later, it was specified 
that this ruling could not apply in every case, but it would be decisive whether there is 
evidence of a physical injury.136 In Rose v ACC, in regard to tenosynovitis, cover under 
the ACC scheme was first affirmed, as the swelling and pain were assessed as evidence 
of physical injuries, namely carpal tunnel syndrome and tenosynovitis.137 Subsequently, 
the court held that the claimant’s tendon sheath swelling might be the result of muscle 
tension pain among other possible causes, and denied cover for tenosynovitis.138  
 
Requirements for a qualifying mental injury are more strict in the New Zealand 
scheme. Section 27 IPRC 2001 defines a mental injury as a clinically significant 
                                                 
131  Teen v ACC (3 September 2002) DC WN 244/02, Beattie J. 
132  Te Puna v ARCIC (11 May 1999) DC CHCH 117/99, p 15, Beattie J. 
133  ACC v Arnold (18 July 2003) DC WN 157/03, Beattie J.  
134  Te Puna v ARCIC (11 May 1999) DC CHCH 117/99, p 15, Beattie J. 
135  Govind v ACC (11 November 2002) DC AK 310/02, Beattie J. 
136  Edwards-Atkinson v ACC (15 November 2005) DC WN 335/05, Hole J.  
137  Rose v ACC (19 July 2000), DC CHCH 179/00, Beattie J; 19; Baker v ACC (5 July 2002) DC Huntly 
186/02, Beattie J.  
138  Westpac Trust v ACC (12 December 2005) DC WN 356/05, Ongley J. 
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behavioural, cognitive, or psychological dysfunction. Section 26(1)(c) IPRC 2001 
limits cover for mental injuries suffered by the claimant “because of” physical injury 
already suffered by the claimant. Work-related mental injuries are now also covered 
under s26 (d). Section 21B IPRC 2001, introduced on 1st October 2008, sets out cover 
for work-related mental injury. The courts have determined, in a number of decisions, 
that in seeking cover for mental injuries under section 26(c) the claimant has the onus 
to establish a direct causal nexus on the balance of probabilities between the physical 
injury and the mental injury.139 The court held that an indirect causal link is not 
sufficient to claim cover.140 In regard to minor injuries, it was found that the courts can 
be reluctant to affirm a mental injury caused by a minor injury when the effects of that 
injury are spent.141 
 
In Seddon v ACC142 cover for a mental injury, namely chronic pain, caused by a 
strained neck injury while playing rugby, was denied. The court held a direct causal 
link had not been shown on the balance of probabilities. Further, an indirect causation, 
such as brooding or worry, is not sufficient.143 
 
 
(c) Observations 
 
The main difference between the two schemes is that, in Swiss law, mental 
injuries are basically covered independently from a physical injury. However, as a 
second step, the threshold for cover in Swiss law is to establish a causal nexus between 
the accident and the mental injury with predominant probability. On the other hand, in 
New Zealand accident compensation, cover is, initially, limited to mental injuries 
directly caused by a physical injury or work-related mental injury before even taking a 
causal nexus between an accident and the mental injury into consideration. 
 
 
 
                                                 
139  Dorrington v ACC (16 February 2004) DC NEL 16/04, Beattie J.  
140  Robinson v ACC (17 September 2003) DC WN 230/03, Cadenhead J. 
141  ACC v Geerders (8 July 2004) DC WN 188/04, Cadenhead J. 
142  Seddon v ACC (8 October 2004) DC WN 320/04, Cadenhead J. 
143  Seddon v ACC (8 October 2004) DC WN 320/04, para 23, Cadenhead J. 
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2 Causality 
 
Both the Swiss and New Zealand schemes focus on the causes of accidental 
injury in determining whether cover should be granted, rather than on the outcomes of 
the accidental injury or the needs of the claimant. 
Broadly speaking, the requirement of the natural causal connection will be 
decided based on the medical report. As a second step, the requirement of the adequate 
causal connection gives discretion to the judge and allows him or her to limit the scope 
for cover in interpreting the general-abstract clause developed by jurisprudence.144 
 
(a) Swiss accident insurance  
  
In Swiss accident insurance, a causal connection between the event that results 
in the damage and the physical or mental injury must be established. Swiss literature 
and jurisprudence distinguish between the natural and the adequate causal connection. 
Both causal connections are conditions that must be fulfilled for a successful claim.145 
 
Natural causal connection146 
First, a natural causal connection must exist between the damaging event and 
the bodily harm. All circumstances are in a natural causal connection without which the 
result would not have occurred either not in the same way or not at the same time. 
Therefore, it is not necessary that the accident is the exclusive or immediate cause of 
health disturbances, in order to affirm the natural causal connection. It is sufficient that 
the damaging event, as well as other conditions, has impaired the physical or mental 
integrity of the insured person and is, therefore, a partial cause for these health 
disturbances.147  
For the assessment of the natural causal connection, the state of health before 
the accident must be compared with the state of health after the damaging event.148  
                                                 
144  BGE 115 V 135; BGE 122 V 416 E. 2a. 
145  Locher, above n 21, 70. 
146  Locher, above n 21, 319. 
147  BGE 112 V 32; BGE 119 V 337 E. 1. 
148  RKUV 1990 No. K 849. 
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Adequate causal connection149 
Second, there must be an adequate causal connection between the accident and 
the damage. An event is an adequate cause of a result, “if after the usual run of things 
and in general life experience, the event is likely to cause that kind of result. Thus, this 
result appears as generally probable”.150  
This clause is an excellent example within the requirements of the definition of 
an accident to show the extent of discretion for interpretation given to the decision-
maker in Swiss law. The rich jurisdiction of the Swiss Supreme Court, in particular 
regarding psychological accident sequences151 and injuries of the cervical spinal 
column, is very intricate and complicated, setting the threshold for cover very high. 
 According to jurisprudence, the event of the accident (“Unfallereignis”) is 
relevant for the assessment of the adequate causal connection of psychological accident 
sequences, not the experience of the accident (“Unfallerlebnis”), in other words, the 
gravity of the accident itself, not the way the claimant has experienced the accident. 
This criterion of an objective observation of the accident is based on the principles of 
equal treatment and legal certainty of the claimants. In order to affirm the adequate 
causal connection, the accident must objectively have certain gravity. Jurisprudence has 
created three categories of accidents:   
1 Minor accidents (“leichte Unfaelle”); 
2 Major accidents (“schwere Unfaelle”); and 
3 Accidents in between those two categories (“Unfaelle im mittleren Bereich”).  
In the case of minor accidents, the adequate causal connection can normally be 
denied. In contrast, for major accidents, the adequate causal connection between the 
accident and the psychological consequences can normally be affirmed. For 
accidents in between those two categories, the question whether the adequate causal 
connection must be affirmed or denied cannot be decided only on the basis of the 
event of the accident. Jurisprudence has developed further objective circumstances, 
                                                 
149  Locher, above n 21, 320. 
150  BGE 115 V 135; BGE 122 V 416 E. 2a. 
151  Psychological accident sequences are defined here as a form of mental injuries caused by the 
accident. 
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which are immediately related to the accident and seem to be direct or indirect 
consequences, which must be considered for the overall assessment of causation: 
- Particularly dramatic concomitant circumstances or particular impression of 
the accident 
- The severity or particularity of the suffered injury, namely if it is empirically 
likely to result in psychological sequences 
- Unusually long medical treatment 
- Chronic physical pain 
- Medical misadventure which has significantly worsened the sequences of an 
accident 
- Difficult healing process and significant complications 
- Degree and duration of work incapacity. 
It is not necessary that all these circumstances must be present. Depending on 
the case, one additional circumstance might be sufficient. This is namely where the 
accident must be qualified as a major accident within the category of in between 
accidents, or must even be qualified as situated at the threshold of the category of major 
accidents. On the other hand, one of these further circumstances can be sufficient if it is 
fulfilled in a particularly distinctive way. If there is no distinctive circumstance, several 
further circumstances must be given, particularly the more minor the accident is. The 
more the accident must be qualified as situated at the threshold of minor accidents, the 
more the additional circumstances must be present.152  
The practical relevance of mental injuries plays a role where the claimant 
suffers from psychological consequences, but not from a physical injury. In the context 
of sport accidents, this is, for example, the case where a group undertakes a ski 
expedition and several members of the group are buried by an avalanche. However, the 
claimant does not suffer from any physical injuries, but has psychological 
consequences. Second, psychological accident consequences might occur as well as a 
physical injury, but not be in an adequate causal connection with the accident.  
 
                                                 
152  BGE 115 V 140 E. 6c, most recently confirmed in BGer of 19 February 2008 (U 394/06). 
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This jurisdiction has been largely criticised in the literature, but never overruled. 
It is submitted in the literature that the subjective experience of the accident should be 
relevant for assessing the adequate causal connection between psychological accident 
sequences and the accident.153  
 
(b)  New Zealand accident compensation 
 
Section 20(2)(a) IPRC Act 2001 states that the person has cover for a personal 
injury if it is caused by an accident to the person. 
 
Causation is the decisive element in many New Zealand cases. It is especially 
important for cases regarding gradual process injury. When assessing whether the 
injury or event is connected to the present symptoms, the judge has to take into account 
intent and policy considerations of the Injury Prevention Rehabilitation, and 
Compensation Act 2001 (IPRC Act 2001).154 
 
 The claimant has to prove the causal relationship between the accident and the 
personal injury on the balance of probabilities. The scope of the IPRC Act 2001 is upon 
outcomes and not risks, in other words, risk or potentiality of injury does not result in 
any entitlements under this Act.155  Cover for personal injury requires probability, not 
possibility, nor loss of chance.  The required probability must be more than 50%.156  
  
In New Zealand law, the modern causation test consists basically of a twofold 
enquiry.157 The first step is the so called ‘threshold’ or ‘but for’ test. The question has 
to be answered whether a claimant would have suffered the loss without (‘but for’) the 
earlier event or happening. In the affirmative, there may be a causal link between the 
                                                 
153  Ueli Kieser ATSG Kommentar (Schulthess, Zürich, 2003) 68. 
154  M.J. Beattie and J. Cadenhead “A sketch of some issues pertaining to the appellate jurisdiction and 
practice of the district court concerning accident compensation appeals” unpublished, para 55. 
155  Atkinson v ACC (9 October 2001) CA 137/01. 
156  This was confirmed in the case of Gregg v Scott ([2005] UKHL 2, 27 January 2005. 
157  Beattie, above 154, para 68. 
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event and the injury.158 Whereas the aspect of procedure is concerned, the causal 
requirements are a question of fact.159 
 
In later cases160, the ‘threshold’ or ‘but for’ test has been fine-tuned insofar, as a 
second step, the policy or scope of the statute must be interpreted on the specific factual 
background and taken into account while analysing causation.161  
 
 
(c) Observations 
Where causation is concerned parallels can be drawn between the requirements 
in Swiss and New Zealand law. 
The New Zealand ‘but for’ test (causa sine qua non) seems to be the equivalent 
to the Swiss law for natural causation (condition sine qua non). Both principles aim at 
the question whether the insured person would have suffered the loss without the earlier 
event or happening. 
It is very interesting to note that also the formula of the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court for adequate causation162 is very close to the formula in the Fairchild v 
Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 305, 338, where Lord Hoffmann says 
that the causal requirements represent “what in ordinary life would normally be 
regarded as the reasonable limits for attributing blame or responsibility for harm”. On 
the other hand, the adequate causal link is established when “if after the usual run of 
things and in general life experience, the event is likely to cause that kind of result. 
Thus, this result appears as generally probable”.163 Both decision-making aids are 
formulas with which the judge decides, based on common sense, in the specific case at 
hand, at the end of the day. 
 
 
                                                 
158  Beattie, above 154, para 55. 
159  Beattie, above 154, para 59.  
160  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 305, 340 para 57-58. 
161  Beattie, above 154, para 70-74. 
162  BGE 115 V 135; BGE 122 V 416 E. 2a. 
163  BGE 115 V 135; BGE 122 V 416 E. 2a. 
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3 External force or resistance 
 
Both Swiss and New Zealand accident compensation law generally require that 
the relevant accident be the result of forces and incidents external to the body.  
 
 
(a) Swiss accident insurance  
 
The primary definition of an accident requires an external factor, must affect the 
body. This external factor is fulfilled if the body is affected by forces such as 
mechanical (being beaten or cut), chemical, thermal (as extreme heat impact) and 
electrical or rays; likewise if the supply of oxygen for the human body is missing (as 
with strangulation or also in case of penetration of water or other substances into the 
airways); and finally also by explosions, which cause damage to hearing. On the 
contrary, for example a heart attack or stroke is a cardio-vascular event and is 
considered not as an accident, but as an illness.164 
 
 The event must have occurred outside the body.165 The consequences can, 
however, show up, perhaps exclusively inside the body.166 For example, a blow to the 
head might not cause an external injury, but a concussion. The oral cavity belongs in 
this context. Thus, the external factor is affirmed in the case of swallowing a needle, 
dentures, or a bone fragment, or biting one’s own tongue.  
 
The external factor has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following cases: 
 
- Water that penetrates into the respiratory system167  
- A large fish whirling up sand while diving168  
- Sting (of a wasp, bee, hornet, tick)169  
 
 
                                                 
164  Locher, above n 21, 72; Ueli Kieser Schweizerisches Sozialversicherungsrecht (Dike, Zuerich, 2008) 
n° 34. 
165  Kieser, above n 164, n° 34. 
166  Koller Alfred (ed) Haftpflicht- und Versicherungsrechtstagung 1995 (Dike, St. Gallen, 1995) 225. 
167  EVGE 1945 91. 
168  SUVA annual report 1984 n° 2 p. 3. 
169  BGE 122 V 239-240. 
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The external factor has been denied by the Supreme Court in the following cases: 
- With a diver, if he or she breathes out insufficiently on surfacing, 
because this is a body-internal, physiological happening and not an 
external factor.170 
 
(b)  New Zealand accident compensation 
 
 Section 25(1)(a)(i) requires that the event or series of events must involve the 
application of an external force or resistance (including gravity). A minor external 
force or resistance also fulfils the requirement. The determining factor is only if the 
(minor) external force or resistance can be pinpointed by evidence as causal to the 
injury.171 
 
I would like to illustrate this with the case of Brock v Accident Compensation 
Corporation (ACC)172 where the District Court dismissed an appeal of a claimant who 
suffered a traumatic hernia caused by a single strenuous event in the course of rowing. 
However, the insured only sought medical treatment seven months after the event. The 
court held that it was not proven on the balance of probabilities that the rowing had 
caused the hernia. 
 
Like in Swiss accident insurance law, internal forces are not covered. The injury 
must occur during the application of any external force or resistance such as lifting a 
heavy object, or falling and striking a hard surface. Where there is no impact between 
the insured person’s body and any other force or source of force or resistance 
whatsoever, the injury may be caused by the interaction of two or more body parts.  
 
 
                                                 
170  Kieser, above n 164, n° 36. 
171  Brookers, IP25.06 (1) ad section 25 IPRC Act 2001 www.brookersonline.co.nz. 
172  Brock v Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) (10 August 2004) DC WN 240/2004, 
Cadenhead J. 
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A lot of cases can be found regarding back injuries such disc prolapse,173 nerve 
root compression174 and herniation.175 Such interaction is internal only and not from 
any external force and therefore, the element of an external factor is not fulfilled.176 
 
The requirement of an external factor has only been included in the Accident 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 following the case of ACC v 
Mitchell.177 In this case, the court interpreted the definition of “personal injury by 
accident” so broadly so as to give an infant who ceased breathing due to unknown 
causes cover under the Accident Compensation Act 1982. 
 
The external factor has been affirmed by courts in the following cases: 
 
- The effect of wearing heavy boots178  
- Digging holes, lifting dirt, and pulling roots179  
- Making the bed by bending over, pulling the mattress up and back180  
 
The external factor has been denied by courts in the following cases: 
- Sudden twisting around while climbing some stairs181 
- Leaning over and turning on a bedside light with both feet on the floor 
and one hand on the bed for support182 
- Sneezing that caused a disc prolapse.183 
 
                                                 
173  For example Lovelace v ACC (6 October 2000), DC CHCH 264/00, Barber J. 
174  For example Shore v ACC (22 December 2003) DC DUN 334/03, Beattie J. 
175  ARCIC v Stephens (7 September 1998) DC AK 196/98, Beattie J. 
176  ARCIC v Stephens (7 September 1998) DC AK 196/98, para 5-6, Beattie J. 
177  ACC v Mitchell [1992] 2 NZLR 436. 
178  Hurunui v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd (4 October 1999) DC WN 276/99, Middleton J. 
179  Fitzsimons v ACC (4 August 2000) DC PMN 197/00, Beattie J. 
180  Shore v ACC (22 December 2003) DC DUN 334/03, Beattie J. Judge Beattie said that it was more 
probable than not that the insured person was bending over, pulling the mattress up and back, and as 
such there was external force involved. In the inferior instance, the judge held that making the bed 
by only bending over did not fulfil the external factor. 
181  ARCIC v Stephens (7 September 1998) DC AK 196/98, para 5-6, Beattie J. According to section 
25(1)(a)(iii) (twisting movement of the body) IPRC 2001, this case would now be covered. 
182  Biggart v HIH Workable Ltd (30 October 2000) DC DUN 290/00, Barber J. 
183  Lovelace v ACC (6 October 2000) DC CHCH 264/00, Barber J.  
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As an example for gravity as an external force or resistance the following case 
has been affirmed: 
 
-  Slipping of sofa cushion which involved stretching and extension of the 
neck.184 
 
 
(c) Observations 
 
Comparing the requirement of an external factor in the Swiss and New Zealand 
accident compensation schemes, it can be concluded that both systems stipulate an 
external element to the human body. Generally, within Continental law, such as Swiss 
law, it is more common to codify, whereas in Common law countries, such as New 
Zealand, case law tends to predominate. However, in this case, this is the exception to the 
general rule: Whereas the wording of Article 4 ATSG does not specify the undefined 
legal term “external unusual factor”, case law does.  In the New Zealand context the 
wording of section 25(1) IPRC 2001 codifies a long list of categories to assist in the 
determination of the external factor. Whether requirements are codified or decided on a 
case by case basis is a crucial issue in regard to legal security, discretion and non-
arbitrary and uniform decisions on cover. 
 
 
4  Time limitation 
 
Both legislative schemes place limitations on granting cover for injuries that are 
incurred gradually. The definition of an accident not only in the legal, but also in the 
ordinary’s person understanding implies an element of suddenness which distinguishes 
an accident from a gradual disease. Thus, both schemes require this element in the 
definition of an accident, even if it is differently worded. 
 
 
 
                                                 
184 Johnson v ACC (29 September 2004) DC WN 311/04, para 34, Beattie J.  
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(a) Swiss accident insurance  
 
The unusual external factor required by the primary definition of accident in 
Article 4 ATSG must affect the human body suddenly; in other words, within seconds 
(e.g. impact, fall) or minutes of the causal event.185 The unusual external factor must be 
unpredictable and unique. Jurisprudence has not set a time limit to determine what 
constitutes “suddenness”. Suddenness is the criterion to differentiate between a 
gradually developed illness and health damage caused by a sudden event, an 
accident.186   
 
The body movement must be suddenly and unusually interrupted by a static 
obstacle. It is insignificant whether the pain suddenly arises, since this already belongs 
to the health disturbance (and not to the external factor). The more obviously the 
suddenness is established, the more likely it will be that the element of unusualness will 
probably be fulfilled in the primary definition of accident.187  
 
The suddenness - and therefore usually also the unusual external factor - is 
denied in circumstances involving thermal damage, such as sun stroke, sun burn and 
frost bite, except if the damage arises under unusual circumstances.188  
 
Suddenness of the impact of the external factor has been affirmed in the following 
cases:  
- Soccer player kicks into the air and suffers an strained trauma189  
- Climbing gloves being torn, and thus rapidly and abruptly causing 
frostbite.190  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
185  Koller, above 166, 207. 
186  Locher, above n 21, 71; Kieser, above n 164, n° 27. 
187  Koller, above 166, 210. 
188  RKUV 1997, 373. 
189  RKUV 1990, 375. 
190  RKUV 2001 n° U 437. 
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Suddenness of the impact of the external factor has been denied in the following cases:  
- Repeated efforts during work, e.g. when operating a hammer or drill191  
 
In Swiss accident insurance, the primary definition of an accident in Article 4 
ATSG with the required element of a sudden movement of the body allows the 
differentiation between a gradually developed illness and health damage caused by a 
sudden event; an accident.192   
 
 
(b)  New Zealand accident compensation 
 
In New Zealand accident compensation, s25(1)(a)(ii) extends cover to a specific 
event or a series of specific events, other than gradual process, that involves the sudden 
movement of the body to avoid force (including gravity), or resistance, external to the 
human body. This amendment to the definition of an accident goes back to the cases 
such as O’Regan v ARCIC193. In this case a dairy farmer suffered from a back injury by 
twisting while dodging a kicking cow’s hoof in a cow shed. Under the 1998 Act the 
event was not covered because the injury was not the result of an external force or 
resistance. 
 
The definition of an accident requires a specific event or a series of specific 
events and cannot be the result of a gradual process. The definition requires, as an 
alternative element, the element of ‘suddenness’ which is missing in a gradual process. 
Under the accident compensation scheme, gradual process injuries are only covered for 
work-related injuries in section 30.194  
  
 
                                                 
191  EVGE 1947, 9. 
192  Locher, above n 21, 71; Kieser, above n 164, n° 27. 
193  O’Regan v ARCIC (21 January 1999) DC Huntly 5/99, Beattie J.  
194  Brookers, IP25.05 (1) commentary ad s 25 www.brookersonline.co.nz (accessed 18 Februry 2008). 
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In the case of Chaplow v Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC),195 the 
District Court decided an appeal from the claimant, who suffered from an injury caused 
by a treadmill exercise. The court quashed the decision revoking cover, based on the 
main argument that the injury could have been caused either by a gradual process or by 
a series of events amounting to an accident. In another case regarding a sport accident, 
the District Court dismissed an appeal against the ACC decision. Principally, the 
decision states that the rupture of the abdominal wall was more likely to be caused by a 
gradual process of muscle weakening than a specific event while the insured was doing 
a sustained number of Russian Twist Sit-ups in a gym. As a matter of fact, the insured 
person felt pain after the training, but did not immediately consult a general 
practitioner.196 
 
(c) Observations 
 
 The slight difference between the Swiss and New Zealand law is that, whereas, in 
Swiss law, the suddenness is an explicit criterion of the primary definition of accident, in 
New Zealand law, it is only an option where there is no external force or resistance. 
However, both schemes aim at differentiating an accident from a sickness which has 
been examined in Part IV.  
 
5 Involuntariness 
 
(a) Swiss accident insurance  
 
The primary definition of accident in Article 4 (ATSG) also requires that a 
qualifying accident involve an involuntary injury caused to the human body by an 
external unusual factor. This element cannot be met, when someone voluntarily 
damages him- or herself. The intention must be aimed at causing damage. It is not 
sufficient that certain behaviour is voluntary, but also the resulting damage.197 For 
example in regard to sport accidents, skiing or playing rugby is probably practised 
voluntarily in most cases. Merely practising those sports voluntarily will not be enough 
                                                 
195  Chaplow v Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) (21 December 2006) DC WN 321/2006, 
Ongley J. 
196  Sonter v Accident Compensation Corporation (8 November 2006) DC AK 279/2006, Beattie J. 
197  Koller, above 166, 211. 
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to prevent cover being granted. Rather the insured person must have intended to 
experience an injury while practicing sports. 
 
This level of intention requires that the insured person is able to judge under 
Article 16 Zivilgesetzbuch (ZGB).198 Thus, if an insured person is not able to make 
such a judgment when voluntarily damaging him or herself, cover will principally be 
granted. Under Article 48 UVV suicide or self-inflicted injuries fulfill the definition of 
an accident, under the condition that the insured person was completely unable to act 
reasonably without fault.199  
 
An exception to this principle is risks stated under article 50 UVV. The insured 
person voluntarily takes the risk of an injury. Practice has determined a list of 
adventures and risk sports where cover will be completely or partially denied.200 
 
(b) New Zealand accident compensation  
 
 The IPRC Act 2001 does not require that a personal injury be incurred 
voluntarily either in s25 (accident) or s26 (personal injury) as a requirement to fulfil the 
definition of an accident.  This characteristic is in keeping with the scheme being a no 
fault scheme. To require the demonstration of voluntariness would necessarily lead to 
consideration of fault which would be beyond the scope of the scheme.201 For personal 
injuries wilfully incurred before 1 August 2008, entitlements may be denied under s 
119 of the IPRC 2001.  This section dealt with wilfully self-inflicted personal injuries 
and suicide. No entitlements (except treatment) are provided for such a personal injury 
if the claimant wilfully inflicts on himself or herself or, with intent to injure himself or 
herself, causes harm to be inflicted upon himself or herself. Furthermore, there was a 
provision for disentitlement where the death of a claimant occurred due to an injury 
inflicted in the circumstances described in paragraph (a), or (c) the death of a claimant 
due to suicide. Section 119(2) no longer applies for injuries incurred after 1 August 
2008). 
                                                 
198  Broadly speaking, “be able to judge” in the wording of this article means “be able to think clearly”. 
Someone would not be “able to judge”, for example, if he or she is (mentally) ill or drunk. 
199  Koller, above 166, 213. 
200  For example car, boat and ski races, full contact boxing, diving below 40 metres. 
201  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 89. 
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(c) Observations 
 
In New Zealand, as the accident compensation scheme is based on “need”, it 
would be inconsistent for cover to be determined on the basis of fault. This goes back to 
the fact that the right to sue, a liability compensation system, has been replaced by a 
compensation system based on need.202 The Swiss accident insurance scheme is not truly 
a non-fault scheme insofar as the injury must be incurred involuntarily. This paper argues 
that this requirement is in line with the underlying purpose of the Swiss scheme because 
it would be beyond the scope of the scheme to cover self-inflicted injuries. The non-fault 
element in the Swiss scheme is seen in the fact that the insured person does not have to 
demonstrate someone else’s fault. 
 
6 Unusualness 
 
(a) Swiss accident insurance  
 
Besides causality, the requirement of an unusual factor in the primary definition 
of accident in Article 4 (ATSG) is a very high threshold for cover, an arbitrary criterion 
which should be repealed. As with causality, the “unusual factor” is a very broad term 
leaving too much discretion and arbitrariness for interpretation to the decision-maker. 
The jurisdiction surrounding the definition is very intricate and inconsistent, as it will 
be shown in this chapter. 
 
The external factor must be unusual, in other words, “a disruption of the 
framework of the ordinary or usual in the respective area of life”.203 This has to be 
assessed by objective criteria.204 The unusualness refers to the factor itself and not to its 
effect on the human body.205  
 
                                                 
202  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, para 14. 
203  BGE 116 V 147. 
204  BGE 122 V 233. 
205  BGE 122 V 232. 
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  The unusualness has to be affirmed with uncoordinated movements, if the 
normal sequence is interrupted by something unprogrammed like slipping, stumbling or 
avoiding a fall.206  
 
The unusual factor was affirmed in the following cases in Swiss jurisprudence: 
-  Nutshell in nut bread207  
-  Bone fragment in a sausage208  
-  Stone in a rice dish209  
-  Transfusion of incompatible blood210  
-  If the course of motion of an amateur soccer player is interrupted by an 
opponent in an unexpected way and he or she suffers a twist of the knee. 
The unusual factor was denied in the following cases:  
 
-  A figurine in a “Three-King cake”211  
-  Hitting an incisor on the glass while drinking212  
-  A cake decoration pearl that was intended to be eaten213 
-  An unpopped kernel of popcorn214  
-  A hard biscuit like e.g. Totenbeinli215  
 
                                                 
206  RKUV 2000 n° U 368 S. 100 E. 2d. 
207  BGE 114 V 170. 
208  BGE 112 V 205. 
209  RKUV 1999 n° U 349. 
210  EVGE 1961 n° U 205. 
211  BGE 112 V 205. 
212  RKUV 1996 n° U 137. 
213  BGE 112 V 204. 
214  BGE of 16 January 1992. 
215  BGE 103 V 181. 
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-  Intervertebral disc degeneration, which developed without hitting, fall or 
other uncoordinated movement216  
-  Observation of a solar eclipse217  
- Strong impact of sun or cold resulting in a sun stroke, sun burn or 
frostbite. On the contrary, an accident is affirmed, if these harmful 
consequences occur due to extraordinary procedures e.g. if the insured 
person cannot move as a consequence of a broken leg, und thus, is 
exposed to the sun.218  
 
There is no special definition for sport injuries, but the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court has refined the requirement of the unusual factor for this type of injuries. 
Essentially, sports injuries are treated somewhat differently to other types of accidental 
injuries in the Swiss law. 
 
The Court has decided that basically a sports accident fulfils the external factor 
because there is often a mechanical impact (fall, collision) involved. According to 
literature and jurisdiction, the criteria of the unusual external factor can consist of an 
uncoordinated movement. The principle is applicable concerning movement of the 
body where the requirement of an unusual external impact is only fulfilled, if an 
external event influenced the natural sequence of the body movement in an 
“unprogrammed” way.219 
 
The element of the unusual factor must be denied for a sport injury if there is no 
specific event present.220 Furthermore, there is no unusual factor when the inherent risk 
of the physical exercise realises itself.221 In addition to this, the unusual factor must 
also be denied when a physical exercise is not executed perfectly, but the quality of 
execution is still within the usual range.222 
                                                 
216  SUVA annual report 1988 n° 8. 
217  SUVA annual report 1984 n° 1. 
218  RKUV 1987 n° U 25. 
219  BGE 130 V 117 E. 2.1. 
220  BGE 130 V 117 E. 2.2. p. 118; RKUV 2004 Nr. U 502 S. 183, U 322/02 E. 4.4. 
221  BGE of 1st February 2005 (U 313/2004) E. 2.2. 
222  RKUV 2004 n° U 502 E. 4.4. p. 185. 
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The unusual factor was affirmed in the following cases regarding sport activities: 
- Involuntary sliding into a snow tube.223  While snow tubing a person slid 
down a special slope on a rubber tyre. In this case, the injured did not 
precisely slide into the tube on departure, but on the hard snow surface 
and hurt her coccyx. The court affirmed the definition of an accident and 
the unusual factor, because the slide happened differently than planned.  
 
- Collision with the board by an ice hockey player.224 The Swiss Supreme 
Court affirmed the definition of an accident and, especially the unusual 
factor, in case of an injury caused by a collision with the board by an ice 
hockey player. 
 
- Impact on the shooting arm of a handball player.225 Another handball 
player grabbed the insured person’s arm while she was trying to throw 
the ball. This impact on the lower arm resulted in a crack in the shoulder 
joint which caused her pain for several days. 
 
- Pain in the ankle immediately after practising a cartwheel.226 The court 
held that the exercise was not executed in the correct way and the 
claimant had landed badly. Furthermore, the claimant was a trained 
gymnast. Therefore, the bad landing was unprogrammed and seemed 
unusual. 
 
                                                 
223  BGE of 11 May 2007 (U 411/05). 
224  BGE 130 V 117 U 172/03. 
225  BGE of 7 July 2003 (U 96/03). 
226  RKUV 1992 n° U 156 p. 258-260. 
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- Twisting of a knee of a soccer player.227 A soccer player twisted his 
knee when an opponent tackled him. As a consequence of this attack, the 
external element, the sequence of movements of the insured person was 
disturbed in an “unprogrammed” way. 
 
- Sliding of a skier on a camel-backed skiing field.228 A skier slid on a 
camel-backed skiing field on an icy surface. Instead of falling, he took 
the next camel-back in an uncontrolled way which resulted in a twist of 
the upper body and subsequent fall. The court saw the “unprogrammed” 
body movement in the sliding on the icy surface and the fall after the 
uncontrolled taking of the next camel-back. 
 
The unusual factor was denied in the following cases regarding sport activities:  
 
- Slipping of a horse while changing from gallop to canter.229 A horse 
slipped while changing from gallop to canter. As a consequence, the 
rider suffered from a whiplash spine injury. The court denied the claim 
of the insured due to insufficient evidence. However, according to the 
court, it is not unusual for a horse to slip when changing from gallop to 
canter. Therefore, the unusual factor of the definition of an accident was 
denied. 
 
- Pain in the neck after a cartwheel forwards.230 A gymnastic teacher 
practised a cartwheel forwards. The unusual factor was denied. 
 
                                                 
227  RKUV 1993 n° U 165 p. 58-60. 
228  RKUV 1999 n° U 345 p. 424 E. 4. 
229  BGE of 14 February 2006 (U 296/05). 
230  BGE of 28 June 2002 (U 98/01). 
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- Spinal injury during a Jiu-Jitsu practice.231 A claimant suffered a spin 
injury when he got under his opponent and tried to push him upwards to 
free himself. This movement resulted in a big pressure on his spine, 
because the head was tucked in and his spine was sprained. The court 
held that the pushing upwards must not be qualified as an uncoordinated 
movement, because the sequence of movements was not disturbed by an 
external factor in an unprogrammed way. 
 
- Back pain after a smash while playing volleyball.232 A player suffered a 
back injury after he played a “smash” in volleyball. He got into a 
stretched back posture and sensed low-back pain. The court said that 
such movements are part of the usual range of type of movements of 
volleyball and therefore, not unusual.   
 
- Jump into water from the swimming pool edge.233 A swimmer jumped 
into water from the swimming pool edge and indicated that he sensed a 
strong pain in his cervical spine. The court held there was no evidence of 
an unusual external element such as bumping into the pool edge or 
slipping). 
 
- Blistering of feet in hiking boots with subsequent infection.234A tramper 
got blisters on his feet from his hiking shoes with subsequent infection. 
The court stated that there is no unusual external factor because the 
bacteria causing the infection did not occur as a result of the injury. 
 
                                                 
231  BGE of 10 January 2003 (U 385/01). 
232  BGE of 10 May 2004 (U 199/03). 
233  BGE of 17 August 2004 (U 243/03). 
234  RKUV 2004 n° U 519 p. 439. 
 78
- Stress fracture after a long tramp in Tasmania with hard striking of the 
heel on the ground.235 The insured person was climbing down a 
mountain in Tasmania and hit her heel hard on the ground. The court 
held there was no evidence of an unusual external element and hitting 
the heel hard on the ground alone could not be considered as an 
“unprogrammed” movement. 
 
By setting out these cases, it has been demonstrated how inconsistent and 
contradictory the interpretation of the unusual factor is. In analysing these cases, it has 
been found that cases with similar fact scenarios have been treated differently. Thus, it 
seems to depend entirely on the interpretation of the judge treating the case if the 
unusual factor is affirmed or denied. This is a result of the notion “unusual” which is 
formulated too broadly. Thus, the purpose of the scheme to provide cover for accidents 
is undermined because in all these cases the injured person will miss out on cover, even 
though an accident has clearly occurred. 
 
 
(c) Observations 
 
It has been shown that the most difficult element to meet in the primary 
definition of an accident under Article 4 (ATSG) is the unusual factor. This element is 
an arbitrary criterion because it is formulated too widely leaving too much discretion 
for interpretation to the decision-maker. 
 
The New Zealand scheme does not require an unusual factor which makes the 
New Zealand definition less arbitrary than the Swiss definition. In New Zealand law, 
there is no unusual factor required in the definition of an accident. The following case 
study “Piece of Shot in Venison” will demonstrate the difference between the two 
schemes in defining accidental injury. It will be demonstrated that the New Zealand 
definition still leaves a considerable flexibility for interpretation.  
 
 
                                                 
235  BGE of 23 November 2006 (U 258/04), E. 3.2. 
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B  Case Study (‘Piece of Shot in Venison’) 
 
It is very important to be able to demonstrate by way of a case study how both 
systems would work differently with the same injury. In this chapter, the main issues 
deriving from the strongly employment-based Swiss scheme will be illustrated, such as 
the definition of an accident and the disparity in insurance cover between injured 
workers and non-workers, by the ‘piece of shot in venison’ case ruled by the Swiss 
Supreme court in 2005236. Afterwards, the same case and the legal solution according to 
New Zealand law will be presented in order to reveal the differences and 
inconsistencies in both accident compensation schemes. 
 
 
1 Under Swiss accident insurance  
 
The primary definition of an accident in Article 4 (ATSG) is crucially 
important. 237 The primary definition of an accident is the criterion to differentiate 
social accident compensation from social sickness compensation. When a claimant can 
establish a personal injury by accident, the Swiss Accident Insurance Act provides 
better benefits than the Sickness Compensation Act. 
 
Apart from those two categories above, a further disparity exists in both systems 
between injured workers and non-workers. Indeed, the former are entitled to 
compensation for loss of income whereas the latter can claim only minor benefits like, 
for example, medical expenses.  
 
 
The ‘Piece of Shot in Venison’ case238 
The material facts are set out as follows. Mr L was an employee, and as a 
consequence, was insured for work-related and non-work related accidents. On 7 
November 2002, he went for lunch around 1 pm to a little restaurant in a countryside 
                                                 
236  BGE of 18 October 2005 (U 367/04). 
237  An accident is defined as sudden and involuntary injury caused to the human body by an external 
unusual factor (art 4 ATSG). 
238  BGE of 18 October 2005 (U 367/04). 
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village of French-speaking Switzerland, and ordered a dish of venison. While he was 
enjoying the delicious dish, he suddenly bit on a pellet ball, broke a filling and a molar. 
The accident insurance declined cover for the dentist’s bill for the amount of 434 Swiss 
francs. Mr. L brought the case before the Swiss Supreme Court after his claim had been 
declined by the lower courts. 
The legal question was if Mr L was entitled to cover from the Swiss accident 
insurance scheme for this event. More specifically, does the incident fulfil all the 
elements of the primary definition of an accident under Article 4 (ATSG)?  In that 
Article an accident is defined as sudden and involuntary injury caused to the human 
body by an external unusual factor.239.  
 
As discussed in Part II, this primary definition contains six elements that must 
be fulfilled in order to accept a claim: 
 
1) A sudden and  
2) involuntary  
3) injury  
4) caused to the human body by  
5) an external  
6) unusual factor.  
 
In this case, the injury is given, because Mr L broke a filling and a molar which 
is a physical injury. 
Next, the injury must have happened suddenly, in other words, within seconds 
or minutes. In our case, the accident has happened suddenly, because Mr L broke his 
filling and molar within seconds of biting on the pellet. 
Furthermore, the definition of an accident requires an external factor. This 
external factor is fulfilled if the body is affected by, for example, in the present case, 
mechanical forces. The external factor is affirmed in the case of swallowing a needle, 
dentures, or a bone fragment, or biting one’s own tongue.240 In our case, the external 
                                                 
239  Federal Act on the General Part of Social Insurance Law (SR 830.1). 
240  Locher, above n 21, 72. 
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factor is the biting of the pellet in Mr L’s oral cavity. This is uncontested an external 
factor. 
The injury was involuntary241, because there is no indication in the case that Mr 
L bit on the pellet on purpose. 
There is also a causal connection242 between the causing event, the pellet, and 
the physical injury, the broken filling and molar in our case. 
The hardest element to fulfil in the case is, as in most cases regarding the 
primary definition of an accident, the unusual factor. The external factor must be 
unusual, in other words, according to the constant formula of the Swiss Supreme Court, 
“a disruption of the framework of the ordinary or usual in the respective area of life”.243 
In our case, the question is whether it is ordinary or usual to find a pellet in a deer dish 
in a restaurant. 
 
The Swiss Supreme Court found there was no unusual factor. The court stated 
that one must expect pellets in a deer dish while eating in a restaurant. Further, it held 
that after general experience, the presence of a piece of shot in venison is not 
unusual:244  
 
Lorsque l'on mange de la chasse au restaurant, on peut s'attendre à ce que se trouve dans 
la viande un reste de projectile. En effet, selon l'expérience générale (ATF 112 V 203 
consid. 1), la présence d'un reste de projectile dans du gibier n'a rien d'inhabituel. 
 
English translation: [my translation] 
 
When eating venison in a restaurant, one must expect a piece of shot in the meat. After 
the general experience, the presence of a piece of shot in venison is not unusual. 
 
To underline this argument, the Court referred to a case of teeth damage caused 
by a home-made cherry cake still containing stones245 and the case of bone splinter in a 
chicken246. In those two cases, the Court held that the unusual factor must be denied 
                                                 
241  Locher, above n 21, 71. 
242  Locher, above n 21, 70. 
243  BGE 116 V 147; BGE 121 V 38 E. 1a. 
244  BGE of 18 October 2005 (U 367/04) E. 4.3. 
245  BGE 112 V 205 E. 3b. 
246  BGE 112 V 205 E. 3b (obiter dictum). 
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because, in the first case, it was not unusual that cherry cake still contained stones, and, 
in the second case, that there was a bone splitter in the chicken. 
 
This paper argues that this comparison is flawed. A pellet in venison simply 
cannot be compared with a cherry stone in a home-made cherry cake made of cherries 
still containing stones. Such a cake obviously contains stones. Likewise it is obvious 
that a chicken contains bones. On the other hand, a pellet is a foreign object in a deer 
which is not the same as a bone in a chicken, nor a cherry stone in a home-made cherry 
cake made of cherries still containing stones. Therefore, the conclusion by analogy of 
the Swiss Supreme Court is questionable. This court decision has been commented on 
and criticized in Swiss literature, but not overruled yet.247   
 
The Piece of Shot in Venison case demonstrates the two issues of the primary 
definition of an accident in the Swiss context, namely the unusual factor in the 
definition of an accident and the disparity between workers and non-workers. 
 
It has been shown that the definition of an accident, and often the element of the 
unusual factor, is the criterion to differentiate accident compensation from sickness 
compensation. The Swiss Supreme Court has interpreted the unusual factor as “a 
disruption of the framework of the ordinary or usual in the respective area of life”248. 
This abstract formula opens the door to a very broad scope of interpretation of the facts 
and creates a legal uncertainty for the insured person, because one decision-maker 
might conclude that the unusual factor is ordinary or usual in the respective area of life 
and another might deny it under the same circumstances.  
 
As discussed in Part V B 1, for the insured person, it makes a huge difference, if 
he or she is covered under the Accident Insurance Act or Sickness Insurance Act. 249   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
247  Michael Ausfeld „Das Bundesgericht als ungewoehnlicher Faktor“ (2006) 6 plaedoyer 23-24. 
248  BGE 116 V 147. 
249  See also Part IX table 4. 
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2 Under New Zealand accident compensation 
 
If the ‘Piece of Shot in Vension’ case had happened in New Zealand, the insured 
person would have entitlements under the New Zealand accident compensation scheme. 
 
A claim for cover of an injury caused by an accident is successful, if it fulfils 
the requirements of three gateways. Unlike the Swiss scheme, before examining the 
definition of an accident, two other requirements must be fulfilled: 
 
First, it must be determined if there is a personal injury in terms of section 26(1) 
and (4) of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act (IPRC) 2001: 
 
26 Personal injury 
(1) Personal injury means 
(b) physical injuries suffered by a person, including, for example, a strain or a sprain; or 
(4) Personal injury does not include 
 (b) personal injury to teeth or dentures caused by the natural use of those teeth or dentures. 
 
In this case, section 26(1)(b) is fulfilled as Mr L broke a molar which is a 
physical injury suffered by a person. Furthermore, it is not natural use of the teeth to 
bite a pellet (section 26(4)(b)). 
 
Second, the requirements for cover under section 20 IPRC 2001 must be 
fulfilled: 
20  Cover for personal injury suffered in New Zealand (except mental injury caused by 
certain criminal acts or work-related mental injury) 
(1) A person has cover for a personal injury if: 
(a) he or she suffers the personal injury in New Zealand on or after 1 April 2002; and 
(b) the personal injury is any of the kinds of injuries described in section 26(1)(a) or (b) or 
 (c) the personal injury is described in any of the paragraphs in subsection (2). 
(2) Subsection (1)(c) applies to 
(a) personal injury caused by an accident to the person: 
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Mr L has cover for the incident because he suffered the personal injury in New 
Zealand after 1 April 2002 (section 20(1)(a) IPRC) and the break of a molar is a 
personal injury described in section 26(1)(b), (section 20(1)(b) IPRC) and the personal 
injury is described in 20(2)(a) IPRC 2001 because the break of a molar was caused by 
an accident. 
 
Finally, the definition of an accident described in section 25 IPRC must be 
fulfilled in order to accept a claim: 
 
 
25  Accident 
(1) Accident means any of the following kinds of occurrences: 
(a) a specific event or a series of events, other than a gradual process, that— 
(i)  involves the application of a force (including gravity), or 
resistance, external to the human body; or 
 
According to sec 25(1)(a)(i) an accident is a specific event or a series of events, 
other than a gradual process, that involves the application of a force (including gravity), 
or resistance, external to the human body. 
 
The element of the personal injury is not mentioned in section 25, but is defined 
in a separate section 26. Moreover, the accident compensation scheme requires a causal 
connection. This requirement is set out in section 20(2)(a) IPRC Act 2001 which states 
that the person has cover for a personal injury if it is caused by an accident to the 
person. 
 
In the case of the ‘Piece of Shot in Vension’ case, Mr L would be covered under 
the IPRC 2001, as biting the pellet was a specific occasion that involves the application 
of a force, the bite, external to the human body.  
 
Furthermore, the New Zealand accident compensation scheme is not restricted 
to cover for workers, it provides also cover for everybody in New Zealand, even 
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tourists.250 The disparity between workers and non workers plays a role regarding 
entitlements such as weekly compensation,251 because the latter will not be entitled to 
weekly compensation as a consequence of not having a salary. There are certain 
exceptions to this principle, such as an insured person in training,252 on parental 
leave253 who will be entitled to a minimum weekly compensation. 
 
3 Observations 
 
In a nutshell, the New Zealand accident compensation scheme, in contrast to 
Swiss accident insurance law, favours the insured person and especially non workers, 
because the definition of an accident does not require an unusual factor which is the gist 
of the definition in Swiss law nor does it necessarily require a sudden movement. The 
sudden movement is just optional as set out in section 25(1)(a)(ii) as a separate 
scenario. Moreover, involuntariness is not required. Even if Mr L intended to bite the 
pellet, he would still be covered. 
 
Furthermore, it provides cover for non-workers. However, the scheme does 
distinguish regarding cover between work-related and non work-related accidents 
insofar as personal injury caused by work-related gradual process, disease, or infection 
is covered (section 20(2)(e) IPRC 2001). 
 
 
C Conclusion 
 
The comparison of the two different definitions of an accident in the Swiss 
accident insurance scheme and the New Zealand accident compensation scheme has 
shown that the significant difference is the fact that the requirement of an unusual 
factor is unknown in the New Zealand scheme. However, it is exactly this element 
which has revealed itself as being the heart of the problem and decisive element in 
regard to cover in most of the cases in Swiss law.  
                                                 
250  IPRC Act 2001 section 20, exception in section 23. 
251  IPRC Act 2001, Schedule 1, part 2. 
252  IPRC Act 1002, Schedule 1, s 47. 
253  IPRC Act 2001, Schedule 1, s 44. 
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The Swiss definition of an accident has only been slightly changed254 since the 
first definition of Piccard255 over 90 years ago. Since then, both the primary definition 
of an accident and the secondary definition of an accident, which will be explained in 
the next chapter and which was developed by jurisprudence, have been enacted in 
legislation. Jurisprudence has developed several specific criteria for determining 
different categories of accidents, for example, for sport accidents, tooth damage, 
infections, and medical misadventure. The aim of these decision-making aids is to have 
specific criteria for specific areas of life in addition to the more general primary 
definition of an accident to judge the case in hand from an objective point of view, and 
to differentiate an accident from a sickness. The resultant case-law has led to some 
unsatisfactory results, and is not very coherent or consistent as has been shown above. 
 
Particularly, the element of the unusual factor I the primary definition of an 
accident has the purpose of excluding cover for day-to-day injuries.  In the light of 
sport activities, Parliament has intended that social insurance should not provide cover 
for sport accidents, if the injury is within the framework of the usual or intended. 
Basically, cover is affirmed when the sport activity takes another course than planned. 
However, if the risk inherent to the type of sport realizes itself, the definition of an 
accident is denied.256 Further, it is also denied if the exercise is not executed perfectly, 
even if the quality of execution is still within usual range.257 
 
It is not very comprehensible why an accident should be affirmed when the 
sport activity takes another course than planned (in an “unprogrammed way” according 
to the wording of jurisprudence) and why, in contrast to this, an accident should be 
denied when the exercise is not executed perfectly, but the quality of execution is still 
within the usual range. The sports person works basically towards an accident free 
execution. If this fails, the social accident insurance should cover the event irrespective 
from the quality of execution. It is not logical why an experienced gymnast should be 
entitled to cover when practising a cartwheel which was not executed with perfect 
quality258, whereas cover should be denied cover for cartwheel backwards outside of a 
                                                 
254  On 1st January 2004, the word „psychic“ has been added to the definition (BBl 2001 3205). 
255  Piccard, above n 118, 15. 
256  BGE of 1 February 2005 (U 313/2004), E. 2.2. 
257  RKUV 2004 n° U 502 E. 4.4. p. 185. 
258  RKUV 1992 n° U 156 p. 258-260. 
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sporting context.259 In a recent “backwards cartwheel case”260, the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court has again denied cover considering the circumstances of the case.  
 
The criterion of requiring those who seek cover to have incurred their accidental 
injury while acting in an “unprogrammed” way is not very convincing because the 
accident is logically the result of an exercise which takes an “unprogrammed”, in other 
words, unexpected course. An accident is always unprogrammed and unexpected.  In 
addition, the criterion requiring that an injury be unintended examines whether the 
claimant had planned the injury or, in other words, self-inflicted the injury. In requiring 
that the external event influenced the natural sequence of the body movement in an 
“unprogrammed” way under the criteria of the unusual factor, the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court confuses the unusual factor with the unintended injury.  
 
In addition to that, it is not convincing to make a distinction between trained and 
untrained sportspeople. As it has been demonstrated above, the external factor is 
unusual if a trained gymnast practises a cartwheel which results in an injury, however, 
not, if an untrained gymnast does the same. It is suggested that cover should be 
affirmed in both scenarios. A reduction of benefits might be considered, at a later stage, 
as a second test, for cases, where sportspersons take risks which do not correspond with 
their ability to practise the exercise.  
 
In a nutshell, the unusual factor and its fine-tuned specifications developed by 
jurisprudence, such as “unprogrammed way”, have revealed themselves as very 
complicated, inconsistent, arbitrary and not suitable as the criteria for delimitation 
between an accident and a sickness. The purpose of the Swiss accident insurance 
scheme is to provide cover for accidents. The unusual factor and above all the 
requirements developed by case law is setting the threshold for cover so high that only 
a specific category of accidents, in other words, the accidents which fulfill these 
requirements, will be affirmed. This is clearly undermining the purpose of the Swiss 
accident insurance scheme. 
 
                                                 
259  RKUV 1993 n° U 165 p. 58-60.  
260  BGE of 7 October 2003 (U 322/02). 
 88
D The Secondary Definition of an Accident in Swiss Law (Article 9 UVV) 
 
1  Theoretical and historical underpinning of the definition 
 
  As has been shown above, the Swiss accident insurance scheme sets a strict 
threshold for cover by requiring an unusual factor in the primary definition of an 
accident in article 4 ATSG. This requirement is very unsatisfactory and hard to fulfil, 
especially for sport injuries.  
 
From a legal point of view, the event is not considered an accident, where 
someone tears a muscle because she or he was not warmed up enough before doing 
sports, because there is no unusual factor, nothing “unprogrammed” has happened. Nor, 
from a medical point of view, is this condition considered a sickness. In case-law and 
literature,261 examples can be found of cover being denied for injuries such as 
dislocated shoulders or sprained ankles, muscle rupture, fractures or meniscus injuries.  
   
  As a consequence of this difficulty, an exception developed in the practice of 
accident insurance law which relieved claimants of the requirement to show the unusual 
factor for common injuries, which are often sport injuries. This practice of the Swiss 
Accident Insurance Company (Suva) was eventually enacted in legislation in 1984 by 
the introduction of Article 9(2) Regulation on Accident Insurance (UVV)262 as an 
exception to the primary definition of an accident of Article 4 ATSG.  As this part will 
show, this secondary definition of an accident was intended to alleviate problems that 
arose from the primary definition of an accident.  However, the development and the 
application of this secondary definition has given rise to the same difficulties of 
arbitrariness and inconsistency as have been found with the primary definition of an 
accident.  These difficulties provide further evidence that the Swiss accident insurance 
scheme has moved away from its underlying purposes as set out in Part II. 
 
 
 
                                                 
261  Gertrud Bollier Leitfaden schweizerische Sozialversicherung (8ed, Stutz, Waedenswil 2003), 309. 
262  Regulation on Accident Insurance (UVV) of 20 December 1982 (SR 832.202). 
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Article 9 UVV  Injuries similar to an accident (Unfallaehnliche Koerperschaedigungen) 
(2) The following, exclusively mentioned physical injuries are, if they are not clearly caused by 
sickness or degeneration, even if they occur without an unusual external factor considered to 
be an accident: [emphasis added] 
 a. broken bones; 
 b. dislocations of joints;  
 c. torn knee cartilages;  
 d. torn muscles;  
 e. strained muscles;  
 f. torn tendons; 
 g. ligament lesions; 
 h. eardrum injuries. 
 
 
2  Elements of the secondary definition 
 
(a) Physical injury or mental injury 
 
 In contrast to the primary definition of an accident in Article 4 ATSG, only 
physical injuries, but not mental injuries, are covered under Article 9 UVV. 
Furthermore, cover is only provided for the mentioned injuries in litera a – h. In 
addition to this, the injury must not be due to sickness nor caused by degeneration.263 
This list is exhaustive and cannot be extended by analogy to other similar conditions.264 
Only the Federal Council is competent to extend this list.  There is also no discretion 
for extension of this list by court.265 The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has held that 
this Article must be qualified as an exceptional provision and it must be interpreted in 
the sense and scope of the Act.266  
   
  Broken bones (Article 9(2)(a) UVV) are not covered, if they are exclusively 
caused by a sickness. Medicine distinguishes between stress and pathological fractures. 
Stress fractures are gradually caused by stress over a long period. Therefore, this 
condition lacks suddenness and, thus, cover is denied under the secondary definition of 
an accident (UVV). However, they might be covered under the category of an 
occupational disease (Article 9 UVG). Pathological fractures, resulting from a sickness, 
                                                 
263  Locher, above n 21, 116. 
264  BGE 114 V 303 E. 3e. 
265  Locher, above n 21, 116; Alfred Bühler „Die unfallaehnliche Koerperschaedigung“ (1996) 40 SZS 
97. 
266  BGE 114 V 303 E. 3e; Part II. 
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must be examined for causation. As we have seen before, cover is only affirmed if the 
fracture is not exclusively the consequence of a sickness. Thus, if an insured person 
suffers a bone fracture while, for example, playing soccer, and the cause is due to bone 
neoplasm, the event will not be covered, even if all the elements of the definition are 
fulfilled. On the other hand, cover will be granted for a fracture caused by a sudden 
external impact, even if the insured person had osteoporosis as a pre-existent condition. 
Tendon and ligament fractures are also interpreted as bone fracture. On the contrary, a 
broken tooth is not been considered as a broken bone.267 
   
  Dislocation of joints (article 9(2)(b) UVV) are not simply distortions, but the 
bones connecting the joints must be horizontally dislocated. Distortions might be 
considered under ligament lesions (litera g).268 
   
  Torn knee cartilages (litera c) are part of bodily harm with an injury character 
for which the Suva already had provided cover before the legal implementation (article 
9 UVV) under the condition that there was no pre-existent degeneration 
(meniscopathy). In most of the cases, this injury consists of an internal body trauma 
such as an uncontrolled rotation with bent knee joint or straightening up after a squat. 
Those internal body traumata fulfil the elements of a sudden and external and damaging 
impact.269 
   
  Torn muscles (litera d) and strained muscles (litera e) are very frequent sport 
injuries. A (partial) torn muscle injury is frequently caused without external impact by 
problems of physical coordination, incorrect application of force, cramp, bad training or 
by inadequate warming up. In those circumstances, the primary definition of an 
accident (ATSG) is not fulfilled, but the secondary definition of an accident (UVV) 
might very often be met. 
 
  Torn tendons (litera f), for example, the achilles tendon, could be the result of 
overstress of sport activities, sickness, degenerative change or excessive abrasion. If a 
sudden, external event meets the elements of the secondary definition of an accident 
                                                 
267  Bühler, above n 265, 99-100.  
268  Bühler, above n 265, 101-102. 
269  Bühler, above n 265, 102-103. 
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(UVV), cover is provided. On the other hand, the Suva has denied cover for a torn 
rotator cuff because, after the age of 40 years, degenerative abnormalities are visible in 
everybody and, therefore, the primary definition of an accident (ATSG) was said to 
apply and an unusual factor was required.   
 
Common sports which result in degenerative modifications are tennis, golf, swimming, 
shot-put and archery.270 Furthermore, tendosynovitis is not considered as falling into 
the category of torn tendons for the purposes of Article 9 (UVV). However, a claimant 
might be covered under the provision of occupational disease.271 
 
  Ligament lesions (litera g) comprise ligament ruptures and ligament strains. 
Bursitis (tennis elbow) is regularly the result of a long period of overstress or repeated 
exertion, and, therefore, not caused by a singular (sudden) event similar to an accident. 
However, it might be covered under the provision of occupational disease. 
 
  Eardrum injuries (litera h) are either eardrum ruptures or perforations. These 
injuries are common as a result of explosions or in water sports.272 
 
(b) Causation, suddenness and involuntariness 
 
 Article 9 UVV injuries require similar to article 4 ATSG injuries a natural and 
adequate causal connection between the event and the injury.273 The injury similar to an 
accident in the meaning of article 9(2) UVV must have been caused by a sudden, 
involuntary, external impact to the human body. Causal requirements are therefore 
exactly the same as in the primary definition of an accident (ATSG).274  
 
The element of suddenness is the same as in the primary definition of an 
accident of Article 4 ATSG. The external factor must affect the human body suddenly, 
in other words, within seconds (e.g. impact, fall) or minutes.275  
                                                 
270  BGE of 29 August 2000 (U 441/99). 
271  Bühler, above n 265, 104-106. 
272  Bühler, above n 265, 108. 
273  Bühler, above n 265, 92-97. 
274  See chapter C 1 (b). 
275  Koller, above 166, 207. 
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Every day, discrete, harmful and external impacts, in other words, gradual 
abrasions, are excluded from cover as they are qualified as sickness.276 In the words of 
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court “repeated microtrauma caused by everyday life” are 
excluded.277 For example, a rupture of the achilles tendon caused exclusively by 
repetitive stress in everyday life which results in a gradual abrasion, and finally needs 
to be medically treated is not considered as a article 9 UVV injury.278 
 
As with the definition of an accident under article 4 ATSG, article 9 UVV 
injuries must have happened involuntarily. When someone voluntarily damages him- or 
herself, cover is basically denied. A special regime has been stated for risks (article 39 
UVG). 
 
As can be seen above there is difference in most of the elements required to find 
an accident pursuant to the secondary definition of accident (Article 9 UVV).  The main 
difference in the requirement for the external factor is set out below. 
 
 
(c) External force 
 
 Like in the primary definition of an accident (ATSG), most often the external 
force is mechanical. However, in regard to Article 9 UVV injuries, and, in particular, an 
eardrum injury (Article 9(2)(h) UVV), the damaging impact may be caused by sonic 
waves or water.279 The damaging external factor can be day-to-day, common and 
discrete. The impact can also consist in a body’s own movement, such as acute 
movement of several parts of the body, for example, kicking into the air while playing 
soccer280 or standing up after crouching.281 
 
 
                                                 
276  Ueli Kieser „Begriff des Unfalls, unfallaehnliche Koerperschaedigungen, Art. 6 UVG, Art.  9 UVV“ 
(1997) 8 AJP 1042. 
277  BGE of 19 February 1997 (U 124/96). 
278  Bühler, above n 265, 88. 
279  Bühler, above n 265, 87. 
280  RKUV 1990 n° U 112, p. 375 E. 3. 
281  BGE 116 V 148 E. 2c. 
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 The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has fine-tuned the requirements for this 
element in a recent case. 282  In this case, an insured person tore her knee when she got 
out of bed. The first physician diagnosed a pinched medial meniscus. The diagnosis of 
a specialist found a meniscus bucket handle lesion.283  
 
 
The Court held in that case that “the activity causing pain has to be done in the 
framework of a general increased situation of danger” [Emphasis added].284 As a 
consequence of this case, increased potential of damage is required, caused by a general 
increased situation of danger or uncontrollability of a usual and day-to-day action.285 
Therefore, on the facts of that case, because the sequence of movements was executed 
in the usual framework and was usual and common, there was no increased potential of 
an injury and there is no external factor present for the purposes of the secondary 
definition of accident (UVV).  Cover was denied under that Act, and also under the 
primary definition of accident (Article 4 ATSG). 
 
 
3 Practical implications of the external factor requirement of Article 9 UVV, 
 especially for sport injuries 
 
  Neither Articles 4 ATSG nor 9 UVV mention sport accidents as a special case. 
In practice, Article 9 UVV injuries are the most relevant in regard to sport injuries. The 
mentioned physical injuries in litera a-h are very often the result of sport activities. In 
addition to that, it was intended by the Federal Council to provide cover for certain 
common physical injuries without requiring an unusual factor. 
 
Despite this intention to alleviate the “unusual factor” requirements for sports 
injuries by the enactment of Article 9 UVV, cases have shown that the secondary 
definition of accident is just as problematic in application, due to the requirement for 
claimants to now show that “the activity causing pain has to be done in the framework 
                                                 
282  BGE 129 V 466. 
283  BGE 129 V 466.  
284  BGE 129 V 466 E. 4.2.2. 
285  BGE 129 V 466 E. 4.3. 
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of a general increased situation of danger” [Emphasis added].286  Cover was affirmed 
in the following cases regarding sport activities: 
 
- Jumping over a branch while walking.287 The claimant jumped over a 
branch while walking and suffered from a meniscus rupture. The pain 
has not been caused by an everyday activity such as walking or climbing 
steps. Jumping over a branch on an uneven ground has an external 
element. As a consequence, the Court found an increased potential of 
damage has been added to the usual and day-to-day action “walking” 
which caused the uncontrollability of the movement.  
 
- Achilles tendon rupture while changing to a sprint movement in volley 
ball.288 During the “Serve-and-Volley-game” the player immediately 
advanced after the service to the net to hit a return. The Court affirmed 
an increased potential of damage for this sequence of movements 
because numerous uncommon movements, such as jumping, 
straightening, turning, running, and bending, impact on the whole body, 
namely, stress the heel in different manners. This potential of danger 
was in this case and caused the Achilles tendon rupture. 
 
- Inner ligament knee injury while skiing with carving skis.289 A skiing 
instructor suffered from an inner ligament knee injury in executing a 
turn. The Court stated that even for a skiing instructor dynamic, driving 
with carving skis is not a usual day-to-day action and must be 
interpreted as representing an increased potential of danger. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
286  BGE 129 V 466 E. 4.2.2. 
287  BGE of 19 November 2007 (U 8C_228/2007). 
288  BGE of 21 November 2006 (U 398/06). 
289  BGE of 27 October 2005 (U223/05). 
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On the other hand cover was denied under Article 9 UVV injury in the 
following cases regarding sport activities:  
 
- Exercising with a band on the floor while sitting.290 The claimant 
strained her inner knee ligament by sitting on the floor and practising 
thigh exercises with a band when she suddenly experienced a pain in the 
knee. Cover was denied due to the lack of an external factor, in that 
there was no increased potential of danger. 
 
- Knee injury while jogging downhill.291 In this case the Court said that 
normal jogging was not a general increased situation of danger. There 
was no external element in the regular movements while jogging. The 
activity misses out on sudden and uncontrollable movements. 
 
These cases have in common, that the claimant has been injured by a mishap of 
some kind. However, not every mishap that results in an injury fulfils the external 
factor for the purposes of the secondary definition of accident (Article 9 UVV). These 
cases have shown that it is now crucial to have an increased potential of damage added 
to the usual and day-to-day action which caused the uncontrollability of the movement. 
For example, jumping over a branch had been added to the day-to-day action “walking” 
in a case where cover was affirmed.292 On the contrary, such an increased potential of 
damage was denied for exercising with a band while sitting on a floor293 and normal 
jogging.294 It is submitted here that it seems very difficult to draw the line between this 
additional requirement for a day-to-day action, and there is a huge discretion while 
interpreting the circumstances of the case. In the case of the knee injury caused by 
exercising with a band, the facts could have interpreted in the sense that the day-to-day 
action comprises sitting and moving the thighs. The increased potential of added 
damage consists here in exercising with a rubber band. Thus, it is submitted, that 
exercising with a rubber band is not a day-to-day action, but a normal sport activity 
where injuries can occur. Consequently, it is advocated that this requirement, of an 
                                                 
290  BGE of 7 November 2007 (U 8C_74/2007). 
291  BGE of 23 October 2008 (U 8C_118/2008). 
292  BGE of 19 November 2007 (U 8C_228/2007). 
293  BGE of 7 November 2007 (U 8C_74/2007). 
294  BGE of 23 October 2008 (U 8C_118/2008). 
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increased potential of damage developed by jurisprudence, has not proven itself as 
helpful or equitable in practice because the discretion of interpreting is arbitrarily too 
broad to lead to fair and consistent decisions in similar cases.  While Article 9 UVV 
was enacted to alleviate the requirement of the unusual factor in the primary definition 
of accident under Article 4 (ATSG), it has merely imposed a similar type of threshold 
for claimants to meet. Further, it is important, in the light of the scope of the accident 
compensation scheme, not to split hairs, but rather decide on the basis of the medical 
report, if the suffered injury is the consequence of an accident or sickness. 
The following case study will illustrate the problems of the primary (Article 4 
ATSG) and secondary (Article 9 UVV) definitions of accident. 
 
 
E  Case Study (‘Lunge while Playing Tennis) 
 
1 Swiss accident insurance  
  
 In this chapter, the main issues deriving from this two-fold definition of an 
accident will be illustrated and the differences between the two definitions presented, 
by the “lunge while playing tennis” case ruled by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in 
2006295. Afterwards, the same case will be presented and the legal solution according to 
New Zealand law will be given in order to reveal the differences and inconsistencies in 
both accident compensation schemes. 
 
The “Lunge While Playing Tennis” case.296 
Ms S suffered from a rupture of the meniscus while she was playing tennis in 
September 2003. She ran to the net in order to return a short ball of her opponent when 
she misstepped. The accident insurance declined cover for this event. Ms S brought the 
case before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court after her claim had been declined by the 
lower courts. 
                                                 
295  BGE of 21 December 2005 (U 368/05). 
296  BGE of 18 October 2005 (U 367/04). 
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The legal question was if Ms S was entitled to cover from the Swiss accident 
insurance scheme for this event. More specifically, does the incident fulfil all the 
elements of the primary definition of an accident (Article 4 ATSG) or all the elements 
of secondary definition of accident under Article 9 UVV? 
First, the court examined if the elements of an accident (Article 4 ATSG) were 
fulfilled. 
 
The gist of the matter in the case is, as in most cases regarding the definition of 
an accident, the unusual factor. The external factor must be unusual, in other words, 
according to the constant formula of the Swiss Supreme Court, “a disruption of the 
framework of the ordinary or usual in the respective area of life”.297 The unusualness 
refers to the factor itself and not to its effect on the human body.  
 
This formula has been fine-tuned for uncoordinated movements. According to a 
constant jurisdiction, the unusualness is affirmed for uncoordinated movements, when 
the normal sequence of movements is disturbed or interrupted by something 
unprogrammed such as slipping, stumbling or avoiding of a fall.298 
 
The Swiss Supreme Court denied the unusual factor in this case with the 
argument that it was not proven that the claimant made an uncoordinated movement 
which disturbed her normal sequence of movements by something unprogrammed such 
as slipping, stumbling or avoiding a fall. Especially, the Court held that there is no 
evidence with predominant probability that she stumbled over the white centre line. 
 Therefore, the definition of an accident was denied because the requirement of 
an unusual factor was not fulfilled.299 
 
Second, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court examined if the requirements for 
cover of the secondary definition of an accident under Article 9 UVV were present.  
 
                                                 
297  BGE 116 V 147; BGE 121 V 38 E. 1a. 
298  RKUV 2000 n° U 368 p. 100 E. 2d. 
299  BGE of 21 December 2005 (U 368/05) E. 3.1. 
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According to this alleviated definition of an accident, cover is provided, where 
all the elements of the definition of an accident (Article 4 ATSG) are fulfilled, except 
the unusual factor, and the injury must be one of the injuries mentioned in litera a - h.  
  
The claimant suffered a rupture of the meniscus when she played tennis. A 
meniscus rupture is one of the mentioned injuries (article 9(2)(c) UVV).  
 
The gist of the problem in this case was the external factor. Most external force 
is mechanical. However, the impact can also consist in a body’s own movement, such 
as acute movement of several parts of the body, for example, kicking into the air while 
playing soccer300 or standing up after crouching.301 The Court looked to whether an 
increased potential of damage could be detected, caused by a general increased 
situation of danger or by uncontrollability of a usual and day-to-day action.302 The 
court was convinced with predominant probability that the claimant must have done a 
lunge in the direction of the coming ball when she attempted to return a short ball 
played by her opponent. This sudden and acute movement was stressful for the knee 
and characteristic of playing tennis. The stressing movement is even more intensive, 
when playing on tennis on sand and sliding in it. When such a lunge turns into a 
misstep, the required increased potential of damage is present. As a consequence, the 
external factor of the damaging impact while moving the body was fulfilled and the 
definition of an article 9 UVV injury was affirmed by the Court.303  
 
It has been shown in this case that the Swiss jurisdiction regarding the definition 
of an accident (article 4 ATSG) and the definition of an article 9 UVV injury is very 
intricate, fine-tuned and complicated. As a point of comparison, it would be instructive 
to see how the same case would have been treated under New Zealand accident 
compensation law. 
 
 
 
                                                 
300  RKUV 1990 n° U 112, p. 375 E. 3. 
301  BGE 116 V 148 E. 2c. 
302  BGE 129 V 466 E. 4.3. 
303  BGE of 21 December 2005 (U 368/05) E. 3.1. 
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2 New Zealand accident compensation 
 
The “Lunge While Playing Tennis” case will now be examined under the New 
Zealand accident compensation legislation. There is no equivalent secondary definition 
of an accident in the New Zealand context, because New Zealand accident 
compensation knows only one definition of an accident. Therefore, the case is to be 
examined under the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act (IPRC) 
2001 Section 25 (definition of an accident). 
 
First, the meniscus rupture was caused by an accident (section 20(2)(a). It is 
also a personal injury under section 26, because the meniscus rupture is a physical 
injury.  
 
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the case that the injury may have been 
caused by a gradual process (s 25(1)).  
 
Next, the question arises if this event (i) involves the application of a force 
(including gravity), or resistance, external to the human body; or (ii) involves the 
sudden movement of the body to avoid a force (including gravity), or resistance, 
external to the body, or (iii) involves a twisting movement of the body. This case can be 
compared to Hodgson v ARCIC304 which affirmed an application of force or resistance 
external to the human body concerning a “heel strike” while a claimant was running 
and experienced pain when his foot struck the ground. The court considered that the 
“heel strike” was caused by an impact, and the action of running did involve force to 
the heel which resulted in the injury.  
 
In our case, the tennis player lunged in the direction of the coming ball when 
she attempted to return a short ball played by her opponent. This sudden and acute 
movement resulted in a misstep and caused the meniscus rupture. In application by 
analogy of Hodgson v ARCIC305 the “knee strike” must be interpreted as an action 
                                                 
304  Hodgson v ARCIC (31 March 2000) DC WN 53/00, Middleton J.  
305  Hodgson v ARCIC (31 March 2000) DC WN 53/00, Middleton J. 
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which involved force to the knee which resulted in the injury. Therefore, the external 
factor must be affirmed.  
 
As a conclusion, the definition of an accident under section 25 IPRC Act 2001 
is affirmed and the claimant is entitled to cover under this Act. 
 
 
3 Observations 
 
It has been shown that the “Lunge While Playing Tennis” case would be 
covered under both accident compensation schemes. However, this case has allowed 
me to demonstrate that the Swiss accident compensation scheme is much more strict 
and complicated in determining when an accident can be said to have occurred. The 
event did not fulfil the element of the unusual factor in the primary definition of an 
accident (article 4 ATSG). It is in such cases, where the unusualness is denied, that the 
definition of article 9 UVV injuries comes into operation. On the one hand, this 
provision does not require an unusual factor, but, on the other hand, the physical injury 
must be one of the stated injuries in the provision which sets the bar again higher for 
cover. In our case, cover must be affirmed under Swiss law, because meniscus rupture 
is one of the mentioned injuries (article 9(2)(c) UVV).  
 
 
F  Conclusion 
 
 In the Swiss accident insurance scheme, the introduction of secondary definition 
accident under Article 9 UVV injuries was an attempt to alleviate the strict requirement 
of the unusual factor in the primary definition of an accident (ATSG) for specific 
injuries which are most common caused by sport injuries. This certainly has brought 
alleviation for the insured person and for commonly injuries such as broken bones, 
dislocations of joints, torn knee cartilages, torn muscles, strained muscles, torn tendons, 
ligament lesions and eardrum injuries. However, it has been shown by presenting “The 
Lunge While Playing Tennis Case” that, even if the crucial point of the unusual factor 
is not required, jurisprudence has, instead, raised the benchmark higher for the element 
of the external factor, by requiring an increased potential of danger added to the usual 
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and day-to-day action.306 This new development of jurisprudence is working against the 
will of the Federal Council and the purpose to lighten the burden of proof for the 
insured person and to shift the difficult distinction between an accident and sickness in 
favour of the insured person.307 
  
From a broader point of view, this system of a primary (article 4 ATSG) and 
secondary definition of an accident (article 9 UVV injuries) and the requirements of its 
intricate jurisprudence compromises the underlying purpose of providing cover and 
compensation for an accident in order to restore work incapacity as satisfactorily as 
possible. By narrowing the requirements for cover and denying insurance, the insured 
person has no access to entitlements such as rehabilitation and the restoration of work 
capacity may be more difficult and takes more time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
306  BGE 129 V 466. 
307  Bühler, above n 265, 84. 
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VI EVIDENCE 
 
The required standard of evidence developed by jurisprudence in Swiss law is a 
further issue of how the scheme has drifted away from the underlying purpose of 
providing cover and compensation for an accident in order to restore work capacity. 
Especially the maxim of the declarations of the first hour imposes an unjustified burden 
upon the claimant in the Swiss accident insurance scheme, which is completely 
unknown in the New Zealand accident insurance scheme. According to this maxim, the 
spontaneous declarations of the first hour after an accident by the claimant are supposed 
to be more unbiased and reliable than later descriptions, which might be, consciously or 
unconsciously, influenced by insurance law or other considerations. On the other hand, 
those early declarations might not necessarily be the most truthful because very often it 
is very difficult to assess the precise sequence of events of an accident and its cause. 
Furthermore, the injured person’s capacity to give accurate information might well be 
compromised by his or her state of health, such as physical and mental pain, 
immediately after the accident. In addition, declarations might not be correctly logged 
due to various reasons, for example, in cases where the insurance does not ask the 
injured person the relevant questions at all. 
 
It is submitted that the standard of evidence required can be too high in Swiss 
law, in a case where the claimant has no means of proof other than his or her own 
description of an accident, because there are no witnesses and the accident insurer must 
assess cover only on the basis of that description. In such a case, the benchmark on the 
claimant’s credibility to decide whether the accident has happened with predominant 
probability should not be too high. 
 
A          Standard of Proof 
 
1        Swiss accident insurance  
 
In Swiss social security law, the standard of proof of the predominant 
probability basically applies. This standard of proof lies between the possibility or 
hypothesis and the strict acceptance of the fact that can be proven. The probability of 
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circumstances is predominant, if no concrete objections oppose the appropriate 
conviction of the judge in this case. If deciding between two or several possibilities, the 
circumstances qualified as the most truthful are predominantly probable.308 In other 
words, it is necessary to follow the description of the circumstances that the social 
security insurer judges as the most probable of all possible sequence of events309. 
 
The principle of the standard of proof of the predominant probability is a social 
security-legal characteristic, which applies in the same way, whether it concerns the 
proof of an accident, a natural causal link between cause and effect or work 
incapacity.310 Therefore, the proof of an accident is achieved, if an event, that fulfils all 
elements of the definition of an accident (article 4 ATSG), appears probable. The court 
must be convinced of the correctness of a certain description of the circumstances. 
Which measure of doubt the probability of proof has, is difficult to quantify (for 
example in per cent); it depends on the possibilities of proof given in the individual 
case and the existing evidence.311 In accordance with Bühler, larger doubts are 
permitted, when it could have also happened differently in reality and the less evidence 
is available in the individual case, despite the requirements of the investigation 
principle of appropriate clarification of circumstances. However, the doubts of the 
accident insurer may not be so significant that he judges a happening other, than the 
one submitted by the insured person, just as probable.312 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
308  Ueli Kieser Das Verwaltungsverfahren in der Sozialversicherung (Schulthess, Zürich, 1999) 104; 
Locher, above n 21, 451; Kieser, above n 153, 436; BGE 111 V 374, E. 2b; Koller, above 166, 262; 
Jean-Louis Duc Les assurances sociales en Suisse, survol de l'assurance-maladie, de l'assurance-
accidents, de l'AVS, de l'assurance-invalidité, du régime des prestations complémentaires à l'AVS/AI 
ainsi que de la prévoyance professionnelle vieillesse, survivants et invalidité, avec un aperçu de 
l'assurance-chômage (IRAL, Lausanne, 1995) 1336. 
309  Locher, above n 21, 451; Ulrich Meyer-Blaser “Die Beweisführung im Sozialversicherungsrecht“ in 
Nicht objektivierbare Gesundheitsbeeinträchtigungen: Ein Grundproblem des öffentlichen und 
privaten Versicherungsrechts sowie des Haftpflichtrecht, Freiburger Sozialrechtstage 2006 
(Staempfli, Bern, 2006) 219; BGE 126 V 360 E. 5b. 
310  Locher, above n 21, 452; BGE 120 V 37 E. 3c; Koller, above 166, 262. 
311  Koller, above 166, 263. 
312  Koller, above 166, 263. 
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This paper argues that it is exactly characteristic of accidents that they occur 
suddenly, within a few seconds and often without witnesses. Even in a case, where 
witnesses are present, they mostly cannot give details about the sequence of the events 
of an accident, since they were potentially not concentrating on the happening of the 
accident in the first place, but on their own activity. 
 
The following example will illustrate this. When a skier falls, the persons in the 
proximity can seldom state whether the skier has fallen due to a bump, an icy surface, 
the crossing over of the skis or a loss of equilibrium as a consequence of tiredness. It is 
also mostly very difficult to determine the exact place of the fall, due to the long 
braking distance of several meters. In addition, the probative value of the declarations 
of the first hour has to be evaluated with great caution. 
 
This paper submits that the requirements of the proof of circumstances for 
accidents should not be too strict for this reason. Exactly the same extreme caution is 
required, when the claimant’s version of the circumstances would be questioned by the 
insurer, because he or she has small possibility to prove an accident. While judging 
whether the description of the accident given by the insured person can be doubted, all 
the circumstances of the individual case must be considered, like the description of the 
circumstances, the severity of the injuries, the existing witnesses and their credibility, 
the time interval between the accident and its logging and the reliability of the insured 
person. 
 
 
2        New Zealand accident compensation 
 
The IPRC Act 2001 does not contain a section about the standard of proof. 
Neither does the Woodhouse report contain any commentary about the standard of 
proof in accident compensation.313  
 
It can be distilled from the cases that the standard of proof is on the balance of 
probabilities by applying common sense. This standard requires that the judge finds 
                                                 
313  Woodhouse Report, above n 1.  
 105
that a particular event occurred, based on the evidence on hand, is more likely to have 
occurred than not. If he or she comes to the conclusion with cogent reasons that the 
occurrence of an event is extremely improbable, the finding that it is nevertheless more 
likely to have occurred than not is not in accordance with common sense. This is 
particularly applicable when it is up to the judge to determine that the evidence leaves 
him in doubt whether the event has occurred or not.314 
 
Whereas jurisdiction has never required a more severe standard of proof than 
the balance of probabilities, this issue has been discussed in the literature. Ison referring 
to Sutcliffe is of the opinion that ‘something more akin to “beyond reasonable doubt” 
seems to be the required standard of proof for some of the cases examined’. He 
suggests the formula that any doubtful questions of fact should be decided according to 
the balance of probabilities. In other words, where any facts are doubtful, the claims 
officer must seek to determine the best available hypothesis. 315 
 
 
3        Observations 
 
In both New Zealand and Swiss law, the standard of proof cannot be found in 
legislation, but has been developed by jurisprudence. On the one hand, further 
development and interpretation of legislation by jurisprudence is in both jurisdictions 
part of the political system. However, there is also the danger of drifting away from the 
underlying purpose of the legislator of the accident compensation scheme. 
 
Whereas in New Zealand law, the required standard of proof is the balance of 
probabilities, in Swiss law, the standard of proof of the predominant probability applies. 
It is interesting to note that both systems do not require a strict evidence of the facts. 
However, the Swiss standard of proof, the degree of probabilities, is more strict than the 
New Zealand one. In other words, a Swiss claimant will have to establish that his or her 
description of the circumstances of an accident is more predominantly probable than 
                                                 
314  Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds [1985] 2 All ER 712, 718. 
315  Ison, 94-95. 
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other possible descriptions. If deciding between two or more possibilities, the 
circumstances qualified as the most truthful are the most predominantly probable.316 
 
In New Zealand law, a description of an accident has to be more probable than 
another, in other words, 51 percent are required for the legal test on the balance of 
probabilities.317 
 
In New Zealand literature, the formula was suggested, that where any facts are 
doubtful, the claims officer must seek to determine the best available hypothesis. This 
formula is indeed very close to the required standard of evidence in Swiss law. Whereas 
the New Zealand claims officer looks for the best available hypothesis, the Swiss 
decision-maker relies on the circumstances that appear the most truthful.  
 
As a conclusion, both New Zealand and Swiss law do not require that the 
claimant has to strictly prove his or her case. The standard of proof is milder in the 
social insurance system than in tort law. The decision-maker has to investigate the case 
but the insured person has to assist in the assessment of evidence.318 
 
 
B          Burdens of Allegation and Proof of the Insured Person 
 
1        Swiss accident insurance  
 
The burden of proof rule319 implies that the party who requires the entitlements 
based on the facts, has the burden of proof to show these facts320. Due to the 
investigation principle in Swiss social security law where the judge will investigate the 
case, the parties do not have a burden of proof. However, the parties carry the burden of 
proof insofar as, if the degree of proof of the predominant probability is not reached, 
the Court must decide against that party, who wanted to derive rights from these 
                                                 
316  Locher, above n 21, 451; Kieser, above n 153, 436; BGE 111 V 374, E. 2b; Koller, above 166, 262; 
Duc, above 308, 1336. 
317  Dunn v ACC (27 November 2003) DC WN 307/03, Hole J.  
318  IPRC Act 2001, s 56(2); Art. 43 ATSG. 
319  Article 8 Civil Code (ZGB). 
320  Koller, above 166, 258. 
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circumstances. Therefore, where an accident is not proven, the insured person cannot 
claim entitlements.321 
An example is the very recent case of an insured person who damaged a tooth, 
when he was eating a plaited loaf and bit on a hard object. The Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court held that, in a case of lack of evidence, the burden of proof is upon the claimant. 
In this case, the insured person had swallowed the hard object which caused the teeth 
damage. Thus, it was not possible to assess whether this particular object is an unusual 
factor.322 
 
It is not necessary that the insured person gives proof of all legally relevant 
elements of the definition of an accident. Rather it is sufficient that he or she makes the 
course of the event of an accident credible. He or she cannot be content, however, to 
claim a personal injury which is possibly the result of any accident. It is, rather, 
necessary that in regard to the concrete accident, true, exact information, and if 
possible, detail about the happening of an accident is submitted in order that the insurer 
is able to make a decision on this grounding.323 The insured person does not have to 
furnish thereby a strict proof for all temporal and local circumstances.324  
 
However, when the insured person does not want nor cannot submit the 
description of an accident, he or she does have, to that extent, a burden to submit and 
give proof of the circumstances of the accident insofar as the accident insurance cannot 
be expected to undertake more investigations and clarifications.325 An accident without 
witnesses should not be considered as unproven. However, the statements of the 
insured person must appear credible and agree with the existing indications about the 
accident.326 This paper argues that if the accident insurer did not ask for details of the 
accident in time and, as a consequence, they are not in the file, the absence of these data 
may not lead to the insured person carrying the consequences of the lack of evidence. 
For example, in case of a water sports accident, a claim must not be denied for the only 
                                                 
321  BGE 121 V 204 E. 6a p. 208; BGE 116 V 136 E. 4b p. 140; Kieser, above 153, 438; Locher, above n 
21, 451. 
322  BGE of 3 June 2008 (9C_196_2008). 
323  Koller, above 166, 259. 
324  SUVA annual report 1972 n° 3b p 15. 
325 Erwin Murer and Hans-Ulrich Stauffer (eds) Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichts zum 
Sozialversicherungsrecht, Bundesgesetz über die Unfallversicherung (3 ed, Schulthess, Zürich, 
2003) 20; Koller, above 166, 259. 
326  SUVA annual report 1986 n° 1 p 1. 
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reason that the insured person has not informed the insurer about rough sea, if the 
insurer has not asked about it.327 
 
In recent cases328 the Swiss Federal Court holds that the accident insurer has an 
obligation to clarify the circumstances of an accident on the basis of the investigation 
principle. This is the counterpart of the obligation of the insured person to assist in the 
establishment of cover and entitlements. Due to interaction of the two obligations the 
insured person has to indicate all those circumstances, which are important, to the 
accident insurer for the evaluation of the case. If the data provided by the insured 
person are insufficient or unclear for the assessment of entitlements, the accident 
insurance has the obligation to inquire and clarify the ambiguities. It is not necessary, 
however, after these investigations to request the insured person for further 
substantiating of the events. These cases have alleviated the burden of proof to a certain 
extent for the insured person. 
 
This paper underlines that caution is required, if the insured person is unable to 
make a statement about the circumstances of the accident. In such a case, the accident 
insurer is obligated to employ additional clarifications and investigations. Such a case 
occurs if the insured person is incapable, for a medical reason, such as memory loss or 
a severe injury, during a long period, to provide details of the sequence of events. A 
severe road accident may be most likely to result in such a case. A reconstruction of the 
accident is possible in severe cases due to the existing traces and police records, so that 
the sequence of events can be sufficiently reconstructed. However, police records are 
not usually available in major sport accidents, as, for example, mountain-, ski- and 
diving accidents. In such cases reconstructions can be problematic. Thus, insurance has 
to rely on the insured person’s and witness’s description. 
 
Apart from the medical issues sports accidents often occur without witnesses 
and without any recorded documents. An accident is frequently not noticed at all in the 
heat of the match and the fast sequence of the events. Therefore, strict requirements on 
the burden of submitting evidence and the burden of proof cannot be required in regard 
                                                 
327  Jürg Senn “Das „Schleudertrauma“ der Halswirbelsäule – Bemerkungen zum Stand der Diskussion, 
1. Teil“ (1996) 40 SZS 326. 
328  BGE of 15 June 2007 (U 71/07), E. 4.2. 
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to the unusual factor of the movement, if the suffered injury is, in the medical sense, of 
typically traumatic genesis. Furthermore, a plausible and non-contradictory description 
of the accident must be sufficient, if it appears as exactly as possible and gives cause to 
no serious doubts, particularly in accidents, where, for lack of witnesses, only the 
declarations of the claimant are available. The medical findings should be qualified as 
indications, which either confirm the description of the circumstances of the insured 
person or arouse doubts about its correctness.329 
 
 
2        New Zealand accident compensation  
 
The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001 does not 
contain any clauses about the burden of allegation or proof.  
 
However, ACC must make every decision on a claim on reasonable grounds, 
and in a timely manner, having regard to the requirements of this Act, the nature of the 
decision, and all the circumstances (s 54 IPRC). ACC has an obligation to investigate 
fairly before making a decision.330 In decision ACC v Ambros [2007] NZCA 304, the 
Court of Appeal names the ‘essentially inquisitorial’ role of ACC to investigate all 
aspects of the claim including causation before matters reach the courts. On the other 
hand, the claimant has an obligation to assist in establishment of cover and entitlements 
(s 55 IPRC), to give a medical certificate (a), give any relevant information (b), 
authorise ACC to obtain medical and other records that are or may be relevant to the 
claim 9(c), undergo a medical assessment (d) or undergo any other assessment at 
ACC’s expense (e). Principally, the claimant cannot refuse to undergo an assessment if 
she or he is claiming an entitlement.331 
 
Basically, the onus of proof is upon the claimant. He or she has to establish on 
the balance of probability that an accident has happened, as well as to prove 
                                                 
329  RKUV 2003 n° U 485 p. 259 E. 5; Murer, above n 326, 21. 
330  Rowe v ARCIC (31 March 1999) DC Huntly 82/99, Beattie J; Patangata v ACC (28 April 2006) DC 
WN 104/06, Ongley J.  
331  Beadle v ARCIC (4 May 1999) DC WN 113/99, Middleton J.  
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causation.332 The onus has to be borne by the person for a proposition or fact which is 
not self-evident.333 On the contrary, s145 (2) reverses the burden of proof and places it 
on ACC when the review concerns a revised decision by ACC under s 65. 
 
It is very interesting to note from a Swiss point of view, that in the first place, 
the burden of proof does not play such an important role in New Zealand law. Viscount 
Dunedin said that the first step is to hear, consider and weigh all the evidence as a 
whole. It is only where the court comes to the conclusion that the evidence pro and con 
is so evenly balanced, that the onus of proof is crucial. Then, as a second step, the onus 
will decide the case. However, the onus will not be considered where the evidence on 
hand allows the court to come to a determinate conclusion.334 
 
3        Observations 
 
In both New Zealand and Swiss law, the burdens of allegation and proof 
basically lie upon the claimant. However, the accident insurance has an obligation to 
investigate all aspects of the claim. The counterpart of the ‘inquisitorial’ role of both 
accident insurances is the obligation to assist in establishment of cover and entitlements 
of the insured person.  
 
This paper finds that, in practice, the gist of the issue is to what extent the 
insurance has the obligation to inquire and clarify ambiguities by employing additional 
clarifications and investigations. As a complement to this obligation, the question is 
how far the injured person has to substantiate the accident from his or her own impulses 
without being asked by the insurance company.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
332  Raimona v ACC (19 December 2001) HC AK M820-IM01, Harrison J; ACC v Ambros [2007] 
NZCA 304. 
333  Robins v National Trust Co [1927] AC 515 Viscount Dunedin, 520. 
334  Robins v National Trust Co [1927] AC 515 Viscount Dunedin, 520. 
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C          Assessment of Evidence  
 
1        Swiss accident insurance  
 
In Swiss social security law, the principle of judicial freedom in weighing 
evidence applies in the non-contentious and contentious procedures (article 61(c) in 
fine ATSG). This means that the court and the accident insurance company assess the 
evidence freely, comprehensively and independently without being bound by formal 
proof rules. The sole determinant is whether the available documents objectively permit 
a reliable evaluation of the contentious legal claim. The amount of the evidence is not 
crucial, but rather whether it is convincing. So, for example, the number of witnesses is 
not relevant, but their reliability, the certainty and the clarity of their statements are.335 
Thus, only if it is convinced due to the existing evidence will the court accept 
circumstances as predominantly probable, after its conscientious examination of the 
facts.336 
 
The court and accident insurer have to state the reasons for the results of the 
assessment of evidence on the basis of the constitutional right to be heard (article 29(2) 
BV). It is to be indicated by the entire assessment of the entire evidence given, why one 
and not other descriptions of the circumstances have been assessed as truthful and 
relevant.337 
 
This paper argues that while assessing evidence of an accident in particular, the 
following elements are to be considered338: 
 
-  Time of and reason for the accident notification as well as the time interval 
between event and notification: Was the notification lodged by the insured 
person or supported by references of the treating physician or other third 
persons? 
                                                 
335  BGE 122 V 157, 160 E. 1c; Koller, above 166, 260, 264; Kieser, above 153, 436; Locher, above n 
21, 451. 
336  BGE 115 V 133 E. 8b. 
337  Koller, above 166, with reference to RKUV 1991 n° U 133, 312 E. 1b.  
338  Koller, above 166, 265. 
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-  Do the events described in the accident notification correspond with the medical 
data given to the first treating physician? 
-   Crucial meaning is attached to the first description of the accident. The 
description is more credible when it is without contradictions and appears true-
to-life and was made by the insured person in a condition able to judge and 
make statements. If a later description of the accident deviates from the first 
description in substantial points (time, place, manner of the unusual factor etc.), 
this is an invitation to the accident insurance to submit the accident described by 
the insured to a critical examination. However, the insurance company may not 
automatically conclude under any circumstances that the insured person’s 
declarations are not plausible. The reasons for the different accident descriptions 
have to be identified on the basis of the maxim of investigation. Human 
memory fades relatively rapidly over the course of time. As a consequence, this 
is the reason that minor contradictions, which are contained in accident 
descriptions months or years after the accident, cannot have a fundamental 
meaning.  
 
2        New Zealand accident compensation 
 
The claims process is described in s 48 – 59 of the IPRC Act 2001. According 
to the IPRC Act 2001, s 56(2), the ACC must investigate the claim at its own expense 
to the extent reasonably necessary to enable it to make its decision or obtain additional 
information. The IPRC does not contain a clause regarding the assessment of evidence 
nor the onus of proof. The claimant has to assist in the establishment of cover and 
entitlements (s 55). Once the evidence is assessed, the ACC makes a decision on the 
cover and entitlements and gives notice of the decision and informs the claimant about 
the review rights (s 59 – 66). 
 
Regarding evidence at appeal, Section 156 states that the court may hear any 
evidence that it thinks fit, whether or not the evidence would be otherwise admissible in 
a court of law. From the cases the principle can be distilled that the judge is not always 
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bound to make a finding based on the facts submitted by the parties.339 The judge must 
consider all the evidence, medical and non medical, together with any temporal 
considerations.340 
 
The decision is made on the truthfulness of the evidence given by the parties. 
Where the truthfulness of a witness is directly challenged, he or she must be questioned 
about the issues.341 
 
3        Observations 
 
 In Swiss law, the principle of judicial freedom in weighing evidence applies. 
The amount of the evidence is not crucial, but rather whether it is convincing.  In New 
Zealand law, the decision is made on the truthfulness of the evidence given by the 
parties.  Both jurisdictions state, that where the truthfulness of evidence is challenged, 
the issues must be investigated. 
 
 
D          Maxim of Evidence of the Declarations of the First Hour 
 
In this chapter, it will be shown that the maxim of evidence of the declarations 
of the first hour developed by case law is an instrument to narrow the requirements for 
cover which undermines the purpose of the accident insurance scheme in Switzerland. 
 
1        Swiss accident insurance  
 
The court makes a decision on the basis of the description of facts that is 
assessed as the most truthful of all the probable versions of the description of the facts. 
If the insured person gives a contradictory description of the circumstances of the 
accident, the maxim of the declaration of the first hour, developed from the 
jurisprudence, should be applied. The spontaneous declarations of the first hour should 
normally be more unbiased and reliable than later descriptions, which are, consciously 
                                                 
339  Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds [1985] 2 All ER 712, 718. 
340  Beattie, above 154, para 53. 
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or unconsciously, influenced to insurance law or other considerations. When the 
insured person changes his or her description of the facts over time, in this case, the 
declaration made shortly after the accident should be given more weight than the 
declaration after a negative decision by the accident insurer. 342 
 
This maxim of proof is not a formal rule of proof excluded by the principle of 
free consideration of evidence, regarding the probative force of declarations made by 
parties. However, it is a standard won out of experience that should be considered 
within the scope of consideration of evidence.343 
 
This paper argues that the declarations of the first hour are not necessarily the 
most truthful and accurate for various reasons as it will be shown. Also in literature, 
certain authors disagree that the practice that principally the declarations of the first 
hour should have more weight.344  
 
In Bühler’s view this maxim is a standard won out of life experience and should 
not be applied where the declaration is the first written account of the circumstances of 
the accident and occurs a long period after the incident, because the human capacity for 
remembering the details of an incident is limited. In such a situation a description of the 
accident, to an insurer or physician, for the first time, given only after months, should 
not be qualified as more credible in the first place than later descriptions. This maxim 
of proof should only be applied in the case where other means of obtaining evidence 
would not bring more results. In Swiss law, the principle of investigation, the right to 
be heard (article 29 (2) BV) and the right to a fair trial (article 6(1) EMRK) are violated 
where relevant and suitable investigation of the facts is omitted and entitlements are 
refused, based on the maxim of proof of the declarations of the first hour. In such a 
case, there is an illegally anticipated assessment of evidence on hand. 345 
 
 
                                                 
342  BGE 121 V 45 S. 47 E. 2a; Duc, above 308, 1335. 
343  Koller, above 166, 267. 
344  Locher, above n 21, 451; Kieser, above 153, 437. 
345  Koller, above 166, 267-268; confirmed in BGer of 21 August 2001 (U 26/00) E. 1b. 
 115
Pantli/Kieser/Pribnow346 summarise the critique in the literature as follows:  
 
First, it is only a maxim of proof and not a strict rule of proof.347 Contradictions 
can thus be the consequence of inability of the insured person and could be avoided by 
questioning the person.348 In the case of contradictory declarations, it has to be 
examined, which one is to be accepted as true.349 Furthermore, the declarations of the 
first hour may be problematic, because they are often incomplete and do not contain the 
necessary detail.350 
 
Especially, in case of clinical symptoms that are difficult to objectify it may 
happen, that the relevant questions that are required to later assess the accident 
insurance’s entitlements are not asked immediately after the accident. It may be very 
problematic to rely only on the declarations of the first hour, because these declarations, 
made to the police at the scene of the accident, in the emergency unit of a hospital, or to 
an inexperienced GP, very often do not contain the necessary detail.    
 
Next, the insured person’s memory may be fragmentary as a consequence of 
variations in consciousness (for example due to confusion, shock, painkillers) or wrong 
perception. This should and must not lead to ‚lack of evidence’. If the jurisdiction bases 
the judgments in such a case on the fragmentary declarations of the first hours, it leads 
to obviously random results.351 
 
Pantli/Kieser/Pribnow352 come to the following conclusions after a detailed 
study in linguistic and legal regard:  
 
From a linguistic view they mark that, by putting the declarations into written 
form, the declarations are removed from the communication situation and become 
independent, practically uncontrollable texts. The nonparaverbal and paraverbal levels 
                                                 
346  Anna-Katharina Pantli, Ueli Kieser and Volker Pribnow “Die „Aussage der ersten Stunde“ im 
Schadenausgleichsrecht – und die Mangelhaftigkeit ihrer Auszeichnung“ (2000) 10 AJP 1196. 
347  Locher, above n 21, 451. 
348  Maurer, above n 125, 263. 
349  Kieser, above n 153, 456. 
350  Senn, above n 327, 325-26. 
351  Pantli, above n 346, 1196-97; Senn, above n 327, 325-26. 
352  Pantli, above n 346, 1195-97. 
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of communication are not logged. So for example gesturing and miming, additions, 
corrections as well as sentence breakups are not visible in the minutes. Often minutes 
do not contain the original wording and sometimes not even the original language (for 
example High-German instead of Swiss German), but are written in linguistically more 
beautiful sounding sentences. If questions asked to the insured person are not logged, it 
cannot be examined whether the circumstances were completely clarified. For this 
reason not only the answers should be logged completely in the original wording, but 
also the questions and auxiliary questions.353 
 
From a legal and in particular social security-legal view, the priority of the 
declarations of the first hour has a true core, but they may, however, be used only with 
reservation. The accident insurer must be aware that the first declarations may be 
without foundation or imprecise, because the insured person was in an abnormal 
physical or mental condition. Declarations of the first hour may be rated only as 
priority, if they were logged as true and complete. In addition, the questions must also 
have been logged. The investigation principle requires that the relevant circumstances 
are clarified so far as evidence is available, until possible contradictions are eliminated. 
In a case of lack of evidence, it should be examined carefully who caused this lack and 
why. It is to be noted that a lack of evidence can also result from the fact that the 
accident insurer or the physician of the insured person did not ask the relevant 
questions at all. Due to the principle of judicial freedom in weighing evidence, the 
declarations of the first hour should not necessarily be given a special weight.354 
 
According to recent cases of the Swiss Federal Court, the maxim of the 
declarations of the first hour is an admissible maxim of evidence as a decision making 
aid, which can be considered in the context of the principle of judicial freedom in 
weighing evidence. It is only applicable if no new findings are expected from additional 
proof measures.355 
 
                                                 
353  Pantli, above n 346, 1202-3. 
354  Pantli, above n 346, 1203. 
355  BGE of 15 June 2007 (U 71/07), E. 4.1; BGE of 18 July 2001 (U 430/00), E. 3b (Italian); BGE of 21 
August 2001 (U 26/00), E. 1b. 
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On the basis of this recent jurisdiction, this paper argues that the declarations of 
the first hour should be important only as a decision making aid.356 The accident insurer 
always has to examine, under consideration of all circumstances, whether the 
declarations of the first hour are predominantly probable. 
 
2        New Zealand accident compensation 
 
In New Zealand accident compensation law, the maxim of evidence of the 
declarations of the first hour does not exist. The decision-maker has to investigate the 
lodged claim and make a decision applying the standard of proof of the balance of 
probabilities.357 Statements made shortly after the accident are not given more weight 
and are not necessarily considered more credible in New Zealand law than those made 
at a later time. 
 
3        Observations 
 
In Swiss law, the declarations of the first hour are presumed to be more truthful 
than later descriptions of an accident. This maxim has been discussed in Swiss 
literature, because there can be circumstances why these declarations may not be 
reliable, for example, the physical and mental condition of the claimant. However, the 
maxim has been accepted in jurisdiction and literature as at least a decision-making aid, 
but not as a formal role of proof. 
 
In New Zealand law, the maxim of the declarations of the first hour does not 
exist. However, the New Zealand decision-maker might consider applying the Swiss 
maxim as a decision-making aid, in case of doubt; that is when there is not enough 
evidence available, and if these declarations appear reliable.  
 
In Swiss law, the maxim of evidence of the declarations of the first hour is still 
of major importance in practice, which will be shown in the “backwards cartwheel 
case” as an example of the issue. 
                                                 
356  BGE of 15 June 2007 (U 71/07), E. 4.1. 
357  IPRC Act 2001, s 56(2); Ison, 94. 
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E Case Study (“Backwards Cartwheel Case358”) 
 
In March 2001, Ms Z practised a cartwheel backwards in a compulsory 
gymnastic class. In her accident notification she wrote that she had “to execute a 
cartwheel backwards which resulted in an injury in the neck and shoulder.” A medical 
report stated Ms Z suffered from a “sudden neck pain”. In a complementary accident 
form of April 2001, she declared three weeks later, that she had sensed a “strong pain in 
her left shoulder after cartwheeling backwards”. She denied whether something special 
(such as falling or hitting) had occurred. After the insurance company had declined 
cover in June 2001, she described the sequence of the event in more detail in July 2001. 
Hereby, she declared that she had slipped while moving backwards and had landed 
awkwardly, where she had hit her shoulder while attempting to avoid the fall. When the 
insurance company asked her why she had previously denied that something special 
(such as falling or hitting) had happened, she declared that “slipping” was not 
mentioned in the form. Furthermore, she emphasised the sequence of cartwheeling 
backwards consists of a movements which are very difficult to describe.359  
 
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court denied cover for the incident, because, 
neither the primary definition of an accident (article 4 ATSG), nor the secondary 
definition of an accident (article 9(2) UVV) were fulfilled on the grounds of the 
submitted facts. The Court said that the complementary description of the accident in 
more detail was not “really contradictory” to the earlier description. However, it stands 
out that the insured person had earlier denied whether something special had occurred.  
On the basis of this version of the facts, the court concluded that there was no unusual 
factor, nor a mentioned injury under article 9(2) UVV.360 
 
This example demonstrates that it depends decisively on the precise wording of 
the insured person’s description on the initial accident notification form whether cover 
is granted. Furthermore, the court decided the case on the grounds of the first 
description of the accident and refused to consider the complementary description after 
cover had been denied by applying the maxim of the declarations of the first hour. 
                                                 
358  BGE of 7 October 2003 (U 322/02). 
359  BGE of 7 October 2003 (U 322/02) E. 3.1. 
360  BGE of 7 October 2003 (U 322/02) E. 4. 
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In New Zealand, a judge would examine on the balance of probabilities if the 
evidence given was convincing and credible on a common-sense basis.  While close 
attention is always paid to the statements made by claimants on their ACC45 (initial 
claim forms) there is no evidence rule or necessary presumption such as the maxim of 
the declarations of the first hour. 
 
This paper argues that it is arbitrary to dismiss any later description of an 
accident. On the one hand, the claimant might not have given enough details of the 
sequence of movements. She might have thought that a brief description is sufficient or 
was not able to remember the exact circumstances, due to various reasons such as 
physical pain or long period between the accident and its notification. On the other 
hand, the possibility that the insured person had intentionally added elements to the 
description of an accident in order to claim cover for the accident cannot be excluded.  
 
This paper submits that the whole circumstances of the case must be considered 
and credibility of evidence assessed against this background. In Swiss law, the maxim 
of evidence of the declarations of the first hour should not be given predominant 
importance when assessing evidence. In addition, the principles and underlying purpose 
of the accident compensation scheme intended by the legislature must not be 
compromised by narrowing the requirements for cover by jurisprudence. The maxim of 
evidence of the declarations of the first hour as applied by accident insurance 
companies and courts today imposes an unjustified burden upon the claimant in the 
Swiss scheme, which is unknown in the New Zealand scheme. 
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VII  CONCLUSION 
 
The paper has compared the current issues in New Zealand’s and Swiss accident 
compensation scheme on a thematic basis in order to find suggestions for improvement 
for the limitations of both schemes. The thesis has been elaborated that in both 
countries the underlying scope of the schemes has been undermined, but for different 
reasons. Both schemes are grounded on the same underlying purposes of the prevention 
of accidents, rehabilitation of the injured person and compensation for loss of income in 
order to restore the person to health and gainful employment.  
 
First, it has been found that the stability of any accident compensation scheme 
depends on the underlying political system. The Swiss political system and legislation 
process is quite rigid, which leads to more continuity of the social security scheme, but 
also means less flexibility to remedy efficiently detected limitations. The New Zealand 
political system allows more space to even completely rewrite the accident 
compensation scheme, but this creates arbitrariness for injured persons suffering 
different accidents through the application of different schemes.  
 
Secondly, the paper has held that both schemes are grounded in an arbitrary 
dichotomy between incapacity caused by accidental injury and that caused by sickness, 
which was a politically pragmatic decision based on costs and state-of-the-art of 
science at the time the schemes were set up. However, the needs of the affected person 
are similar in both cases and financial support is crucial in order to cover medical 
expenses and restoring the person’s work capacity. Acknowledging the current reality 
of the economic situation, the issue still needs to be addressed, and further research is 
necessary to determine whether a merger of both schemes would really result in surplus 
costs. It is advocated that the additional costs in order to achieve equal treatment of 
entitlements for accident and sickness might, to a large extent, be compensated by a 
faster return to work capacity by the person incapacitated by sickness. 
 
Thirdly, this paper has found that the system of a primary (article 4 ATSG) and 
secondary definition of an accident (article 9 UVV injuries) has not alleviated the issue 
of the requirement of the “unusual factor” in the Swiss accident insurance scheme. This 
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requirement holds that the external factor in the definition of an accident (article 4 
ATSG) must be unusual. Jurisprudence has defined this term as a “disruption of the 
framework of the ordinary or usual in the respective area of life”.361 This notion has led 
to incoherent jurisprudence, especially for sport injuries, which leads to arbitrary results 
due to the difficulty of interpreting the overly broad notion of “unusual factor”. 
 
Fourthly, there is a need for improvement in the Swiss accident insurance 
scheme regarding the maxim of declarations of first hour. Notwithstanding the fact that 
those declarations might seem more unbiased, at the same time they might also be 
inaccurate because of the physical and mental stress shortly after the accident. 
Consequently, more weight should be given to the medical assessment and overall 
circumstances as in the New Zealand scheme. 
 
To sum up, both accident compensations schemes have advantages and 
limitations, with more research needed to improve the limitations in a cost-effective 
manner. Despite the current global economic situation, the underlying purpose of both 
schemes, to continue to provide social security, cover for medical expenses, benefits 
and restoration of work capacity should not be compromised. Any shortcuts of the 
schemes might mirror back by increasing the need for social welfare. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
361  BGE 116 V 147. 
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IX APPENDIX: OVERVIEW OVER THE SWISS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 
 
Table 1  The Three pillar system to cover the social risk of retirement, death and disability362 
 
The Swiss Social Security consists of three pillars to cover for the contingencies of retirement, death and disability. It is a combination of 
federal company-sponsored and individual retirement plans.  
The first pillar (Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung, AHV) is the federal retirement fund providing cover for the elderly and 
bereaved such as widows, widowers and orphans. The pension of the first pillar should cover a minimum living wage. The 
Invalidenversicherung (IV) is the second insurance within the first pillar providing cover for disability. These two insurances are funded by 8.4% 
of salaries for the AHV (4.2% from the employer and 4.2% from the employee) and 1.4% for the IV (0.7% from the employer and 0.7% from 
the employee). Self-employed people pay 7.8% contributions into the AHV and 1.4% into IV. Those not engaged in paid employment have to 
contribute between Swiss francs (CHF) 353 and 8,400 towards AHV, and CHF 59 – 1400 per year towards IV, depending on circumstances. 
Additionally, public authorities participate in financing the AHV (Confederation: 16.36% of annual insurance expenditure; Cantons: 3.64% of 
annual insurance expenditure; Value added tax (VAT): 13.33% of total annual revenue of the VAT; a certain % of tax revenue on gambling 
clubs). The IV is complemented by public authorities to the value of 50% of the annual insurance expenditure, 75% of this sum from the 
Confederation and 25%  from the Cantons. 
The 2nd pillar is the company-sponsored pension plan (Berufliche Vorsorge, BV). It is financed equally by employer and employees to a 
percentage of the salary (7-15%) providing benefits for retirement, disability and death. The 2nd pillar is compulsory for all workers earning 
more than approximately CHF 2000 per month. Together with the first pillar, it is supposed to guarantee the continuation of the insured’s living 
                                                 
362  MP Group Switzerland AG, www.mb-group.ch (accessed 28 March 2008). 
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standard after retirement or to provide 80% of the income. There is no participation by public authorities, but there are federal regulations for the 
provident institutions and safety fund.363 
The 3rd pillar is the private retirement plan in the form of either (fixed) bank accounts or insurance. The contributions are determined by 
the insured person. However, they are deductible from taxable income up to CHF 6,192 per year for workers and to a maximum of CHF 30,960 
per year for self-employed. 
 
 Social risk Title and 
abbreviation of the 
act 
What is it? Who is insured? Benefits How is it funded? 
1st 
pillar 
Old age Gesetz ueber die 
Alters- und 
Hinterlassenen-
versicherung (AHVG) 
State old age 
and life 
insurance 
Everyone living or working in 
Switzerland; Swiss living 
abroad working for the 
Confederation or Swiss 
institutions. 
Old age pension, pension for 
widows/widowers and 
orphans. Pension is 
minimum 13,260 per year 
and to a maximum of 26,520 
per year.  
Widow/er pensions to a 
maximum of 80
%, orphans pension 40% or 
80% for full orphans 
8.4% of the salary for the 
AHV (4.2% from the 
employer and 4.2% from 
the employee). Self-
employed person pay 7.8% 
contributions. Those not 
engaged in paid 
employment have to 
contribute between CHF 
353 and 8’400.- towards 
AHV depending on 
circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
363  Overview of Swiss social security, Bern 2006: www.bsv.admin.ch/publications (accessed 28 March 2008). 
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1st 
pillar 
Disability Gesetz ueber die 
Invalidenversicherung 
(IVG) 
State 
disability 
insurance 
Everyone living or working in 
Switzerland; Swiss living 
abroad working for the 
Confederation or Swiss 
institutions. 
Pension in case of disability. 
Disability pensions are 
depending on the degree of 
disability:  
40% → 25% pension,  
50% → 50% pension,  
60% → 75% pension,  
from 70% → 100% pension 
1.4% for the IV (paid by 
0.7% by the employer and 
0.7% by the employee). 
Self-employed pay 1.4% 
into IV. Those not engaged 
in paid employment have to 
contribute between CHF 59 
– 1400 per year towards IV 
depending on social 
conditions (like contributing 
husband or wife). 
1st 
pillar 
Supplementary 
benefits 
Gesetz ueber die 
Ergaenzungsleistungen 
(ELG) 
State 
supplementary 
benefits to the 
1st pillar 
People entitled to pensions of 
the 1st pillar whose basic 
needs are not covered 
Means tested supplementary 
benefits to meet basic needs 
Non-contributory, financed 
by Confederation, Cantons 
and local bodies 
2d 
pillar 
Old age 
Accident 
Disability 
death 
Gesetz ueber die 
Berufliche Vorsorge 
(BVG) 
Compulsory 
Company 
Pension Fund 
Employed persons with an 
annual salary of over CHF 
19,890. 
Old age, disability, accident 
and death benefits 
Percentage of the salary; 
normally paid half by 
employer and half by 
employee (approx. 7-15%, 
depending on the various 
factors) 
 → The first pillar should cover the existence minimum. 1st and 2d pillar should allow the retired person to have 80% of the previous income while he or she was 
working 
3d 
pillar 
Old age 
Death 
disability 
Private retirement 
plans 
Private 
savings and 
pension in 
form of life 
insurance or 
bank account 
Employed and self-employed 
persons on a optional basis 
Voluntary sums are paid out 
of a bank account  or 
insurance at retirement 
By private people, in case 
of tax privileged savings on 
bank accounts or life 
insurance (in form of 
premium) 
 → The 3d pillar consists of the private savings of a person that may top up income after retirement from the 1st and 2d pillar. 
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Table 2 The additional branches of social security in Switzerland364 
 
 
Apart from this three pillar system, the Social Security Scheme has additional branches to cover the contingencies of sickness, 
unemployment, military service, maternity and child-rearing - and accident. 
 
Social risk Title and abbreviation of 
the act 
What is it? Who is insured? Benefits How is it funded? 
Accident 
Disability 
Death 
Occupational 
disease 
Unfallversicherungsgesetz 
(UVG) 
Accident 
insurance 
Employed and self-
employed,  those on 
unemployed benefits 
Medical costs and income replacement (maximum 
CHF 126,000 per year, 80 % of salary), disability 
pensions depending on degree of disability, 
widow/er and orphan’s pension 
Percentage of the 
salary 
 Berufsunfall (UVG) Compulsory 
accident 
insurance for 
work-related 
accidents 
Employed and self-
employed,  those on 
unemployed benefits 
Medical costs and income replacement (maximum 
CHF 126,000 per year, 80 % of salary), disability 
pensions depending on degree of disability, 
widow/er and orphan’s pension 
Percentage of the 
salary, depending 
on type of work, 
paid by employer 
(approx. 0.1%) 
 Nichtberufsunfall (UVG) Accident 
insurance for 
non-work-related 
accidents; 
compulsory for 
employees, who 
work more than 
8 hours a week 
 
 
Employed and self-
employed,  those on 
unemployed benefits 
Medical costs and income replacement (maximum 
CHF 126,000 per year, 80 % of salary), disability 
pensions depending on degree of disability, 
widow/er and orphan’s pension 
Percentage of the 
salary, depending 
on type of work, 
paid by employee 
(approx. 1-2%) 
                                                 
364  Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO), Overview of Swiss Social Security, www. bsv.admin.ch; Swiss social insurance system; Sojourn in Switzerland and departure, 
Information for foreign nationals, publisher; Federal Office for Migration (FOM), in cooperation with the Federal Social Insurance Office (FISO), the Federal 
Commission for Foreigners (FCF). www.bbl.admin.ch/bundespublikationen, Bern 2005. 
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Sickness Krankenversicherungsgesetz 
(KVG) 
Sickness 
insurance and 
optional daily 
allowance 
All persons living in 
Switzerland, but 
may freely choose 
their insurer. 
Medical and pharmaceutical care insurance, 
hospital treatment, minimum franchise per year 
CHF 300, maximum franchise per year 2,500, share 
of 10% of costs exceeding the franchise up to CHF 
700 for adults and CHF 350 for children, 
contribution to the cost of board and 
accommodation in the case of hospital stays CHF 
10 per day 
Monthly premium 
paid by insured 
person, individual 
subsidies of 
premium by canton 
if conditions apply 
(premium with 
franchise of CHF 
2,500 costs 
currently between 
CHF 150 and 180 
per month) 
Unemployment Gesetz ueber die 
Arbeitslosenversicherung 
(ALVG) 
Unemployment 
insurance 
Employees Unemployment benefits like daily allowance, 
reduced work allowance, bad weather allowance, 
allowance in case of insolvency of the employer, 
financial benefits for active labour market 
programs. 
2% of salary, paid 
equally by 
employer and by 
employee 
Child-rearing Gesetz ueber die 
Familienzulagen (FZG) and 
cantonal legislation 
 
 
 
 
Family 
allowances, 
partial 
compensation for 
family expenses 
Special allowances 
for farmers 
Employees and self-
employed 
Children allowances vary between CHF 154 and 
344 per month according to canton, principally paid 
until child is 16 years old (except apprentices and 
students until 25 years) 
Public authorities 
(confederation, 
cantons and 
communities) 
Military service  
 
Maternity 
Gesetz ueber den 
Erwerbsersatz (EOG) 
Salary 
replacement 
during military 
service, 
maternity 
compensation 
Person serving in the 
Swiss army or in the 
Red Cross, persons 
carrying out a 
civilian service or 
civil defense service 
Payment per day during military service;  
 
14-week 80% income compensation for gainfully 
employed women (max. CHF 172 per day) 
0.3% of salary, 
paid by employer 
and 0.3% by 
employee 
Accident while 
serving in the 
Swiss army, Red 
Cross or civil 
defense service 
Gesetz ueber die 
Militaerversicherung 
(MVG) 
Income 
replacement 
insurance for 
accidents 
happening in the 
army 
Person serving in the 
Swiss army or in the 
Red Cross, persons 
carrying out a 
civilian service or 
civil defense service 
80% income replacement to a maximum of CHF 
137,545, medical expenses, disability pension 
by Confederation 
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Table 3  Overview of insurances for the contingency accident 
 
An insured person suffering from an accident will basically be entitled to claim benefits from the following (social) insurances. 
 
 Title and abbreviation of the 
act 
When? Who is insured? Benefits Coordination 
Social insurance Unfallversicherungsgesetz 
(UVG) 
In case of a work-related 
or non work-related 
accident 
Employed and self-
employed,  those on 
unemployed benefits 
Medical costs and 
income replacement 
(maximum CHF 126,000 
per year, 80 % of salary), 
disability pensions 
depending on degree of 
disability, widow/er and 
orphan’s pension 
Cover for work-related 
accidents and non work-
related accidents if 
weekly hours of work at 
least 8 hours 
The sum of income 
replacement based on 
UVG, IVG and BVG 
must not be higher than 
90% of the insured’s 
salary 
Social insurance Gesetz ueber die Berufliche 
Vorsorge (BVG) 
In case of a work-related 
or non work-related 
accident 
Employed persons with 
an annual salary of over 
CHF 19,890. 
Disability, accident and 
death benefits in form of 
pensions, compensation 
for loss of income 
 
Social insurance Gesetz ueber die 
Invalidenversicherung (IVG) 
If the accident results in a 
permanent disability 
Everyone living or 
working in Switzerland; 
Swiss living abroad 
working for the 
Confederation or Swiss 
Pension in case of 
disability depending on 
the degree of disability:  
40% → 25% pension,  
50% → 50% pension,  
60% → 75% pension,  
from 70% → 100% 
pension 
 
Private insurance Gesetz ueber den 
Versicherungsvertrag (VVG) 
If the insured person has 
taken out voluntary 
private insurance 
  In addition to social 
insurance 
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Table 4  Overview dichotomy in entitlements between employed and non-employed for the contingency accident 
 
Table 4.1. Basic overview 
 
  
UVG 
(social accident insurance) 
 
BVG 
(social pension plan) 
 
IVG 
(social disability insurance) 
 
KVG 
(social sickness 
insurance) 
 
VVG 
(private insurance) 
 
Employed 
 
     /  
 
Unemployed 
 
     /  
 
 
Table 4.2. Detailed table on the differences in entitlements 
 
 Title and abbreviation of the 
act 
When? Who is insured? Benefits for EMPLOYED 
PERSONS 
Benefits for NON-
EMPLOYED PERSONS 
Social insurance Unfallversicherungsgesetz 
(UVG) 
In case of a work-related 
or non work-related 
accident 
Employed and self-
employed,  those on 
unemployed benefits 
Medical costs and income 
replacement (maximum 
CHF 126,000 per year, 80 
% of salary), disability 
pensions depending on 
degree of disability, 
widow/er and orphan’s 
pension 
Cover for work-related 
accidents and non work-
related accidents if weekly 
hours of work at least 8 
hours 
None 
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Social insurance Gesetz ueber die Berufliche 
Vorsorge (BVG) 
In case of a work-related 
or non work-related 
accident 
Employed persons 
with an annual salary 
of over CHF 19,890. 
Disability, accident and 
death benefits in form of 
pensions, compensation for 
loss of income 
None 
Social insurance Gesetz ueber die 
Invalidenversicherung (IVG) 
If the accident results in a 
permanent disability 
Everyone living or 
working in 
Switzerland; Swiss 
living abroad 
working for the 
Confederation or 
Swiss 
Pension in case of disability 
depending on the degree of 
disability:  
40% → 25% pension,  
50% → 50% pension,  
60% → 75% pension,  
from 70% → 100% pension 
 
Pension in case of 
disability depending on 
the degree of disability:  
40% → 25% pension,  
50% → 50% pension,  
60% → 75% pension,  
from 70% → 100% 
pension 
 
Social insurance Gesetz ueber die 
Krankenversicherung (KVG) 
Only for non-employed 
persons in case of an 
accident 
Non-employed 
persons must take out 
a compulsory 
accident insurance 
None Medical and 
pharmaceutical care 
insurance, hospital 
treatment, minimum 
franchise per year CHF 
300, maximum franchise 
per year 2,500, share of 
10% of costs exceeding 
the franchise up to CHF 
700 for adults and CHF 
350 for children, 
contribution to the cost of 
board and accommodation 
in the case of hospital 
stays CHF 10 per day. 
No income replacement. 
Private insurance Gesetz ueber den 
Versicherungsvertrag (VVG) 
If the insured person has 
taken out voluntary 
private insurance 
 According to insurance 
policy 
According to insurance 
policy 
 
 
